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A phishing attack is one of the most common forms of cybercrime worldwide. In recent 
years, phishing attacks have continued to escalate in severity, frequency and impact. 
Globally, the attacks cause billions of dollars of losses each year. Cybercriminals use 
phishing for various illicit activities such as personal identity theft and fraud, and to 
perpetrate sophisticated corporate-level attacks against financial institutions, 
healthcare providers, government agencies and businesses. Several solutions using 
various methodologies have been proposed in the literature to counter web-phishing 
threats. This research work adopts a novel strategy to the detection and prevention of 
website phishing attacks, with a practical implementation through development 
towards a browser toolbar add-in. 
   A three-fold approach to the mitigation of phishing attacks is developed. Firstly, a 
total of 13,000 features and 10,000 images were collected from both phishing and 
legitimate websites to collate a database that was used in the current work. This 
database has been donated to the public domain to promote further work on phishing 
detection within the wider research community. Secondly, a hybrid feature selection 
approach is adopted. This approach combines the associated elements of images, 
frames and text of legitimate and non-legitimate websites which can then be 
collectively processed by an Artificial Intelligence scheme based on the adaptive 
neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS). Thirdly, an alternative novel approach is 
evaluated using two deep learning techniques, the Convoluted Neural Network (CNN) 
and the Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) variant as a combined classifier called the 
Intelligent Phishing Detection System (IPDS).  
   The IPDS is shown to be highly effective both in the detection of phishing attacks 
and in the identification of fake websites. Experimental results show that an offline 
approach using the ANFIS has a 98.3% accuracy with an average detection time of 30 
seconds, whilst the CNN+LSTM approach has a slightly lower accuracy with an 
average detection rate of 25 seconds. These times are within typical times for loading 
a web page which makes toolbar integration into a browser a practical option for 
website phishing detection in real time. The results of this research are compared with 
previous work and demonstrates both better or similar detection performance. This is 
the first work that considers how best to integrate images, text and frames in a hybrid 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
The Internet today has become an effective means of communication with many 
people using it to generate an online environment to manage offline commercial 
activities (Arachchilage and Love, 2014). However, even when used to set up a solely 
online business functionality, despite the benefit that the Internet offers there is also a 
negative aspect that requires that the user pay attention to issues such as identity theft, 
fraud, malware and phishing. Phishing is a form of social engineering attack in which 
an attacker, also known as a phisher, attempts to fraudulently retrieve sensitive user 
information by sending an email claiming to be a legitimately established organisation. 
They scam the user into giving confidential information that will be used for identity 
theft (Arachchilage, Love and Beznosov, 2016). A phisher uses various methods, 
including email, web pages, and malicious software, to steal personal information and 
account credentials (Purkait, 2012). The aim of the phishing website is to use users’ 
private information without their permission, and they do this by developing a new 
website that mimics a reliable website (Upadhyaya, 2012). Hence, phishing website 
detection has become the object of a great deal of consideration among many 
academics who are attempting to find ways to incorporate malicious detection devices 
into web servers as a safety precaution (Hu et al., 2016).  
     The trend of increasing technology usage is causing the threat of online identity 
theft to rise (Chang et al., 2013). Also, as individual users primarily use the Internet, it 
has become crucial that organisations have a presence online. These circumstances 
have made the security of commercial transactions on the Internet less safe (Yang, Lin 
and Chen, 2018). As mentioned above, phishing is among the threats that affect web 
activities, where an attacker mimics the website of an official establishment by 
gathering the personal data of online users (Imani and Montazer, 2017). Phishing is a 
complicated problem to tackle as it differs from other types of security threat such as 




of enterprise systems architecture (Moradpoor, Clavie and Buchanan, 2017). Users on 
the network are the weakest link that phisher targets and the type of users that the 
phisher decides to attack depend on the users’ activities and the attacker’s aim in terms 
of social engineering.  
     Despite there being several ways to carry out phishing attacks, current phishing 
detection techniques unfortunately only cover some attack vectors such as fake 
website and emails (Daeef et al., 2016). Moreover, phishing has become more 
sophisticated, and such attacks can now bypass the filters that have been put in place 
by anti-phishing techniques (Hong, 2012). Some detection techniques have been 
proposed, but most of them only deal with spoof web pages (Tan et al., 2016). 
However, it is quite challenging in detection due to the evading techniques that the 
phisher uses.  
     This chapter reviews the relevant research background which is used to identify the 
appropriate  purpose and scope of this study. Research questions, aims and objectives 
are subsequently presented, along with a sentence on contribution to knowledge. The 
chapter concludes with an overview of the thesis structure. 
1.1 Background  
Web spoofing is the act of luring the user of the Internet to interact with a fake website 
instead of the original site. A phisher does this by sending an email to a user falsely 
claiming to be a legitimately established organisation in an attempt to trick the worker 
into giving sensitive information that will be used for fraudulent activities (Arachchilage, 
Love and Beznosov, 2016). Cyberattacks, such as phishing and scamming, are 
anticipated to rise in number and sophistication in the future (Cherdantseva et al., 
2016).  
     However, the existing defence mechanisms are not able to stop attacks such as 




sophisticated (Baykara and Gürel, 2018). Smart detection techniques that can solve 
the existing phishing problem are therefore required (Shabut, Lwin and Hossain, 
2016). Combined techniques that use human factors such as awareness as their basis, 
as well as a heuristic-based approach, can deliver an active, intelligent-based defence 
scheme to help users achieve excellent real-time protection for their online 
transactions (Daeef et al., 2016). Some Internet security products, such as anti-virus 
software attract a large number of users based on their product features. These tools 
alert users to the presence of suspicious web pages as part of an anti-theft approach 
(Shabut, Lwin and Hossain, 2016). Hence, the capability offered by these tools is 
useful for users who have knowledge of online threats, costs and countermeasures 
and who can in turn respond to such security warnings (Babu, Nirmala and Kumar, 
2010).  
     A phishing attack may appear in various forms of communication such as 
messaging, voice over Internet protocol (VOIP), short message service (SMS) and 
spam emails (Ahmed and Abdullah, 2016). However, phishing attacks are mainly 
delivered by an email that lures users to click a link in the body of the email that then 
takes them to an external website that targets their financial information by claiming to 
be their bank, the inland revenue, a utility company or a government agency (Office 
for National Statistics, 2017). Financial institutions and end-users are regularly 
exposed to the threat of phishing attacks (Barraclough et al., 2013). Furthermore, the 
threat is continuing to grow due to an increase in deception, impersonation, fraud and 
multiple online attacks (Abbasi et al., 2015).  
1.2 The Phishing Problem 
The phishing scam has evolved in recent years due to productive economic and high-
tech conditions worldwide. The rise in all types of fraud loss in 2019 is attributed to the 
increase in deception scams and impersonation, as well as sophisticated online 




that there has been a fraudulent transaction on their target’s account that looks 
suspicious and suggests that they should update or verify their account (Purkait, 2012). 
There have been several high-profile data breaches (APWG, 2019) reported, as well 
as some low-level attacks. The data that is acquired can be used to commit fraud 
directly in the case of card details that can be used for remote purchases and huge 
amount of money lost (Financial Fraud Action, 2018).  
     The technical resources needed to execute phishing attacks can be readily 
acquired through private and public sources (M Jameel and George, 2013). Some 
technical resources have been streamlined and automated, enabling non-technical 
criminal individuals to also use them for attacking users online (Mohammad, Thabtah 
and McCluskey, 2012). Criminal gangs also use malware and phishing emails as a 
means to compromise customers’ details and security. Phishing is one of the most 
rapidly growing threats to the interconnected world of information technology. It is a 
system-based attack that exploits human vulnerabilities rather than software 
vulnerabilities (Mao et al., 2017).  
   Therefore, there is a need to develop a solution that supports the user in identifying 
a replica website that potentially could be used to host phishing attacks. As phishing 
attacks pose a severe threat to economy and security globally, there is a strong need 
for the automation of phishing attack detection using a robust algorithm (Islam and 
Abawajy, 2013).  
   Security professionals are seeking to diminish the impact of phishing by filtering 
spam and phishing emails. Also, educating users and encouraging the use of anti-
phishing toolbars that are designed to prevent users from accessing phishing web 
pages where their sensitive information would be requested and then transmitted to 
criminals (Liu, Qiu and Wenyin, 2010).  
   Some tools have also been developed to warn users that the website they are visiting 




incorporate various elements of the website such as frame, text and image into a single 
solution that provide more accurate detection and protection for online user. On this 
basis this work will take into consideration the website features like image, frame, and 
text into one system that can prevent the phisher from exploiting the vulnerable who 
are performing their legitimate activities online. The various methods of detecting 
phishing web pages can be classified into three types: toolbar based, user-interface 
based and content-based (Zhang et al., 2011). 
   One approach to preventing the impact of phishing is to terminate the phishing 
website itself. This action is usually undertaken by an expert in the anti-crime 
organisation, or by specialist anti-phishing organisations and volunteer groups 
(Shaikh, Shabut and Hossain, 2016).      
   The purpose of the present research work is to develop a system to detect phishing 
attacks and also to provide insights and increase awareness of how active Internet 
users can protect themselves against such phishing attacks. The outcomes of this 
study will, therefore, help researchers and industry professionals in identifying trends 
and in formulating practical preventive measures against cybersecurity attacks. Hence, 
this study aims to use an algorithm (ANFIS) and website hybrid features to detect 
phishing activities and protect users while they are surfing the Internet. These features 
will be used to develop an automated plug-in web browser in an attempt to protect 
online users against phishing website attacks by classifying the collective properties of 
the images, frames and text web page features. The real-time activity means that the 
decision is made by the plug-in to notify the user about the website before the user 
web browser loads the intended page, a time period which is on average 60 seconds 
(Barraclough et al., 2013). The developed plug-in checks these features on the web 
page to determine the level of originality of the website. If the web page check results 
in a legitimacy level of 85% and above, the web page is considered legitimate 
according to Barraclough, Sexton and Aslam (2015), whereas at around the 50% level 




the best of knowledge, this is the first work that considers how best to integrate images, 
text and frame of the website in a hybrid feature-based solution for a phishing detection 
scheme. 
1.3 Motivation and Scope 
The use of technology for fraudulent activities has flourished in recent years. The 
technical resources required to carry out phishing attacks are readily available through 
private and public sources. Hence, some of these technical resources have been 
automated and streamlined, thereby allowing their use by non-technical criminals. This 
automation has made it easier for a larger population of less-sophisticated criminals to 
commit crimes online, as it has made phishing more viable and economical. According 
to a report by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)1, the number of phishing 
attacks on website discovered in the second quarter of 2019 was up 36% over the 
fourth quarter of 2018 (see Chart 1-1), while the most targeted sector is the software-
as-a-service (SaaS)/webmail which accounted for 36% of phishing attacks over the 
same period, followed by payment service sector with 22%, financial institutions with 
18% and other sectors with 9% (see Chart 1-2) (APWG, 2019). Phishing attacks pose 
a severe threat to the economy and security globally (Crosman, Quittner and Wolfe, 
2012). Hence there is a need for the automation of phishing detection algorithms, 
which is within the scope of this research. According to a Financial Fraud Action2 UK 
report for 2017, about £165 million was lost to fraud related to Internet payment cards, 
telephone banking and identity theft in 2017, and while this is 3.68% lower than in the 
same period in 2016 (Financial Fraud Action, 2017), it is still a cause for concern.   
     In the recent times, there has been a considerable increase in the assortment, 
technology and complexity of phishing attacks in response to the increase in 
 
1   APWG report [online]. Available at: 
https://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q2_2019.pdf [Accessed 31 October 2019] 
2   Financial Fraud Action UK [Online] Available at: < https://www.financialfraudaction.org.uk/wp-




countermeasures and user awareness in order to sustain profitability from the illegal 
activities by the phisher (Sharma, Meenakshi and Bhatia, 2017). Providing the ability 
to detect website phishing attacks may help individual users or organisations in 
identifying legitimate websites. The effectiveness in recognising an attack may 
significantly contribute to the making of an effective decision between a fake and 
legitimate site (Arachchilage, Love and Beznosov, 2016). 
   Despite various methods having been used to develop anti-phishing tools to combat 
phishing attacks, these methods suffer low accuracy (Sharma, Meenakshi and Bhatia, 
2017). Therefore, there is still room to improve the accuracy of phishing website 
detection. In the solution proposed in this study, three critical features of image, frame 
and text of websites are extracted and used for phishing detection. Previous methods 
have failed to combine the usage of frames, images, and text to develop an effective 
phishing detection method. Because using only text which is the common trend to a 
detection phishing website, this will not be effective as some changes can be made to 
the frame and the image. Doing so is, therefore, the focus of this research work and therein 
lies its originality using Adaptive Neuro-fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) as classification 
algorithm, as well using the deep learning of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and Long 
Shorth-term Memory (LSTM) for further classifying in this solution. 
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Chart 1-2: Most Targeted Industry Sectors (APWG, 2019) 
1.4 Research Questions  
This research attempts to solve the phishing website problem by developing a method 
to detect phishing websites based on the image features, frame features and text 
features of web pages. The research also looks at how features are extracted from a 
website and how they can be used to automate the detection of a phishing attack using 
a browser extension. In this thesis, we attempt to answer the following two research 
questions: 
1. How can we detect a phishing website effectively? Detection plays a significant 
role in tackling phishing attacks. In this research, an algorithm with website 
hybrid feature will be use to developed a decision support plug-in to effectively 
detect a phishing website attacks.  
2. How can we automate phishing detection? Automate the plug-in in MATLAB 
version 9.5 AppDesigner and test the application on dataset to evaluate the 
































1.5 Research Aims and Objectives 
The main aim of this research is to develop an intelligent phishing detection and 
protection scheme for identification of website-based phishing attacks. This goal 
involves improving on previous work by building a robust classifier for intelligent 
phishing detection in online transactions. In order to achieve this aim the intelligent 
phishing detection support system should possess the following characteristics:   
1. Robustness: It should have a hybrid algorithm that can support efficient 
classification for website phishing detection in real-time. 
2. Accuracy: It should improve accuracy by reducing the false positive (FP) rate 
and increasing the true positive (TP) rate with absolute precision. 
3. Optimisation: It should be able to optimise performance by employing a hybrid 
method that uses the features of website images, frames, and text for the user’s 
objectives. 
4. Real-time functionality: It should notify the user about the about the 
legitimacy of the website before the user web browser loads the intended page. 
     These requirements will be met by achieving the following five specific objectives: 
I. Examine the Adaptive Neuro-fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) 
algorithm as a baseline and the use of more advanced methods to 
improve accuracy. 
II. Develop an algorithm that improves phishing-detection accuracy by 
comparing the text, images and frames of a given website with a 
knowledge model; 
III. Train, test, and validate the developed system (machine learning) for 
real-time phishing detection;  
IV. Automate the detection mechanism in real-time and test it offline. 




1.6 Contributions to Knowledge 
Phishing website detection has become the focus many studies and has been 
considered by many researchers. However, phishing has become more complex, and 
attackers can now bypass the filters that have been put in place by anti-phishing 
systems (Baykara and Gürel, 2018). Phishers sometimes implement new techniques 
such as embedding obfuscation in a website URL, creating a hyperlink from the original 
website or redirecting their victim to a phishing web page by using malicious software. 
Hence, it is necessary to identify phishing behaviour in online activity to detect phishing 
websites. In this regard, this research makes the following contributions: 
1. First, a hybrid feature selection approach is developed for use in the detection 
of website phishing attacks. The proposed method is based on a combination 
of content-based and visual-based approaches. The hybrid feature selection 
approach combines the use of the associated elements of images, frames and 
text of legitimate and non-legitimate websites and an associated artificial 
intelligence algorithm to develop an integrated method to address these 
elements together. The current methods to classify phishing websites are 
based on modest features of phishing attacks such as text, but these are not 
sufficient to combat the threat (Sharma, Meenakshi and Bhatia, 2017). The 
proposed phishing detection and protection scheme is based on the ANFIS 
algorithm, which is a robust scheme and uses integrated features of frames, 
text and images for web-phishing detection and protection. The deep learning 
(DL) algorithm is evaluated as a baseline to build the solution. The use of three 
features of a website (image, text and frame) make it more efficient in phishing 
detection, rather than using only one element for detection as a single solution.     
2. A second notable contribution of this study is that it is the first study to attempt 
to differentiate legitimate from phishing websites using two deep learning 




memory (LSTM) approach, that are combined as a single classifier in a novel 
approach called the Intelligent Phishing Detection System (IPDS).  
3. Thirdly, a total 13,000 features and 10,000 images were collected both from 
phishing and legitimate websites providing an important new dataset resource 
for other researchers in phishing detection to utilise (Adebowale, 2019). 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The chapters of this thesis are structured as follows: 
1. Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter introduces the issue of interest and the 
significance of this research study. It provides details of the research problem 
and the research questions to be resolved together with the precise research 
objectives. It also summarises the existing literature and clarifies the main 
contributions of this research.  
2. Chapter 2: Literature Review. This chapter contains a review of the literature 
on the topic under study, namely phishing detection schemes. It also discusses 
the focus of the research by critiquing the relevant existing research methods 
and summarising their findings as well as their strengths and weaknesses. It 
then discusses appropriate provision for the phishing detection problems and 
how to resolve them. 
3. Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology. This chapter provides details 
of the methodological approach used in the research and justifies the selection 
of the chosen methods. Also, it describes the features collection, the size data 
and sources from which the features are collected. It also describes the 
optimisation concept of the methodology as well as the feature preparation and 
normalisation steps. This chapter also provides detail about deep learning 
algorithm, the hybrid approach to detect phishing website using Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) and Convolution Neural Network (CNN) with the 




4.  Chapter 4:  Implementation of Intelligent Phishing Detection System (IPDS). 
This chapter presents the experimental work and process done in the research 
using the adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) methodology with 
three sets of input as a hybrid. Besides, it details of the process used for fuzzy 
modelling and fuzzy operation in the testing, training and validation phases. It 
then presents the results of applying the proposed offline approach. Also, it 
presents the experimental work done in the research using the CNN+LSTM 
model and how the system work. It then justifies the method and explains its 
limitations. The chapter also presents the approach used in developing our 
model with the result of the experiment.    
5. Chapter 5: Implementation and Evaluation of Phishing Detection Toolbar in 
MATLAB version 9.5 AppDesigner. This chapter proposes an approach for a 
web browser toolbar for phishing detection. It discusses the result of the 
validation test of the toolbar using a suspicious site, legitimate website and 
phishing websites from various sources. It also provides a comparative study 
to highlight the benefits and limitations of the proposed plugin. 
6. Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work. This concluding chapter contains a 
summary of research achievement and the contributions of this study to 
knowledge, with some future research directions.  
 














Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter introduced the research topic and outlined the subject area to be 
covered in this thesis. This chapter discusses the background and basic concept of 
phishing website detection with a focus on the feature-based approach (of particular 
interest to this present study). 
2.2 Background to the Phishing Problem    
The principal approach that phishers adopt to conduct their nefarious activities involves 
presenting fake situations to potential victims in which the users are directed to take a 
certain kind of decisive action. For example, they may send an email stating that the 
user’s bank account requires an urgent update due to some security measures, or 
stating that a user’s transaction has not been processed due to incorrect information 
that the user presented while purchasing their goods online (Bandhaniya and Joshi, 
2017). The anti-phishing filtering system has been reinforced to withstand massive 
generic phishing attempts, and user awareness has increased regarding the existence 
of generic phishing that targets both organisations and individuals (Gascon et al., 
2018). Nevertheless, the attacker’s ability to forge customised messages to send to 
their targets still results in a high success rate as these messages can exploit human 
vulnerabilities (Aleroud and Zhou, 2017). One of the more sophisticated phishing 
attacks is the spear-phishing attack (Bender et al., 2018). In this type of attack, the 
attacker creates fake content with relevant information based on the personal data of 
the target, which make the information look more legitimate to the user when they are 
visiting the phishing website (Steer, 2017). This type of attack is not readily identifiable 
by non-technical users, and even those well versed in technology have difficulty in 





   Phishing is a term that is commonly used to define a scam that uses spoofed web 
pages and unsolicited emails, which are sent by a phisher to lure victims into revealing 
personal information (Zhao et al., 2017). The term phisher is used to describe the 
criminal individual who uses the information acquired through phishing to, for example, 
steal money from a victim’s bank account. They might also use the information to 
access the victim’s computer, lock them out, and then demand a ransom from their 
victim in return for handing back control (Pathak and Nanded, 2016). 
     Phishers use various techniques to gain personal information from users. For 
instance; 
• The phisher pretends to be the victim’s bank, sending them an email message 
informing them that their bank account details have expired and that there is a 
need to update them. The potential victim is then instructed to click a link in the 
body of the email so that the victim can continue to use their account (Crain, 
Opyrchal and Prakash, 2010). 
• The phisher pretends to be the victim’s bank and sends them a message 
stating that there has been a suspicious purchase made with their bank card. 
They suggest that the victim clicks on the link in the email if they would like to 
cancel the transaction. 
• An email message is sent to the victim claiming that they have won a lottery, 
and states that in order to claim the prize, the victim needs to click on the secure 
link provided, enter their bank account details and the money will then be 
transferred into their account. 
• The  Phisher pretends to be the inland revenue, informing the victim by email 
that they are due a tax refund due to an overpayment of income tax, and must 




     Phishing attacks are divided into two groups: (1) ‘flash attacks’ that give the attacker 
a virtually undetectable way to redirect the victim to a fake website (an example of this 
is the so-called “man in the middle” attack) and (2) ‘non-flash attacks’ in which an 
attacker uses existing software to enable applications and authorised protocols to carry 
out malicious activities, which can only be revoked by making a payment. Such an 
attack is called ‘ransomware’. Flash attacks usually involve the dissemination of a large 
volume of similar messages that are transmitted within a short period of time (Bullee 
et al., 2017), whilst non-flash attacks although similar deliver messages over a 
relatively long period of time (Lin et al., 2015). The interaction between the receiver 
and the message may happen when the receiver follows the malicious link in the 
message they have received, replies with useful information or fills in a deceptive form 
with relevant data, which then allows the attack to succeed. Regardless of the type of 
attack it follows the same process flow ((Ahmed and Abdullah, 2016) as shown in Fig. 
2-1 and which consists of five phases as follows: 
1. Planning: First, the phisher will identify the target user or organisation that they 
wish to be their intended victim. Next, they will decide how to get the personal 
information of their targets, such as their account number, password and email 
address. Then a phishing website is structured as a clone of the original 
website so that the victim is not able to distinguish it from that of the service 
they usually access (Virvilis et al., 2014).  
2. Setup: After the phisher has decided on their target, they set up and prepare 
to attack. In this phase, the phisher creates techniques for sending many spoof 
email messages to random Internet users that seem to be coming from a 
legitimate and well-known organisation (Kazemian and Ahmed, 2015). The 
email urges the victim to update their personal information to avoid losing 
access rights to specific services, and the phisher thereby collects valuable 
information from their target. Usually, they do this by developing a web page 




3. Attack: The attack phase involves delivering a malicious payload through three 
common propagation vectors, either by a deceptive message, spam email or 
fake website (Silic and Back, 2016). Ordinarily, the phishing message appears 
to be emanating from a reliable source. Hence, the victim may take action that 
compromises their personal information; by clicking on the link provided the 
victim is directed to a bogus website implemented by the attacker, or the user 
is prompted to provide confidential information, either by a delivered web Trojan 
on their system or a remote web page (Amrutkar, Kim and Traynor, 2017). 
Spam filtering can block many of the phishing emails; if an organisation whose 
user is being phished uses authenticated email regularly, the email recipient 
may notice that the email does not have a valid signature, which thereby 
stopping the attack (Gascon et al., 2018). 
4. Collection: The personal information that the user inputs into the fake site is 
relayed to the phishing system and the phisher. This compromised information 
is obtained through a pop window or web pages presented to the user. 
5. Identity theft and fraud: The final phase of the phishing attack involves the 
phisher using the sensitive data gathered from the victims. This information is 
used to impersonate the victim and making illegal purchases or to commit other 
types of fraud. Phishers evaluate their attack, and if it has been successful, 





Fig. 2-1: Phishing Attack Process  
     The use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (https) as a website prefix indicates 
the communication is secure as it denotes that the data exchanged between a person 
and the website they visit is encrypted and is a considerable measure to protect 
malicious site interactions. The https protocol is always used by websites that offer 
online sales or to protect user passwords. However, a study by the Anti-Phishing 
Working Group (APWG 2019) provides insights on how phishers are fooling Internet 
users by turning Internet security features against them. The report states that in the 
second quarter of 2019, more than a third of phishing attacks were hosted on websites 
that had a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate and https. Moreover, a phishing 
page can still function as intended, even without an SSL certificate (APWG, 2019). 
Phishers take a further step to make their site look legitimate by obtaining a valid SSL 
certificate as well creating an https page to make their victims think that the site is the 
original and this may, therefore, lead to a successful attack. The general widespread 










of https websites on web browsers are the primary reasons why the usage became a 
popular favourite for phishers to host phishing sites (Thakur and Kaur, 2016).   
     More sophisticated types of phishing attack have been identified in recent times 
and some of the main ones are listed below: 
❖ Session hijacking: This type of attack occurs when a user’s activities are 
monitored online until they log into their target account or transaction and 
establish their official identifications (Deshmukh, Popat and Student, 2017). At 
this point, the malicious software takes over and can perform illegal actions 
such as bank transactions without the user’s knowledge.  
❖ Screen loggers and key loggers: This type of attack usually involves the use 
of a variety of malware that tracks keyboard input and sends relevant 
information to the phisher via the Internet. The phisher can embed malware 
into the user’s browser as a small utility program, known as helper objects, 
which runs automatically when the web browser is started, as well as into 
system files as a screen monitor or device driver (Gascon et al., 2018). 
❖ System reconfiguration: This attack type usually modifies the user system 
settings for criminal purposes. The inclusion of a fake URL in the user’s 
favourites file may be modified to direct the user to a web page that looks like 
the legitimate site.  
❖ Data theft: Unsecured access server can be accessed with the techniques to 
steal sensitive data from an organisation. This type of attack is also called 
espionage and encompasses stealing confidential information, research and 
development, legal opinion and employee-related records. The phisher can 
profit from obtaining these types of sensitive information as its disclosure can 
cause embarrassment or economic damage to the victims (Oest et al., 2018).  
❖ Pharming: This type of attack is based on a Domain Name Server (DNS) 
phishing attack or host file modification. A pharming attack occurs when a 




request to the website name service returns a compromised address, and 
subsequent communication is directed to the fake website (Purkait, 2015). 
Although the users will be unaware that the fake site is where their confidential 
information is submitting and the phisher controls over it. 
❖ Content Injection: This type of attack involves replacing some part of the 
content of the legitimate website with fake content to mislead the user into 
giving their confidential information to the phisher (Silic and Back, 2016). The 
phisher inserts malicious code into the real site to log the user’s information 
and credentials which are then secretly delivered to the phisher’s server.  
❖ Man-in-the-Middle: This attack is one of the more sophisticated attacks and is 
more difficult to detect than many of the other phishing attacks. In this type of 
attack, the phisher positions their fake site in between the user and the 
legitimate site. They collect the information that is entered into the fake site but 
then pass it on to the legitimate site, so the user's transaction is not affected 
(Ahmed and Abdullah, 2016). In this way, the phisher can gather the 
information in order to sell to fraudsters that use them when the user is not 
active online.          
2.3 Overview of Anti-Phishing Techniques 
Phishing attacks usually involve the use of complicated tricks, which makes it 
problematic for users to know if they are the victim of phishing (Abbasi et al., 2015). 
Legacy anti-phishing techniques can be categorised into (1) threat elimination and (2) 
user awareness and education, the latter of which is aimed at educating users so that 
they do not become victims of phishing attacks (Gavahane et al., 2015). Existing 
phishing detection tools have improved on legacy tools, but they still suffer from false 
negatives, that is to say, false alarms. Also, regrettably, malware scanners are not very 
good at spotting malicious objects. Most virus scanners apply a fingerprint technique 




scanning the binary code of the known malicious pattern. However, this detection 
strategy has a poor response time against phishing attacks that utilise malware (Safer-
Networking, 2016).  
     The use of a personal firewall gives an added layer of security against phishing by 
imposing control over network traffic; the firewall is designed to defend the network 
against malware-based phishing attacks, such key loggers and Trojans. Such attacks 
always have to transmit the captured information over the network through the Internet 
to the phisher. These phishing activities can be prevented by using a personal firewall 
(Thiyagarajan, Venkatesan and Aghila, 2010). Moreover, authentication mechanisms 
play a significant role in combatting phishing attacks. A user authentication mechanism 
helps in validating the identity of the user and their location, and the server also needs 
to be authenticated (Silic and Back, 2016).   Nevertheless, phishing attacks still work 
because they exploit the user’s social instincts, such as being helpful and efficient. 
Hence, these attacks can be particularly powerful because these instincts also make 
us good at our jobs and should not be discouraged. Thus, educating users to identify 
suspicious websites and emails is essential in defending against phishing attacks as 
is providing documentation to increase their awareness (Jansson and von Solms, 
2013). However, users are not usually interested in reading documents about anti-
phishing, especially when surfing websites as security is not their primary concern. 
The majority of users do not find anti-phishing documents, new reading material. On 
the other hand, it has been shown that the use of game-based learning increases user 
motivation and awareness (Yang et al., 2012). Therefore, various anti-phishing games 
have been developed to educate users about this threat (Arachchilage and Love, 2013; 
Yang et al., 2012; Arachchilage, Love and Beznosov, 2016). However, the effective 
prevention of phishing attacks requires a solution that combines process, technological 
and people-based approaches (Comar et al., 2013). These approaches must be 
considered together to create a holistic defence strategy to protect against phishing 




there is need to back that up with a technical support in doing that, and timely feedback 
is submitted back to the user (National Cyber Security Centre, 2018).      
2.3.1  Anti-Phishing Techniques  
Whilst phishing can be channelled via social media, text message or by phone  (Babu, 
Nirmala and Kumar, 2010) nowadays most people use the term phishing to define 
attacks that arrive by email. Email is a perfect distribution technique for a phishing 
attack as it can be disseminated to numerous users straightaway and hide among the 
vast number of useful emails that busy users receive (Bandhaniya and Joshi, 2017). 
Phishing emails can hit an organisation regardless of its size or type. Apart from the 
theft of information, attacks can install malware, disrupt organisational systems, or 
steal money through fraud. An organisation might get caught up in a mass operation 
where the phisher is just looking to gather some new passwords or make some easy 
money, or the aim could be something much more precise such as the theft of sensitive 
data. Using the spear-phishing attack (Fig. 2-2) against an organisation is when a 
phisher uses information about an organisation to make their message more 
persuasive and realistic, as reported by the (Government Communication 
Headquarter. (GCHQ, 2018). 
   The primary defences against phishing are reliant on users’ abilities to detect 
phishing emails. By strengthening and broadening the available defences, an 
organisation can improve its resilience against phishing without disrupting the 
productivity of users (Government Communication Headquarter. (GCHQ, 2018). 
However, accepting the fact that some phishing emails will get through will help 
organisations to plan for the day when an attack is successful, and also minimise the 
damage caused (Bandhaniya and Joshi, 2017). Below are some steps that can be 
taken by organisations to build effective defences against phishing attacks: 




2. Help users identify and report suspected phishing website/emails 
3. Protect the organisation from the effects of an undetected phishing site 
4. Respond quickly to incidents. 
 
 
Fig. 2-2: Spear-Phishing Attack (Source: Karen Goertzel, 2012) 
    Several methods have been proposed in recent years to overcome phishing attacks 
(Al-Daeef, Basir and Saudi, 2014). Khadir and Sony (2015) reviewed a range of 
phishing detection techniques that had been proposed up to the year 2015, mainly 
focusing on scientific techniques and machine learning technology. They categorised 
these techniques into technical and non-technical approaches. The technical approach 
includes heuristic-based, content-based, blacklist/whitelist-based and toolbar 
approaches. 
2.4 Technical Phishing Detection Solutions  
Phishing detection strategies are implemented in a reactive and proactive manner 




implemented in various anti-phishing tools. As most anti-phishing solutions run many 
checks, they can detect more phished websites than others. However, when multiple 
checks are performed to validate a web page, this can result in a slow response time, 
which could make the users of that solution frustrated and reduce their usage. In order 
to prevent an attack on the user doing their legitimate activities online, there is need to 
completely adopt appropriate security measures. One approach is to set up a dummy 
e-commerce website account and monitor and/or protect the account from phishing 
activities. Many solutions for stopping phishing attacks rely on checking the content 
and the visual similarity in order to expose phishing sites that obscure their online 
identity.   
2.4.1  Content-Based Approaches 
Thiyagarajan, Venkatesan and Aghila (2010) proposed a method that addresses one 
of the limitations in the transaction authentication number (TAN) method. The 
proposed method was based on the TAN approach but included a modification to the 
challenge and response techniques. However, their method protects against phishing 
attacks in nearly the same manner as the TAN method except for some intelligence 
added for providing the challenge-response (Thiyagarajan, Venkatesan and Aghila, 
2010). Also, Blum et al. (2010) proposed a solution that utilises a confidence-weighted 
classification combined with content-based phishing URL detection of present and 
emerging types of phishing domains (Blum et al., 2010). The proposed approaches 
are better than comparable approaches. However using only the content of a website 
only will not be surfficient to protect user against phising attack, but it requires 
additional features such as image and frame to make it more effective.     
     The solution proposed by Dunlop et al. (2010) consists of three main steps and 
involves capturing the image of the website of interest in a user’s web browser as an 
image and using OCR techniques to convert the images into readable text. They tested 




2% false positives. Their solution is better than the previous image comparison 
methods that rely on a database. Nevertheless, more comprehensive tests need to be 
carried out because 100 sites are minimal in comparison to the number of phishing 
sites that emerge every day (Sharma, Meenakshi and Bhatia, 2017). A scheme was 
also proposed by Dunlop, Groat and Shelly (2010) called GoldPhish, which provides 
zero-day protection phishing attacks with high detection rate (Dunlop, Groat and 
Shelly, 2010). However, their method has unstable performance, using a third party 
database, if an image is manipulated with little variation; this will causes the detection 
process to fail inaccuracy. 
     Also, Alkhozae and Batarfi (2011) proposed a solution based on checking the web 
page source code in which the security of the website is evaluated by checking the 
characters in the web page source code for phishing characters (Alkhozae and Batarfi, 
2011).  
    A scheme was also proposed by Dunlop, Groat and Shelly (2010) called GoldPhish, 
which provides zero-day protection phishing attacks with high accuracy (Dunlop, Groat 
and Shelly, 2010). However, their method has unstable performance if such an image 
is manipulated with little variation this causes the process to fail in accuracy. Also, 
Wardman et al. (2011) proposed a solution that depends on a file-matching algorithm 
that is implemented to detect a phishing website based on its content. To test their 
solution, they used a dataset of 17,992 phishing attacks targeting 159 different brands. 
The tests on the file-matching and string-alignment techniques were done on MD5 
matching, deep MD5 matching, and syntactical fingerprinting. Based on the results of 
their experiment, the authors report that syntactical fingerprinting outperformed file-
matching in regard to the detection rate. Moreover, the full implementation using 
syntactical fingerprinting for candidate file selection had the best overall error rate 
handling performance. The authors report that the result of the experiment using a 
variety of different content-based approaches demonstrated that some were able to 




     Likewise, Aggarwal, Rajadesingan and Kumaraguru (2012) developed a Chrome 
browser extension that detects phishing on Twitter in real time. They use the content 
of the tweet and some URL features such as hashtag, length, and mentions, and apply 
machine learning classification to detect phishing. The result is promising, but the 
solution needs to be tested on other social media to produce a more robust result 
(Aggarwal, Rajadesingan and Kumaraguru, 2012).  
    On the other hand, Mao et al. (2013) proposed an algorithm to quantify the 
suspicious ratings of web page layouts by using CSS as the basis for detecting visual 
similarities among web pages. The prototype extension, called BaitAlarm, was used 
against 7,000 phishing websites. The authors report that the scheme was able to 
achieve 96% detection rate in thousands of the samples used for their experiment 
(Mao et al., 2013). Chang et al. (2013) proposed a method that extracts a screenshot 
of the web page and segments the region of interest, which includes the website logo 
for phishing detection. However, their solution may be more effective if they use more 
features to make robust as the scheme only relies on the image of a web page. In a 
different vein, Fatt, Leng and Nah (2014) proposed an approach that employs the 
website favicon to search for the identity of a website and uses the Google search-by-
image API search engine solution in order to evaluate the authenticity of a website. 
The authors used 1,000 web pages to verify the effectiveness of their approach. The 
results showed that it achieved a better of 97.2% true positives and 5.4% false 
positives. Their approach is efficient because it does not maintain an image database 
for its operation (Fatt, Leng and Nah, 2014). However, it could achieve even better 
results if it were combined with the use of other phishing detection methods that 
consider features such as the text and the frame structure according to the author. 
Their approach does have capacity to include more features, which would make it a 
robust solution as reported in their study. 
    Kumar and Kumar (2015) develop an anti-phishing solution based on a visual 




using a (2, 2) visual cryptography scheme. The first time that the user registers on a 
website, the user stores the first share of the image, and the other part is uploaded to 
the site. During each login attempt, the user must verify the legitimacy of the location 
by comparing the image of both shares (Kumar and Kumar, 2015). However, their test 
result is not robust due to the low number of websites used in the test experiment, so 
there is a need to undertake a comprehensive analysis to improve precision. 
    Shekokar et al. (2015) proposed a solution for the detection and prevention of 
phishing that involves web page similarity and URL-based detection. They used the 
LinkGuard3 algorithm to analyse the extracted URL from which the website is directed 
and the virtual URL that is seen by the user (Shekokar et al., 2015). Unfortunately, 
their result is not reliable due to the hundreds number of websites used in their 
experiment, so there is a need to do a comprehensive analysis using thousands of 
websites to improve precision. 
    Also, Kazemian and Ahmed (2015) proposed a novel approach to detect fake web 
pages that are based on the utilisation of machine learning algorithms. Their 
experiment showed that the supervised learning techniques were able to produce up 
to 98% classification accuracy (Kazemian and Ahmed, 2015). However, their online 
approach was unable to use an incremental data source. They employed a different 
approach than traditional batch processing to accommodate new incoming data by 
using stream data in the form of a list of phishing web pages and safe websites. The 
approach is better than existing comparable ones,because of it zero day protection 
approach. However, relying only on one feature of a website is not safe as phisher can 
use a deciful means to alter the image of an original website, and use it to create 
phishing web page. But Including an additional feature and multiple processing will 
make it more strong in detection. 
 
3 LinkGuard algorithm [Online] Available at:  http://www.ijafrc.org/Volume3/issue34/6.pdf 




    Gavahane et al. (2015) proposed a system that focuses on retrieving the necessary 
attributes in real-time using Hadoop-MapReduce, which helps to increase both the 
speed and throughput of their model. The goal of their system is to increase the speed 
of phishing detection (Gavahane et al., 2015). On the other hand, Chiew et al. (2015) 
proposed a method for detecting a phishing attack in which a website logo image is 
used to determine the identity consistency between the legitimate and the phishing 
website. The experiments gave reliable and promising results (Chiew et al., 2015).   
    Tan et al. (2016) proposed a phishing detection technique based on the identification 
of the difference between the target and the original web page. The proposed method 
is called PhishWHO and consists of three phases. Their overall experiment results 
showed that the scheme outperforms most of the conventional phishing detection 
techniques with which the proposed scheme was compared (Tan et al., 2016). In a 
similar vein, Hu et al. (2016) proposed a new phishing detection method based on the 
analysis of a legitimate server’s log information. Their idea is based on finding the 
references point that is used every time the victim opens the phishing website; the site 
will refer to the original website by asking for resources. The authors report that the 
result of their experiments showed that their proposed scheme is both highly accurate 
and effective (Hu et al., 2016).  
   Marchal et al. (2016) developed a phishing detection scheme that contains several 
essential elements and has several advantages: it requires very little training data, 
scales well to much larger test data, is language independent, is resilient to adaptive 
attacks, is fast and can be implemented as a client-side solution (Marchal et al., 2016). 
Li, Yang and Ding (2016) proposed a novel approach that uses the minimum Enclosing 
Ball Support Vector Machine (MEB-SVM) to detect a phishing website. They aimed to 
improve the speed and accuracy with which phishing websites are detected (Li, Yang 
and Ding, 2016). The proposed model was able to predict the presence of a phishing 
web page with 96.6% accuracy, which is 0.4% higher than the SVM classifier with 




algorithm. However, in their model, only a small amount of data was used to build the 
classifier, and it only consisted of text features. Therefore, this model can be improved 
by using a larger dataset and other web page features such as frames and images to 
increase accuracy further.  
    Zouina and Outtaj (2017) proposed a phishing detection solution based on using six 
features of the URL and used an SVM and similarity index to perform the detection 
procedure. The result showed that the method was able to predict the presence of a 
phishing URL with 95.8% accuracy. The authors stated that detection could be 
improved further by using a larger dataset and more features because the number of 
features they selected is small compared to those that the phisher would use in 
creating a fake website (Zouina and Outtaj, 2017). Marchal et al. (2017) presented an 
approach for detecting phishing web pages in real-time while they are visited by the 
browser (Marchal et al., 2017). The add-on uses JavaScript and interacts with the web 
browser. The authors tested their solution to 8,500 legitimate and 1,500 phishing 
datasets, and it achieved 98% precision. This phishing detection algorithm could also 
be improved by using more techniques because the number of features it considers is 
small compared with those that the phisher can employ by using various tools to create 
look-alike websites. 
    Mao et al. (2017) proposed a solution called the phishing-alarm to detect phishing 
attacks by using features that the phisher has to use to create a fake website that looks 
like the original one. They also proposed an algorithm to quantify the suspicious ratings 
of a web page that works by identifying the visual similarities between web pages. 
Their solution was prototyped and implemented in the Google Chrome browser (Mao 
et al., 2017). Jain and Gupta (2017) proposed an approach that utilises a feature set 
containing features such as HTML tags, text formats, text contents, CSSs and images 
to decide as to whether a website is suspicious or not (Jain and Gupta, 2017). Zhang 
et al. (2017) introduced prediction label of website contents to be part of the proposed 




content, URL and rule-based features. Their framework was developed with the use of 
an efficient two-stage extreme learning machine (ELM). Their solution is highly 
accurate, but it could still be improved by adding other features to make it more robust 
(Zhang et al., 2017). 
    Churi et al. (2017) proposed a model that uses visual cryptography and code 
generation techniques as methods of authentication. Their scheme ensures that users 
know that the sites they visit are legitimate, especially those with which they are 
already registered, and makes users aware of phishing attacks (Churi et al., 2017). On 
the other hand, Tripathi, Nigam and Edla (2017) proposed a new architecture for web 
fraud detection using the apriori algorithm for association rule mining with the 
PhishTank dataset in the web advertising network. They analysed the web access log 
which stores the activities performed by end-users. This log is used to detect a fraud 
sequence of repeated web URLs (Tripathi, Nigam and Edla, 2017). Patil, Rane and 
Bhalekar (2017) also develop a solution that uses the basic visual features of a web 
page’s appearance as the basis for detecting page similarities. They implemented the 
obfuscated URL detection algorithm, which provides multilayer security that protects 
user data against phishing attacks over the Internet (Patil, Rane and Bhalekar, 2017). 
    Mishra and Gupta (2018) proposed a novel intelligent phishing detection system to 
detect zero-day phishing attacks using the concept of uniform resources identifier 
(URI) and cascading style sheet (CSS) matching. The authors report that the proposed 
solution is very efficient in detecting phishing and zero-day attacks with a true positive 
rate of 93.27% (Mishra and Gupta, 2018). Likewise, Smadi, Aslam and Zhang (2018) 
proposed a novel framework that combines a neural network with reinforcement 
learning to detect phishing attacks in real-time online for the first time. The authors 
report that their proposed model can handle zero-day phishing attacks with high 
performance achieving a true positive rate of 98.63% (Smadi, Aslam and Zhang, 




which can be improved if the other aspect of the website features such the frame and 
image is added for more accurate detection. 
   Shirazi, Bezawada and Ray (2018) proposed a solution that indicates the domain 
name of phishing websites reflect of phishing site and holds the key to successful 
phishing detection. The authors report that their model was able to achieve 97% 
classification accuracy (Shirazi, Bezawada and Ray, 2018). Kuo, Lee and Lee (2018) 
also proposed a method for identifying phishing websites in which the content of a 
website that the user visits are extracted and translated into a format that can be 
classified (Kuo, Lee and Lee, 2018). On the other hand, due to the increase in the 
number of phishing attacks in recent times, Butler and Butler (2018) anticipated a 
solution to educate Internet users to try to stop them becoming the victim of a phishing 
attack and suggested a framework of anti-phishing measures. Sahoo (2018) proposed 
an architecture to differentiate between fake and legitimate emails with high accuracy. 
The author used data mining algorithms to analyse emails and help in preventing 
phishing attacks (Sahoo, 2018). All the methods rely only on the text content of the 
website. However, these methods can be improved with the integration of other 
website features such as image and frame.   
    Rao, Vaishnavi and Pais, (2019) propose a solution called CatchPhish. The 
proposed solution is a lightweight application that predicts the legitimate URL without 
visiting the website. The scheme uses full URL, hostname, TF-IDF features and 
phishing hinted words from the suspicious URL for the classification using the random 
forest classifier algorithm. They investigate the URL with the use of hand-crafted 
features and TF-IDF features. The hand-crafted features include special characters 
and word in the URL. Also, the TF-IDF features were extracted using the information 
retrieval algorithm is applied on set URLs. They combine the set of hand-crafted and 
TF-IDF feature are loaded into the machine learning for classifying the URL. The result 




accuracy of 94.26% on their dataset and 98.25% on a benchmark dataset (Rao, 
Vaishnavi and Pais, 2019).  
2.4.2 Heuristic Approaches  
Heuristic-based anti-phishing techniques use website features for phishing detection 
analysis to create a robust classification model (Lee and Park, 2016). Some original 
resilient and efficient models that use heuristics for detecting phishing websites have 
been proposed (Barraclough et al., 2013; Aburrous, 2010; Weiwei et al., 2012). The 
results of the above-cited works show that there is a considerable improvement in the 
accuracy of phishing detection using neuro-fuzzy. However, the solutions proposed in 
those works are text-based, so they could be expanded with other website features to 
enhance detection. 
   Meanwhile, Abbasi et al. (2010) proposed the development of a new class of 
fraudulent website detection system that is based on statistical learning theory (SLT), 
also known as Vapnik-Chervonenkis theory, which is a computational learning theory 
that attempts to explain the learning process from a statistical point of view (Abbasi et 
al., 2010). Similarly, Wenyin et al. (2010) proposed an approach for finding phishing 
web pages that depend on the construction and reasoning of the semantic link network 
(SLN) of the suspicious web page. The authors report that their experiment showed 
that the method was able to achieve a false negative rate of 16.6% for phishing sites 
and a high level of accuracy for legitimate sites (Wenyin et al., 2010). Aburrous et al. 
(2010) proposed a model based on fuzzy logic combined with a data mining algorithm 
to characterise e-banking phishing websites. The model was able to identify worse e-
banking phishing site of 83.7% accuracy and best e-banking phishing website of 16.4% 
accuracy, which representing the legitimate Internet banking site. However, the feature 
set that was used in their work was based on text-only features, so it needs to be more 




is efficient, the level of accurracy is low deu to the number of dataset used, and some 
data are not necessary for improving the phishing detection accuracy. 
    Afroz and Greenstadt (2011) proposed a phishing detection approach that uses the 
profiles of legitimate websites appearance to build a fuzzy hashing system for phishing 
detection. They evaluated their approach on over 600 phishing sites that duplicated 20 
original sites and showed that it provides the same precision as that offered by 
blacklisting methods, with the added benefit that it can classify new attacks and 
targeted attacks against smaller sites. The scheme is likely to have a beneficial impact 
on phishing detection by reducing the efficiency of the sites that look a lot like real 
websites, thus giving users a better chance of detecting ‘phishy’ sites. The authors 
showed that their model was able to detect a phishing attack with 97% accuracy (Afroz 
and Greenstadt, 2011). The level of accuracy in their scheme motivate this study to do 
more in term of phishing detection accuracy.    
Huang, Qian and Wang (2012) proposed an anti-phishing solution based on a semi-
fragile watermark to provide protection for the online activities of service providers. The 
semi-fragile watermark consists of website identity characters, the URL, and the 
heuristics that occur in a phishing attack, which are embedded into the service 
provider’s website tags. When a suspicious web page is launched, the provider uses 
the solution to compare the embedded characters with the generated watermark, and 
if an inconsistency is found an alert raised. The identified spoofed website is then 
classified as a phishing website (Huang, Qian and Wang, 2012). Their solution, which 
is based on embedded watermark in a web page, could improve the detection rate, but 
there is a need for more features to make the algorithm more robust and enable 
comprehensive detection. Their approach was carefully look into and inspire the 
decision to use frame as part of our hybrid solution.  
    Barraclough et al. (2013) proposed a neuro-fuzzy system with fuzzy rules to 




result showed that higher accuracy was achieved with two-fold cross-validation, i.e., a 
98.5% true positive rate and a 1.5% false-positive rate. Moreover, this result 
demonstrated that the neuro-fuzzy system with five inputs was able to achieve higher 
accuracy in detecting phishing websites in real-time. The proposed solution 
(Barraclough et al., 2013) is right has it shows greater accuracy an improving efficiency 
of phishing website detection in real-time. The comparison mechanism was also better 
compared to another study. The proposed method could be improved further by adding 
more features and by optimising the parameters for greater accuracy. This approches 
is one of the study that that motive this study, because of the algorithm used, the 
feature selction and the level of accuracy derived in their experimnt. 
    Abdelhamid, Ayesh and Thabtah (2014) investigated the problem of phishing 
detection by using an associative classification (AC)4 approach for data mining. They 
developed an AC algorithm called the multi-label classifier-based associative 
classification (MCAC) 5  and compared its performance with that of other AC rule 
induction algorithms when applied to phishing data. The experiment results showed 
that MCAC can improve the predictive precision of the AC algorithm which classify 
phishing website wrongly (Abdelhamid, Ayesh and Thabtah, 2014). Meanwhile, Xu, 
Wang and Jajodia (2014) proposed a simple but very efficient approach to prevent 
phishing attacks, which they called Gemini. The solution starts to work as soon as a 
user enters their username, and it tackles the phishing problem from a new standpoint. 
It is thus able to actively block access to phishing sites before the potential victim 
begins to enter their password (Xu, Wang and Jajodia, 2014). Chauhan and Shiwani 
(2014) proffered a solution based on honeypots being used currently in some solution. 
However, they proposed a solution to the limitation of the current solution by 
 
4 Associative classification (AC) is a data mining approach that uses association rule 
discovery methods to build classification systems (classifiers). [Online] Available at: 
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219649212500116?src=recsys& [Accessed 
12 June 2016]. 
5 Multi-label Classifier-based Associative Classification (MCAC) [Online] Available at: 
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0129626414500017?journalCode=ppl 




performing the remodelling of the real online banking system into a considerable 
honeypot equipped with honeytokens (Chauhan and Shiwani, 2014).  
    The solution proposed by Gowtham and Krishnamurthi (2014) identifies phishing 
websites and notifies users that they are on such a website. However, their solution is 
solely based on the website login form, so it can be fooled or misclassify a site that 
does not have a login form (Gowtham and Krishnamurthi, 2014). Marchal et al. (2014) 
presented a solution called PhishStorm, an automated phishing system that analyses 
any URL in real-time to identify potential phishing threats. The result of their experiment 
showed that their approach gave 94.91% classification accuracy with only a 1.44% 
false-positive rate (Marchal et al., 2014).  
    On the other hand, Singh, Jain and Maini (2015) proposed a useful scheme that is 
based on the pre-processing of classification algorithm and feature selection. The 
result of their experiment showed that RF was able to achieve the highest classification 
accuracy with 97.47% precision (Singh, Jain and Maini, 2015). Aydin and Baykal 
(2015) proposed a feature extraction technique for extracting website URL features by 
analysing subset-based features and classification algorithms for phishing website 
detection. The result of their experiment showed that the sequence minimal 
optimisation (SMO) algorithm had the best compatibility, achieving 95.39% accuracy, 
which was the highest accuracy obtained in their analysis (Aydin and Baykal, 2015). 
Feroz and Mengel (2015) proposed an approach that classifies URLs automatically 
based on their lexical and host-based features. Their model was able to detect a large 
number of phishing hosts with an average of over 93% accuracy (Feroz and Mengel, 
2015). However, the above approaches chose to use website URL which classified as 
text content that can be improved with some of the other website features to improve 
detection accuracy according to the authors. Nanda and Gupta (2015) proposed a 
method of increasing security for online banking activities in order to reduce phishing 




    On the other hand, Dong et al. (2015) proposed a machine learning approach to 
detect phishing websites by using features from their X.509 public-key certificates. 
Thus, their approach works not only against HTTPS-enabled phishing attacks but also 
against HTTP phishing attacks. The result of their experiment showed that the RF 
algorithm was able to perform the best with a precision of 94.2% (Dong et al., 2015).  
    Jeeva and Rajsingh (2016) proposed a solution that is based on discerning the 
significant features that distinguish between phishing and legitimate URLs. The 
authors report that their model was able to detect 93% of phishing URLs using the 
rules obtained by the apriori algorithm (Jeeva and Rajsingh, 2016). Geng et al. (2016) 
also proposed an intelligent phishing detection system to address the phishing attack 
problem proactively. The authors report that their experimental results demonstrate 
the effectiveness and timeliness of the model in recognising phishing web pages (Geng 
et al., 2016). They also demonstrated the efficiency of the model in distinguishing new 
phishing websites from real ones. Daeef et al. (2016) developed a detection system 
with a comprehensive level of protection by using URL features. Their system relies 
on the fact that users deal directly with URLs when surfing the Internet. The result of 
the experiment showed that the proposed system was able to achieve an accuracy 
rate of 93% by using URL detection (Daeef et al., 2016). Therefore, the approach that 
the authors took to create the above solutions requires an additional feature and some 
elements of the website to make it more accurate.  
    On the other hand, Dadkhah, Shamshirband and Abdul Wahab (2016) proposed a 
hybrid approach based on the use of classification algorithms that are capable of 
identifying various types of the phishing site. The authors report that their techniques 
can identify periodical phishing attacks and legitimate sites that are embedded with 
malicious code more effectively compared to other techniques (Dadkhah, 
Shamshirband and Abdul Wahab, 2016). In a similar vein, Tahir et al. (2016) proposed 
a hybrid model for classification to overcome phishing website attacks. They tested 




incorporate into their hybrid solution. Moreover, their experiment result revealed that a 
combination of a Bayesian network (BN) and the instance-based learning with 
parameter k (IBK) model gave the best classification accuracy (97.75%) (Tahir et al., 
2016).  
     Vargas et al. (2016) presented the results of an analysis into the elements of web 
pages that focused on the content and HTML structure as well as the domain 
registration records and DNS information of the sites in order to look for patterns and 
correlations between phishing sites. In this way, they provided insights into how 
phishers operate and provided guidance on how to build better tools for the detection 
of phishing activities (Vargas et al., 2016) 
    Abutair and Belghith (2017) proposed a multi-agent system for phishing detection, 
which is an adaptive intelligent technique that acts on distributed case-based 
reasoning (CBR). The authors considered that a very significant advantage of their 
scheme is its ability to detect and avoid the zero-hour attack (Abutair and Belghith, 
2017). It is also able to detect phishing attacks in a large-scale distributed system 
which shows the effectiveness and a high prediction. Weiss and Khoshgoftaar (2017) 
constructed several scenarios for phishing website detection. Besides, a novel transfer 
learning technique called canonical correlation analysis is used to align the feature 
space between the training and testing data. The authors report that the result of their 
experiment showed that their scheme was able to achieve an average of 87.5% 
accuracy (Weiss and Khoshgoftaar, 2017). Sonowal and Kuppusamy (2017) proposed 
an approach that detects phishing by using a multilayer model that contains five layers: 
an auto-upgrade whitelist, URL features layer, lexical signature layer, string-matching 
layer and accessibility score comparison layer (Sonowal and Kuppusamy, 2017). The 
experiment result showed that the proposed model was able to detect phishing sites 
with an accuracy of 92.72%. The detection rate of this approaches could be improved 
as the implementation is not best result and further work in this area is necessary such 




dynamic way in which phishers use various tools to create a web page that is similar 
to real ones.  
     Park, Quadari and Tsang (2017) proposed a framework for phishing detection that 
discovers phishing websites based on existing and newly detected heuristics. The 
authors report that their heuristics-based solution is a new way of detecting phishing 
(Park, Quadari and Tsang, 2017). Abutair and Belghith (2017) proposed a case-based 
phishing detection system. Their scheme is designed to be updated frequently with 
approved phishing attack experiences. The authors report that their experiment result 
showed that their approach was able to achieve a classification accuracy of 95.62% 
(Abutair and Belghith, 2017). Subasi et al. (2017) proposed an intelligent phishing 
attack detection method that uses various data mining techniques to identify the 
classes of websites. The result of their experiment showed that among the 
classification techniques tested the RF algorithm gave the best performance, achieving 
an accuracy of 97.36% (Subasi et al., 2017). The approaches are designed to protect 
user online against phishing attacks. Nevertheless, the solution was based on text-
only and adding more website feature such as frame and image feature will improve 
the accuracy of the system.    
    Srinivasa Rao and Pais (2017) proposed a solution to automate the behavioural 
process of online users submitting fake credentials to the login page before submitting 
their actual credentials. Their application, FeedPhish, feeds a fake value into the login 
page. Based on their experiment results, the authors report that their proposed method 
was able to achieve an accuracy of 96.38%. Their application has an advantage in that 
it does not rely on any third-party service or prior knowledge such as the web history 
or a blacklist or whitelist of URLs. This service allows the scheme to detect not only 
zero-day phishing attacks but also phishing sites that are hosted on compromised 




     Dhanalakshmi et al. (2017) proposed an end-host-based anti-phishing algorithm 
which is based on the characteristic of the phishing hyperlink. The approach that they 
used to develop their solution is an improvement on those proposed in some previous 
works, but it still requires additional features such as images and frames to make it 
more robust. Ramesh, Gupta and Gamya (2017) proposed a method that automatically 
identifies the victimised domain very effectively and differentiates domain with phishing 
web content. The authors report that the result of their experiments showed that their 
model is efficient in protecting users from phishing attacks with 99.54% accuracy 
(Ramesh, Gupta and Gamya, 2017). The developed methodology is an excellent way 
to start the detection of a phishing website. However, the small dataset means that the 
robustness of the scheme is not proven. They also need to incorporate more analysis 
into the scheme and expand the test.  
     Wu et al. (2017) proposed an innovative technique based on deep-learning 
techniques to address the challenges associated with phishing attacks. The results of 
their experiment show that the scheme is more effective and accurate (Wu et al., 
2017). In other previous work in this area, Shirazi, Haefner and Ray (2017) used an 
SVM in combination with stratified k-fold validation and grid search. The results of their 
experiment indicated that their system is more efficient and accurate than some 
comparable approaches. On the other hand, Machado and Gadge (2017) proposed 
an efficient way to detect phishing websites using the C4.5 decision tree approach and 
URL features. They reported that their solution provides 89.40% phishing detection 
accuracy (Machado and Gadge, 2017).    
    Wen, Zhao and Yan (2018) proposed a comprehensive associated analysis model 
for malicious web page detection that uses topic tracking, abnormal topic discovery, 
web page similarity, web page structure analysis and URL analysis. The authors 
reported that the result of their experiment showed that their method is better than the 
existing systems and has high classification accuracy (Wen, Zhao and Yan, 2018). 




described as a new recognition and mitigation approach, where deep packet 
inspection (DPI) is used while leveraging software-defined networking (SDN) to identify 
phishing activities through web-based and email communication. Their experiment 
showed that their model provides a practical solution to deter malicious activities (Chin, 
Xiong and Hu, 2018). The approach the authors adopted to develop their solution is 
better than those against which it was compared, but there is still room for improvement 
according to the author. 
    Gawade et al. (2018) proposed a solution in which they collected data from 
PhishTank for URL analysis and performed classification analysis on it using the RF 
algorithm. They develop an application that compares every parsed feature with a 
phishing feature, and if any features are detected, it would be classified as legitimate 
or phishing (Gawade et al., 2018). Oest et al. (2018) also proposed a new generic 
classification model for phishing URLs which applied up-to-date used social 
engineering techniques and reveals a relationship between URL type and 
compromised infrastructure use (Oest et al., 2018). Thaker et al. (2018) as well 
proposed a system that can detect phishing URLs that have no past behaviours by 
which to detect them. The result of their experiment showed that their system was able 
to achieve an accuracy of 97.25% (Thaker et al., 2018). These approaches are mainly 
motivated to protect organisation interests. Nonetheless, they do not directly defend 
against phishing attack for users.  
     Babagoli, Aghababa and Solouk (2018) proposed a model for phishing website 
detection that utilises a meta-heuristic-based non-linear regression algorithm together 
with a feature selection approach. The authors report that their approach was able to 
produce a detection rate of 96.32% and performed better than an SVM (Babagoli, 
Aghababa and Solouk, 2018).     Sankhyan et al. (2018) similarly proposed a solution 
that focuses on discerning the significant features that distinguish between fake and 




anti-phishing technique that can detect phishing websites and alert inexperienced 
Internet users to threats (AlShboul et al., 2018).   
     Parekh et al. (2018) proposed a solution for phishing detection that uses the RF 
algorithm to detect fake URLs. The authors concluded that their technique has an 
excellent performance in phishing detection with an accuracy rate of around 95%. 
Tyagi et al. (2018) proposed a solution for phishing prediction that is based on machine 
learning algorithms. For instance, in their experiment, the classification accuracy of the 
RF algorithm after applying PCA improved to 98.4% from 96.71% (Tyagi et al., 2018). 
Sonowal and Kuppusamy (2018) proposed a model based on a multidimensional 
similarity metrics scheme for screen reader users to help them detect phishing 
activities. Thus their work draws the attention of researchers to the need to develop 
anti-phishing tools to protect persons with visual impairment (Sonowal and 
Kuppusamy, 2018). Shyni, Sundar and Ebby (2018) proposed a technique called parse 
tree validation to detect whether a web page is phishing or legitimate. Their technique 
was able to achieve a false negative rate of 7.3% and a false positive rate of 5.2% 
(Shyni, Sundar and Ebby, 2018).  
   Jain and Gupta (2019) proposed an approach that can detect phishing attacks by 
analysing the links found in the HTML source code of the website. The solution 
incorporates many new outstanding hyperlinks specific features to detect a phishing 
attack. The result of their experiment was compared methods for phishing detection 
and discover that their scheme is relatively high accuracy in phishing website 
detection, which achieved more than 98.4% accuracy (Jain and Gupta, 2019). 
Recently, Li et al. (2019) presented a model to detect phishing web pages that use 
URL and HTML features. They also designed a lightweight features HTML and URL, 
which they introduced HTML string-embedding without using third-party services, 
which allows their model to work in a real-time detection application. The authors report 
that their scheme was able to achieve 97.30% accuracy and 4.46% true positive rate 




also proposed a solution called two-factor authentication (2FA)-PP; the scheme is a 
phishing detection that protects user’s novel browser APIs that support direct 
communication between mobile devices and a web browser which enable the user’s 
device to check the domain to which the user is accessing. The solution is can be 
integrated with some other 2-factor authentication models, such as QR codes and OTP 
that are an interactive and pairing device which are non-interactive (Ulqinaku, Lain and 
Capkun, 2019). However, the above model has impressive techniques an attacker can 
tamper with result of the verification using man in the middle attack and therefor corrupt 
the recognitions of all the system. 
2.4.3 Blacklist-Based Approaches 
Phishing attacks are widespread in today’s cyber world, and they are increasing in 
number and complexity day by day. One of the other approaches that have been 
developed and implemented to resolve this issue is the provision of additional security 
features within Internet browsers that mostly rely on ‘blacklisting’, which is a process 
that compares a URL with a list of URLs belonging to the blacklist (Prakash et al., 
2010). Blacklisting is an approach that is similar to the use of signatures by anti-virus 
programs that maintain a blacklist of sites that contain malicious content. Whenever a 
user tries to access a web page that is on a blacklist; an appropriate warning is 
generated to alert the user (Li et al., 2014). Microsoft chose to use this approach and 
some heuristics in version 11 of IE (Microsoft, 2015). However, blacklisting is reactive 
and can be evaded by the rapid reusing of blocked phishing websites. Nevertheless, 
the blacklisting of known spammers has been one of the effective spam-filtering 
techniques. These methods may also contain domain used by known spammers, the 
IP addresses of open relays and proxies, virus and exploit attackers for better 
blacklisting solution (Chen et al., 2014). 
    Whittaker, Ryner and Nazif (2010) developed a scalable machine learning classifier 




blacklist automatically. Their classifier examines millions of web pages daily, analysing 
the URL and the content of the page to determine whether it is a phishing site. Their 
model classifies web pages that are submitted by end-users and those that are 
collected by Gmail’s spam filters. The scheme also extracts and analyses some of the 
features associated with these sites. These features describe the composition of the 
web page’s URL; the page HTML content and the hosting of the site that is collected 
by the web crawler. They trained their classifier on a noisy dataset consisting of millions 
of samples from previously collected live classification data. A logistic regression 
classifier was used to make the final decision as to whether a page was phishing or 
legitimate based on the selected features. Despite the noise in the training dataset, the 
classifier was able to learn a robust model for identifying phishing sites and was able 
to correctly classify more than 90% of the phishing pages (Whittaker, Ryner and Nazif, 
2010).    
    Abraham and Raj (2014) proposed a string-matching method for detecting phishing 
attacks. Their method determines the degree of similarity a URL with blacklisted URLs. 
Hence, based on the textual elements of the URL, it can be classified as a phishing 
attack or otherwise. From their experiment results, the method was found to be 
effective in detecting phishing attacks with a shallow false-negative rate and an 
accuracy of 99.5% (Abraham and Raj, 2014). Hawanna, Kulkarni and Rane (2016) 
proposed a novel algorithm which detects whether a given URL is that of a legitimate 
or phishing website. Their algorithm performs a check against Google’s updated 
blacklist and also utilises Google search engine results, the Alexa ranking and the 
number of URL-based features in order to detect phishing URLs. They use a safe 
browsing API to check URLs against Google’s blacklist update for malware and 
phishing pages. The authors report that the algorithm is useful in detecting both known 
and unknown phishing URLs and that it can give a speedy response in the case of 




    Furthermore, they stated that their solution provides the user with an alert message 
to let them know that the URL could lead to a potential phishing attack (Hawanna, 
Kulkarni and Rane, 2016). The approach used to develop the solution is decent, but it 
requires an additional feature to make it more efficient. However, they require an 
additional feature to make it more efficient in detection. 
     Li and Wang (2017) proposed a model called PhishBox that efficiently gathers 
phishing data and produces models for phishing validation and detection. The said 
approach incorporates phishing detection and validation and website data collection 
into an online tool that monitors the PhishTank blacklist to validate and detect phishing 
websites in real-time. Moreover, the model uses a two-stage detection procedure to 
ensure better performance. The result of the experiment showed that their two-stage 
model was capable of verifying phishing websites. Moreover, they monitored the 
blacklist and found that the blacklist contained a lot of invalid data. Hence, their scheme 
can remove five times more than regularly update in blacklist database after a week 
(Li and Wang, 2017).  
    Peng, Harris and Sawa (2018) proposed an approach that uses natural language 
processing techniques to analyse text and detect statements that are indicative of 
phishing attacks. Their approach is novel compared to the previous solutions because 
it focuses on the natural language text contained in the phishing attack and performs 
a semantic analysis of the text to detect phishing attacks. Natural language processing 
techniques are applied to parse each sentence and identify the semantic roles of 
essential words in the sentence. Their approach has a low false-negative rate, which 
shows that semantic information is a useful indicator in identifying phishing attacks 
(Peng, Harris and Sawa, 2018). They also report that the approach was able to achieve 





2.4.4 Whitelist-Based Approaches 
In phishing and pharming, the aim is to trick users into submitting their confidential 
information to fraudulent websites whose appearance looks similar to that of the 
original ones. The whitelist-based approach for phishing detection involves storing all 
the legitimate website URLs in a database such that any website visited by the user 
can be checked against this list to identify whether the site is phishing, suspicious or 
legitimate website. However, the whitelist approach is challenging to use because it is 
impossible to store all the legitimate websites that exist in the global cyber world. 
However, researchers have investigated the whitelist-based approach in order to 
protect the user from a phishing attack.  
    In light of the above, a proactive scheme to identify new phishing URLs accurately 
must be developed and implemented to improve the protection of online users (Le, 
Markopoulou and Faloutsos, 2010). Whitelist techniques are the most shared and 
straightforward type of anti-phishing solution. However, their general ineffectiveness 
means that this technology lags due to the continual emergence of new phishing 
websites (Huh and Kim, 2011).  
      Han et al. (2012) proposed an approach known as an automated individual whitelist 
(AILW) to protect the user’s digital web identities. Their scheme leverages a naïve 
Bayesian algorithm to maintain an individual whitelist of a user automatically. If the 
user tries to submit his/her account information to a web page that does not match the 
whitelist, the model alerts the user about possible attacks. The scheme also keeps 
track of the features of login pages such as the paths to the DOM and the IP address 
in the input form. Their model can effectively protect users against phishing attacks 
and dynamic pharming. The result of their experiment confirmed that a model is a 
useful tool that can protect web identities (Han et al., 2012). The detection algorithm 




features is small compared to the dynamic way in which features are used in phishing 
attacks. 
     For instance, Jain and Gupta (2016) proposed an approach to protect against 
phishing attacks that are based on the Google open DNS whitelist and hyperlink 
features and that use the auto-update of the legitimate site accessed by the user. Their 
approach can detect various types of the phishing attack, such as poisoning, DNS, 
embedded objects and zero-hour attacks in a real-time environment. The approach 
was able to achieve an 86.02% true positive rate and a 1.48% false-positive rate (Jain 
and Gupta, 2016a). Whitelist methods are the most common and straightforward 
solution. However, their ineffectiveness has made this technology lag behind new 
phishing websites.  
     Likewise, Armano, Marchal and Asokan (2016) proposed a new phishing detection 
technique that can be implanted as a client-side application and as a web browser add-
on. Their application makes use of information that is extracted from a website visited 
by the user to detect whether the site is fake, and it warns the user if that is the case. 
In addition to detecting a phishing site, the solution also offers a redirect to the 
legitimate website. Their implementation was able to deliver the intended goal. The 
warning message produced by the warning system contains specific information about 
phishing attacks and offer the user three alternative options. First understanding the 
risk of a phishing attack by the user and second is to proceed to the website is the web 
page is in the whitelist, third is by clicking the check-in the warning message so as the 
application not to think the web page is phishing (Armano, Marchal and Asokan, 2016). 
2.4.5 Toolbar Approach   
Security organisations and experts and researchers in the field of security are 
concentrating on developing an anti-phishing toolbar which employs a whitelist-based, 




phishing accurately and to prevent the user from becoming a victim of a phishing attack 
(Purkait, 2015). The approach proposed by Moghimi and Varjani (2016) aimed to 
determine the relationship between the page address and page content and was based 
on extracted feature sets. However, in addition, a hidden knowledge rule was 
formulated and embedded in a browser extension in order to detect phishing attacks 
in Internet banking sites, which achieved high accuracy and reliability (Moghimi and 
Varjani, 2016). The authors used an SVM algorithm to classify phishing web pages, 
and they used 10-fold cross-validation to test and train their model. The proposed 
model was able to detect phishing activities in Internet banking with an accuracy of 
99.14% for true positives and 0.86% for false positives. 
   Sharma, Meenakshi and Bhatia (2017) carried out a survey and compared eight 
different types of phishing detection tool to find the tool that was the most effective. 
They tested each of the tools against a dataset consisting of 2,000 verified phishing 
websites reported between August 2016 and March 2017 that were collected from a 
reliable platform. The authors discovered that the anti-phishing toolbar performed very 
well as it was able to identify 94.32% of the phishing and legitimate websites in the 
dataset. However, they also conducted a survey and found that close to 61% of the 
respondents were unaware of phishing detection tools (Sharma, Meenakshi and 
Bhatia, 2017).  
     The toolbar developed in the current study uses a combination of the above 
methods. The publicly available information provided on the websites from which the 
toolbars were downloaded as well as our observations that were derived from using 
each toolbar gave us a basic understanding of how each toolbar works. An overview 
of some of the most well-known toolbars is provided below. 
Cloudmark Anti-Phishing Toolbar:  
The Cloudmark anti-phishing toolbar relies on the rating the user gives when he/she 




The toolbar runs on Microsoft IE and displays a coloured icon for each web page 
visited. The toolbar shows a green icon for a site that is rated by users as legitimate 
and a red icon for sites that have been confirmed as fraudulent, while a yellow icon 
indicates that not enough information is available about the site to make a precise 
determination. Besides, users are rated according to their record of correctly identifying 
phishing sites (Wardman et al., 2011). Furthermore, each site’s rating is computed by 
aggregating all the ratings given for that site, while each user’s rating of the site 
weighted according to that user’s reputation.      
EarthLink Anti-Phishing Toolbar:  
The EarthLink Toolbar is a Firefox and an IE extension. It provides a collective user 
browsing experience with features to improve phishing detection. It also provides 
constant updates and pop-up blockers that prevent unwanted pop-ups when the user 
visits a website (Zhao et al., 2017). Moreover, it also provides a spam blocker that 
warns the user about the potential risk of a phishing attack. Besides, it provides the 
location and further information about the organisation purported to be responsible for 
the website that the user is visiting (Arachchilage, Love and Beznosov, 2016). 
   Furthermore, it gives warnings to the user about the safety of websites by showing 
a red thumb sign for a phishing web page or a green thumb sign if the web page is 
safe, but if the web page is suspicious, it provides information about it (Arachchilage 
and Love, 2014). However, the toolbar does not provide real-time protection as the 
warning is provided after the user has input sensitive information into the web page, 
and the updating of the toolbar takes a long time. 
eBay Account Guard Toolbar: 
The eBay Account Guard toolbar provides an indicator that notifies the user that the 
current website that he/she is visiting is the bona fide eBay site. The green indicator 




phishing website that is on the blacklist database maintained by eBay, and the grey 
icon is for all other sites (eBay, 2010). 
GeoTrustWatch Anti-Phishing Toolbar: 
The GeoTrustWatch anti-phishing toolbar provides domain validation of the SSL 
certificate that employs encryption by signing the request form of the website through 
enrolment which is meant to protect the user from potential security risks (Upadhyaya, 
2012). This toolbar function is useful against phishing because many legitimate 
websites use the SSL to encrypt the transmission of the user’s sensitive information, 
whereas most phishing sites do not. Phisher avoids SSL because they need to obtain 
an SSL certificate from a public certificate authority (CA), such as VeriSign, which 
requires site identity information that can be traced back to the originator (Purkait, 
2015). Using a CA that is not known to the browser will cause the user to be more 
cautious and thus increase their level of suspicious about a website. The solution also 
provides security for business identity authentication via secure 256-bit encryption, 
2048-bit root and support for more than 99% of web browsers on both desktops and 
mobile devices. The toolbar only gives an identity of the user response for the less 
secure domain (Purkait, 2015). The toolbar provides the user with warnings in various 
colours and information about the website they are visiting, and it is free to download. 
As phishers use a range of deception tools, providing this type of warning information 
helps the user to check the legitimacy of the websites he/she visits. 
GoldPhish Toolbar: 
The GoldPhish toolbar was originally developed by Dunlop et al. (2010). It provides 
zero-day protection against phishing attacks with high precision. However, the time 
consumption of the system in scrutinising websites is quite high. The approach uses a 
browser plug-in to detect and report phishing sites. There are three main steps in 
GoldPhish that are followed. First, the current website in the user web browser is 




readable text. Then the text is input into a search engine to retrieve the results. Their 
application compares the top-level and second-level domain of the website the user is 
visiting with the first four in the Google search engine results. When a match is found, 
the application can verify the website and notify the user via the GoldPhish toolbar that 
the website is legitimate. The solution produced 98% true positives and 2% false 
positives when it was tested on over 100 sites. However, this method has unstable 
performance because an image could be manipulated with little variation, causing the 
process to fail in terms of accuracy. However, their solution is better than the previous 
image comparison methods that relied on a database. Nevertheless, more 
comprehensive tests need to be carried out as 100 sites are small in comparison to 
the number of phishing sites that spring up every day.  
Google Safe Browsing Anti-Phishing Toolbar:  
The Google Safe Browsing toolbar is an extension for Google Chrome and Firefox web 
browsers (Chiew et al., 2015). This extension can alert the user that a site is fraudulent 
by referring to a blacklist when the user visits a web page (Chang et al., 2013). The 
extension uses two methods to detect a fraudulent web page. The user can either ask 
Google about each site he/she visits or download the Google list of websites that have 
been identified as suspicious. If the user downloads the website list, the web browser 
will update the blacklist each time before a new browser window is opened. The 
Google Safe Browsing extension check if the web page visited is in the blacklist stored 
locally (Google, 2016). However, if the user chooses to ask Google whether the 
website, he/she is visiting is legitimate or fake, the request is sent to a server 
maintained by Google. Then an analysis is conducted and returned by the server. If 
the page visited is considered to be a misleading one, the toolbar will stop the user’s 
activities and give a warning advising the user on the next action to take, and the user 
is also able to report false or harmful web pages (Google, 2016).     




Internet Explorer SmartScreen Filter:  
Microsoft has incorporated a SmartScreen filter into its IE web browser that acts as a 
phishing filter. The filter utilises a server-side blacklist and a client-side whitelist that is 
maintained by Microsoft to perform a safety check to determine the legitimacy of a web 
page (Whittaker, Ryner and Nazif, 2010). If the web page is a phishing page, it 
automatically prevents the user from visiting the website (Microsoft, 2015). The 
detection mechanism uses the web address, which it sends to Microsoft’s server to 
query it against the blacklist database and then returns the detection result to the client-
side. This plug-in can alert the user about spoof web pages. After the user visits a 
website, the domain name is checked by the plug-in for the possibility of spoofing. 
Hence, the address that is visited is also checked against keywords that are stored in 
the blacklist. So, if the real domain name is different, the user is then alerted about a 
possible threat and the browser will block the user’s attempt to visit the web page 
(Microsoft, 2015).  
 McAfee Anti-phishing Filter: 
The McAfee anti-phishing filter checks the web page the user is visiting by providing 
the URL of the site to McAfee for evaluation and validation. If the web page is identified 
as a phishing page, a warning is presented to the user in a black colour and if the web 
page is suspicious it displays a warning in a grey colour, but if the web page is secure 
and safe the user is allowed to continue with his/her activities (Sharma, Meenakshi 
and Bhatia, 2017). However, the toolbar warning is passive, so some users may be 
unaware that this toolbar is installed on their browser (Armano, Marchal and Asokan, 
2016). 
Netcraft Anti-phishing Toolbar:  
The Netcraft anti-phishing toolbar relies on a blacklist-based phishing filter that 
includes the URL, domain name, hostname, registration date and domain registration 




URL and compares it with a blacklist stored in their server to process the information 
in the browser (Zhang et al., 2012). This method uses various risk rates. If the web 
page the user is visiting has a risk rate that is higher than the prescribed rate for a safe 
website, Netcraft will inform the user about the danger and advise him/her on how to 
continue browsing safely. The main drawbacks of Netcraft are, firstly, that the 
connection with blacklist may be slow, so the warning pop-up takes time to appear, 
and secondly, the user may have to present their sensitive information to the web page 
before finding out whether it is safe or not. This means that the toolbar is both weak 
and time-consuming and therefore, may cause the user to be vulnerable to phishing 
attacks. The toolbar is designed for phishing prevention, even though most of its 
functionalities are not directly associated with the prevention of phishing. These are 
designed to identify fraudulent web pages they spoof, and they are short-lived against 
the legitimate site that is a US-based corporation but also registered in another country. 
   The heuristic-based anti-phishing technique uses website features such as text and 
frame content for phishing detection analysis to create a strong classification model 
(Lee and Park, 2016). Others use the blacklist/whitelist approach, which is similar to 
the use of signatures in anti-virus software solutions that maintain a blacklist of the 
sites that contain malicious content. Blacklisting is reactive and can be evaded by the 
rapid recycling of blocked phishing web pages. Therefore, for our solution, all the 
features and techniques listed in Table 2-1 will be explored in order to develop a robust 
phishing detection and protection scheme. As these features and techniques have not 
been used together in a single solution in any of the previous approaches, this 







Table 2-1: Techniques Used by Anti-Phishing Plug-ins and their Level of Effectiveness 
Anti-Phishing Plug-ins Techniques Browser Effectiveness % Service 
Type 
GoldPhish Heuristics & Features-based IE 98 Free  
Cloudmark Heuristics  IE 94 Free  
Microsoft 
SmartScreen 
Blacklist and Whitelist IE 95.9 Free  
Netcraft 
(Customised) 
Blacklist and Whitelist Chrome; 
Firefox 
90 Free  
SpoofGuard Heuristics & Features-based
   
IE 91 Free  
Phishdentity Google search-by-image API IE 97.2 Research 
PhisTackle Heuristics & Features-based IE 91.3 Research 
PhishGuard Heuristics Firefox 94 Research 
PhishIdentifier Heuristics Firefox 92 Research 
PhishTester Heuristics & Features-based IE 97.1 Research 
CANTINA+ Heuristics & Features-based IE 98.06 Research 
PhishAri Features-based Chrome 92.52 Research 
PhishShield Heuristics & Features-based Chrome 96.57 Research 
PhishNet Blacklist Chrome 95.0 Research 
PhishDef Heuristics & Features-based Chrome 97 Research  
Google safe 
browsing 
Blacklist  Chrome; 
Firefox 
93.3 Free  
PhishZoo Heuristics Chrome 96.10 Research 
Seclayer Heuristics & Features-based IE; Chrome 91 Free  





Table 2-2 shows the type of features used that each of the plug-ins listed in Table 2-1 
uses for phishing detection. Column 1 in Table 2-2 contains the list of phishing plug-
ins, and the rest of the columns illustrate the type of features each plug-in uses in their 
detection model. As indicated in the table, the majority of the plug-ins use text and a 
heuristic approach. 
Table 2-2: Techniques and Features Used by Anti-Phishing Plug-ins for Phishing Detection 
   Phishing Plug-in  Techniques/Features 
 AI Frame Heuristic  Image Text Whitelist & Blacklist 
GoldPhish   √ √ √  
Cloudmark   √  √  
Microsoft SmartScreen     √ √ 
Netcraft (Customisable)      √ 
SpoofGuard   √  √  




   Phishing Plug-in  Techniques/Features 
PhisTackle    √ √  
PhishGuard   √  √  
PhishIdentifier   √  √  
PhishTester   √  √  
CANTINA+   √  √  
PhishAri     √  
PhishShield   √  √  
PhishNet      √ 
PhishDef   √    
Google safe browsing      √ 
PhishZoo   √  √  
Seclayer   √    
IPDPS √ √ √ √ √ √ 
2.5 Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS)  
The ANFIS has been used for decades in engineering science to embed expert input 
into a computer model for a broad range of applications. It offers a capable alternative 
for determining operational risk. The integration of the neural network and fuzzy 
inference systems is formulated into concurrent and neuro-fuzzy models, which use 
human expertise by loading essential components in rule-based form and perform 
fuzzy reasoning to deduce the overall output value (Nguyen, Nguyen and To, 2016). 
There are two types of fuzzy inference system models: the Mamdani and the Sugeno 
model (Karaboga and Kaya, 2016). These fuzzy inference systems have two inputs 
and one output. Mamdani’s fuzzy inference model was initially the standard fuzzy 
methodology and was the first control system built using fuzzy set theory. The 
Mamdani neuro-fuzzy system uses a supervised learning technique, namely, back-
propagation learning, to acquire the parameters of the membership functions (Çakıt 
and Karwowski, 2017). On the other hand, the Sugeno neuro-fuzzy system applies 
hybrid techniques including back-propagation to study the membership functions, and 
least mean square estimation to fix the coefficients of the linear mixtures in the 




   Aburrous et al. (2010) implemented an intelligent and efficient model based on an 
associative classification and data mining algorithm. This algorithm is used to identify 
rules and factors, to classify the phishing website and the relationship that correlate 
the factors and standards together. The authors demonstrated the flexibility of using 
associative classification techniques in an experiment involving a large dataset and 
showed that the proposed algorithm gave a better performance as compared to 
traditional classification algorithms. Nevertheless, they did not use different pruning 
techniques to remove rules that resulted in incorrect classifications, which reduced the 
accuracy rate of their algorithm (Aburrous et al., 2010). 
      Ba Lam et al. (2014) also proposed techniques to detect phishing websites that 
apply fuzzy logic based on the features of the URL. They created an algorithm to check 
the URL of a page. The algorithm extracts some features in the URL, such as the 
primary domain, sub-domain, path domain and the domain itself (Ba Lam et al., 2014). 
The authors report that the result of their experiment showed that the approach had a 
98.18% success rate in phishing site detection. Barraclough, Sexton and Aslam (2015) 
developed an online toolbar, which continuously runs in the background of the IE web 
browser, checking all websites user requests against a set of data in real-time. To 
detect phishing web pages, their approach uses a neuro-fuzzy scheme with six inputs: 
ethical site rules, user behaviour profile, PhishTank, user-specific sites, pop-up 
windows, and user credential profile. The toolbar was developed using 300 broad 
features based on six sets of inputs. This data is fed into the feature extractor algorithm 
based on neuro-fuzzy. The toolbar compares web page requests against features and 
downloads the website features if a suspicious site is detected (Barraclough, Sexton 
and Aslam, 2015). The result of their experiment indicated that their proposed 
approach improved the rate of phishing detection in real-time. However, they 
concentrated only on text-based features, so they could expand their approach further 
by analysing frame and image features to achieve better accuracy. The main 




interface algorithm for toolbar detection. This aspect of their toolbar will be integrated 
into our system implementation. Because of voice generation for visual impeded user 
and the colour warning system for those with hearing aids.  
    Paliwal, Anand and Khan (2016) developed an intelligent phishing system by using 
a fuzzy-based fuzzy inference system. They used a University College Irwin (UCI) 
machine learning dataset to test their scheme and found that the scheme gave 
satisfactory results. The developed model was tested against 60 websites, of which 30 
were phishing websites, 15 were doubtful, and 15 were legitimate. Moreover, the 
dataset was tested on other classifiers to justify their claim. The authors report that 
their proposed approach was able to perform better than other classifiers such as naïve 
Bayes and the J48 system. The approach used to develop their solution is better than 
some others, but it requires additional features such frames and images, to make it 
more robust (Paliwal, Anand and Khan, 2016). Nguyen, Nguyen and To (2016) also 
proposed a solution for phishing detection based on neuro-fuzzy without using rule 
sets. Their approach has a high detection rate but fails to consider the valuable aspects 
of the website in the detection process (Nguyen, Nguyen and To, 2016). However, this 
limitation could be overcome by expanding the features used in the detection to include 
images and frames. 
     Pham et al. (2018) developed a neuro-fuzzy framework to detect phishing websites. 
The framework is based on URL features and web traffic features. Their designed 
scheme monitors phishing activities and protects fog users from phishing attacks. The 
framework consists of two components: an identification module and a backend. The 
identification module is deployed at the fog nodes to observe and detect the requested 
URL. This module discovers websites that pose a threat and prevents the user from 
visiting those websites. The backend is placed in the cloud and acts as a tool that 
manages the activities of the phishing attacks. The authors’ experiment result showed 
that their model could effectively prevent phishing attacks in real-time at fog nodes and 




2.6  Deep Machine Learning 
Currently, machine learning is continuously demonstrating its effectiveness in an 
extensive range of applications. This technology has come to the fore in recent times, 
owing to the advent of big data (Sahingoz et al., 2019). Big data has enabled machine 
learning algorithms to discover more fine-grained patterns and to make more accurate 
and timely predictions than ever before (Zhou et al., 2017). Machine learning 
techniques are used for object identification in images, the transcription of voice into 
text, matching news items and products with user interests and presenting relevant 
search results (Tyagi et al., 2018). The most common form of machine learning, 
whether deep or not, is supervised learning (Yao, Ding and Li, 2018).  
     Machine learning methods such deep learning (DL) have become a crucial tool for 
a broad range of applications such as image classification, natural language 
processing and speech recognition (Montavon, Samek and Müller, 2018). Machine 
learning is adopted in a wide range of domains, mostly in cybersecurity to evaluate the 
techniques to apply to the detection of intrusion, malware, spam and phishing 
(Apruzzese et al., 2018). Deep-learning architectures are composed of non-linear 
operations in multiple levels, such as neural networks with hidden layers, or of 
complicated relational methods in reusable approaches (Montavon, Samek and Müller, 
2018). The deep-learning concept started with the study of artificial neural networks 
(ANNs) (Vazhayil, Vinayakumar and Soman, 2018), and it has become an active 
research area in recent years.  
     Deep-learning techniques have also been found to be suitable for big data analysis 
and been successfully applied in pattern recognition, computer vision, natural 
language processing, speech recognition and recommender systems. In a standard 
neural network (NN), neurons are used to produce real-value activations, and with the 
adjustment of weights, the scheme behaves as required. Moreover, training the ANN 




played a vital role in the model in the past decades. Although training accuracy is high 
with back-propagation, when it is applied to testing data, its performance might not be 
satisfactory (Liu et al., 2017).  
     Yi et al. (2018) designed two sets of features for web-phishing interaction features 
and original content. They also developed a scheme based on a deep belief network 
(DBN). The test, which included using real IP flows from an Internet service provider 
(ISP), indicated that the proposed DBN-based model was able to achieve an 
approximately 90% true positive rate.      Also, in the area automotive proposed in 
(CireşAn et al., 2012) in which a deep NN was used to assist the driver in the aspect 
of traffic light classification, the techniques were used to develop a system to assist in 
driving.  
     Below are some of the advantages of deep learning algorithms (Liu et al., 2017): 
1. It has robust unsupervised learning by getting most of its connecting structure 
in other to observe data, which is crucial in other to limit an enormous number 
of tasks and if the upcoming tasks are not known on time. 
2. It can learn from mostly unlabelled data. This means that it can work in a semi-
supervised situation, where not all of the dataset has comprehensive and 
correct semantic tags. 
3. It can exploit the interactions that are existing across a vast number of tasks. 
These interactions exist because all that the algorithm task offer is a diverse 
view of the same underlying reality.    
4. It can learn multifaceted, highly varying function with several disparities much 
higher than the number of training instances. 
5. It can learn low-, mid- and high-level concepts with little human input, which is 
useful in terms of characterising the type of intricate functions that are required 




6.  It can learn from a massive dataset of features and can compute the training 
data in a short period with several linear examples.    
However, there are some challenges associated with deep learning algorithms 
regarding the issue of the data used (Guo et al., 2016), as follows: 
1. Unbalanced data: This is an issue that occurs in learning and mostly happens 
during classification if there are more features of some class than others. This 
issue can be resolved by using some techniques that focus on the data level 
or the classifier level.  
2. Inadequate data for learning: This is an issue that occurs when a limited 
amount of data is available for cross-validation methods which are mostly 
applied by dividing the available data into two sets, one for learning and the 
other for validation, in order to check the behaviour of the network. However, 
to gain a better knowledge of the network, the size and features may be 
modified for training and evaluating the various aspects of the network.    
3. Overflow of data: This problem occurs in big data because the generation of 
data is growing exponentially, and it is forecast that the information contained 
big data will continue to increase daily. 
4. Partial data: Sometimes, a collection of data is used for solving a particular 
task, but the data becomes partial when some of it is lost or because some of 
its variables or features are unidentified. To resolve this issue, it is necessary 
to approximate missing values and then discover the relationship between the 
identified and unidentified data. There some methods based on NNs (Liu et al., 
2017) and some other approaches that can be used to solve the problem.  
5. High-measurement: Information in the real-world application is often 
overflowing from the determination of a specific problem point of view which 
can be handled by the algorithm.   




2.6.1 Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) 
Long short-term memory is based on the recurrent neural network (RNN), which is 
used to recognise the occurrence of patterns in time series and which also uses error 
flow in its analysis. However, the LSTM architecture was developed to overcome the 
shortfalls in RNN, which is a highly non-linear recurrent network with multiple gates 
and propagative feedback (Breuel et al., 2013). An LSTM layer contains a set of 
recurrently connected blocks, known as memory blocks. These blocks can be a look-
alike version of memory chips in a digital system. Hence, each of the blocks includes 
one or more repeatedly connected memory cells and contains three multiplicative 
units, namely, the input, forget gate and the output, which provide non-stop analogues 
of the read, write and reset functions for the block cells (Sundermeyer, Schlüter and 
Ney, 2012). The LSTM network has achieved excellent results in character recognition 
applications (Breuel et al., 2013). It has also been used extensively in the analysis of 
handwriting recognition, speech recognition and polyphonic music modelling, where 
the results have shown that its usage leads to an improvement in standard detection 
analysis with variance in the parameter (Greff et al., 2017). It has also been used in 
language modelling to analyse speech in a speech recognition system, where it was 
found to show an improvement in confusion over the RNN (Sundermeyer, Schlüter and 
Ney, 2012).         
     Bahnsen et al. (2017) investigated the performance of LSTM in their work on a 
solution for phishing site prediction that uses URLs as input for machine learning 
models. The authors compared a feature engineering approach with random forests 
(RF) classifier against a novel method based on RNNs. They used 14 features to build 
their lexical and statistical analysis of the URLs. They used an LSTM unit to build the 
model that receives as input a URL as a sequence of character and predicts whether 
the URL is phishing or legitimate. They also constructed a dataset that consisted of 




model had an overall higher prediction accuracy compared to the RF classifier without 
the need for expert knowledge to create the features. Their approach was able to 
achieve an accuracy of 98.7% even without the need for manual feature creation 
(Bahnsen et al., 2017). Their approach was part of the study that motivate this study 
using deep learning algorithm, because of the level of dataset used in their experiment 
and the features used with the result.  
2.6.2  Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) 
In recent years, the convolutional neural network (CNN) has seen massive adoption in 
computer vision applications (Yu et al., 2017). In the area of object recognition, CNN 
has also been used for feature extraction (Xu, Li and Deng, 2015). The CNN belongs 
to the family of multilayer NNs that are developed for use with two-dimensional data, 
such as videos and images (Arel, Rose and Karnowski, 2010). CNN is one of the most 
prominent deep-learning methods where numerous layers are trained using a rigorous 
methodology. 
     Recently, Yang, Zhao and Zeng (2019) proposed an approach for a 
multidimensional feature phishing detection solution that is based on a fast 
classification method using deep learning. In the initial stage, they extract the feature 
and sequence character of the URL and use deep learning for quick classification; note 
that this step does not require third-party assistance or prior awareness of phishing 
websites. In the next stage, they combine the URL demographic features, web page 
text, code features and the quick CNN-LSTM classification into multidimensional 
features. In total, they extracted 24 features from a given website to develop their 
model. After the extraction of the features from the different elements of the website 
were fused, they were fed in the CNN-LSTM algorithm is to generate an output used 
as in-depth URL features and combine it with the statistical URL, web page code, and 
the text features to build the multidimensional features that are classified using a 




detection time for setting a threshold that reduces the classification time. The scheme 
was applied to a dataset containing millions of legitimate and phishing URLs. The result 
of their experiment showed that it was able to achieve an accuracy of 98.99% and a 
false positive rate of just 0.5% (Yang, Zhao and Zeng, 2019). 
     Likewise, Vazhayil, Vinayakumar and Soman (2018) performed logistic regression 
using CNN, CNN-LSTM and a bigram to evaluate two datasets of URLs for phishing 
detection. They collected the dataset from four different sources: the 
MalwareDomainlist and MalwareDomain for malware URLs, and PhishTank and 
OpenPhish for phishing URLs. The dataset contained 60,000 training URLs and over 
56,000 testing URLs. The dataset was used to train the CNN and CNN-LSTM models 
to detect phishing URLs. The choice of the algorithm is that it can take raw data URLs 
as their input. The result of the experiment showed that the CNN-LSTM architecture 
performed better than the other model, achieving an accuracy rate of about 98% for 
the classification of URLs (Vazhayil, Vinayakumar and Soman, 2018). 
     Similarly, Yao, Ding and Li (2018) proposed a detection method with fast object 
recognition techniques using an improved R-CNN for small-scale identification. They 
decided to use a faster R-CNN with a feature pyramid network (FPN) for logo 
recognition because of the limited size of the two-dimensional code and because the 
size of logos embedded into websites is also small. Their method is comprised of three 
processes: recognition and extraction, logo extraction, and recognition and 
identification, First, the logo extraction process extracts the image used as a logo on a 
website as a two-dimensional code. Next, the recognition process is improved by using 
a fast R-CNN to identify the logo. The final process is the identification, which evaluates 
the consistency between the true uniqueness of the requested website and its defined 
identity. If the given website logo has consistency, then the site is confirmed as 
legitimate, whereas if it has inconsistency, then the website is considered to be a 
phishing site. The scheme was implemented on the Flickr logo-32plus dataset. The 




was able to perform logo recognition more effectively than other methods (Yao, Ding 
and Li, 2018).  
     Yuan et al. (2018) also proposed an in-depth learning approach for phishing 
detection using URL characters. They mapped URLs to documents and words using 
a word2vec-based embedding learning method. Hence, they combined the structure 
of the URLs with the embedded characters to acquire a vector representation of the 
URLs. Their detection system consists of three modules. One is the character 
embedding learning module which stores the vector representation of the characters 
in the URLs. Part of the detector module which is the third that involves training 
algorithms on the vector illustration of the URLs to classify them into legitimate and 
phishing websites. The scheme was tested on a publicly available dataset containing 
one million phishing websites. According to the authors, the result of the experiment 
showed that their method was able to achieve an accuracy of 99.69% (Yuan et al., 
2018).  
     Similarly, Le et al. (2018) proposed a solution called URLNet, which is an end-to-
end deep-learning framework for learning non-linear malicious URLs by detecting it 
from the URL. They applied a CNN to both the words and characters of the URL 
features to learn the URL embedding in a jointly optimised framework. This approach 
allowed their model to capture several types of semantic data, which would not have 
been possible using existing schemes. They also presented advanced word-
embeddings to solve the problem of too many rare words being observed in a 
classification task (Le et al., 2018). They conducted their experiments on a large-scale 
dataset and demonstrated that their proposed method gave a strong performance that 
was better than that of an existing method. The approach has two branches; the first 
branch has a character-level CNN where character-level embedding is used to 
represent the URL. The second branch contains a word-level CNN where word-level 




character-level embedding and individual word-embedding. Their approach works in 
such a manner that it does not require any expertise.   
     As mentioned above, CNN has also been shown to be highly effective in computer 
vision applications (Guo et al., 2016) and is, therefore, commonly used for that 
purpose. The CNN contains an input layer, convolution layer, pooling layer, fully 
connected layer, and output layer. The input layer holds the raw image values; the 
convolutional layer computes the output of the node that is connected to local regions 
in the input layer; the pooling layer performs a down-sampling process along the three-
dimensional dimensions; the fully connected layer calculates the session scores, and 
the output layer produces the results. Currently, three main techniques are used in 
CNN for image classification: (1) unsupervised pre-training of the CNN with supervised 
fine-tuning, (2) transfer learning by fine-tuning the CNN models that have been pre-
trained on a natural image dataset and (3) training the CNN from scratch using 
available pre-trained features (Yao, Ding and Li, 2018).  
     Recently, Li, Wang and Kot (2017) proposed using the RNN and the CNN for image 
recapture detection in order to learn the deep representation of the images in order to 
extract discriminative and essential features of the intra-block and inter-block 
information of images (Li, Wang and Kot, 2017). Also, LSTM and CNN were used in 
combination by (Xu, Li and Deng, 2015) to learn the temporal structure of video in 
order to show how the temporal features are used for face anti-spoofing purposes and 
to differentiate the genuine attempt to identify a fake website. 
2.7 Non-Technical Anti-Phishing Solutions 
Non-technical anti-phishing solutions are also available and can be classified into two 
types: legislation and user awareness. Legislation or Acts have been passed all around 




promoted by educating end-users about phishing to help them to recognise phishing 
websites and how to avoid them (Shabut, Lwin and Hossain, 2016).  
2.7.1  Legislative Tools 
The use of legislation is a direct measure to reduce phishing by tracking and arresting 
those who are involved in this criminal activity. The US was the first nation to use laws 
to combat illegal cyber activities, and many cyber attackers have been arrested and 
arraigned. The main issue with this approach is the effectiveness of the laws as it is 
challenging to trace phishing attacks. Fraudulent websites naturally migrate quickly 
from one server to another. Also, an average phishing website is online for less than 
48 hours (Oest et al., 2018). Hence phishing attacks are committed very quickly and, 
subsequently, the criminals who commit these attacks also quickly disappear into 
cyberspace. The other issue is that many laws are applied only when the damage has 
been done, and the online user has already been defrauded as a result of phishing 
attacks.    
2.7.2 User Awareness 
Purkait, Kumar De and Suar (2014) presented a report on the result of an empirical 
investigation into the various factors that have a significant effect on the Internet user’s 
ability to identify a phishing website. In their empirical analysis, they used some groups 
of Internet users who had at least some experience of financial transactions over the 
Internet. They conducted quantitative research with the help of a structured survey 
questionnaire and also performed three experimental tasks. A total of 621 sound 
samples were collected, and multiple regression analysis techniques were used to 
deduce the answer to the research question. The result of their study showed that their 
model was useful and had an explanatory influence. Their analysis also showed that 
92.7% of the Internet users could identify a phishing website but cannot explain by the 




   Nevertheless, educating users remains a critical aspect of phishing detection 
because users need to be aware of phishing techniques and of how reputable 
organisations would communicate with them on the web and via email; the lack of 
phishing education among users is one of the contributory factors to phishing attack 
success. Due to the growth in cyberspace technology, computer users have a 
significant role to play in making the Internet a safer place for everyone because cyber 
attacks are targeted at achieving either financial or social gain (Arachchilage and Love, 
2014) to the detriment of the user. On the other hand, some people undertake phishing 
activities for fun and a sense of accomplishment rather than for financial or social gain.  
     Phishing awareness has been improved through the development and use of online 
game training and email-based training to combat phishing attacks. However, there 
will always be some inexperienced users accessing Internet web browsers, which can 
quickly become phishing targets. Moreover, phishing techniques are continually being 
improved to such an extent that even experienced Internet users can still be fooled by 
phishing websites (Shabut, Lwin and Hossain, 2016). Thus, it is challenging to combat 
phishing solely through education because not only do users not read the educational 
materials; it is hard to teach users how to make the right decision online. Therefore, 
continued user training and awareness may be the key to combating phishing attacks 
in organisations (Jansson and von Solms, 2013).  
2.8 Organisational Best Practice to Combat Cyber Attacks 
The best practice that an organisation can follow in order to handle cyber attacks and 
protect against them is to create a policy framework that guides all of the staff of the 
organisation in their day-to-day activities against privacy and security. Mouratidis et al. 
(2012) proposed a framework that supports the unified analysis of security and privacy. 
The scheme uses a meta-model that combines concept from privacy and security 
requirement methods. The methods include privacy and security goals, constraints, 




framework provides a holistic approach overcoming the drawback information system 
security by analysing security and privacy from the requirement engineering stage. The 
framework also provides a unified requirement that is based on organisation views an 
actor which suggest the correct implementation procedures for the respective privacy 
and security which provides a solution to successfully bridge the gap between the 
requirement and implementation stages (Mouratidis et al., 2012). Alkhozae and Batarfi 
(2011) proposed a solution for securing web system that is based on quality models 
used in security requirement engineering method (Alkhozae and Batarfi, 2011). The 
scheme provides a means for refinement and requirement repository for future reuse.       
Below are some steps that need to be followed to achieve this aim in protecting an 
organisation against a cyberattack: 
❖ Create company policies and communicate them to users: Create 
organisational policies for email content so that legitimate websites cannot be 
confused with phishing sites. These policies should be created and sent to 
users with proper monitoring. The organisation should also carefully assess the 
effect of such a policy on the user experience versus the increased security 
provided by implementing the policy (Wang, Kannan and Ulmer, 2013).      
❖ Implement stronger authentication of websites: The organisation should 
create a stronger authentication mechanism and should not ask users for 
sensitive information when they log on to the organisation’s website. This will 
make it difficult for a phisher to extract such information from the user (Xinming, 
Jing and Jun, 2010).  
❖ Offer measures for the user to validate the legitimacy of an email: The 
organisation should embed authentication information into every email that is 
sent to users, and they should be able to identify that the email is from the said 
organisation and not from a phisher (Cox, 2012). 
❖ Monitor the Internet for possible phishing websites: A phishing web page 




attack. Also, most of the sites sometimes modify the organisation’s trademark 
to appear legitimate (Chiew et al., 2015). The organisation should, therefore, 
monitor the Internet for sites that look similar to its legitimate site. 
❖ Implement good-quality anti-spam, anti-virus and content filtering 
solutions at the Internet gateway: The intrusion detection and firewall system 
at the Internet gateway provides a scanning functionality and acts as an 
additional layer of defence for the internal network. This type of system can 
block new phishing sites at the gateway. A gateway anti-spam-filtering system 
can help users to avoid unwanted spam and phishing websites (Chen et al., 
2014).    
2.8.1 User Best Practices  
An organisation needs to secure its environment against phishing attacks and 
reduce its vulnerability, but it also needs to educate users on how to approach any 
suspicious email activities on their system and set up an automatic blocking 
mechanism to protect itself and its users from some known malicious sources. The 
organisation can do this by: 
❖ Automatically blocking malicious or fraudulent email: Spam filtering can 
assist in keeping the user from ever opening a suspicious phishing email, but 
spam filtering is not foolproof (Inuwa-Dutse, Liptrott and Korkontzelos, 2018). 
❖ Automatically detecting and deleting malicious software: A phishing attack 
often make spyware tools for attacking users when they find their way into the 
user's computer (Arachchilage and Love, 2013), but many commercial 
programs can remove this type of software, which is the focus of this research 
in our future development.   
❖ Automatically blocking outgoing delivery of sensitive information to 
malicious parties: Although some users may not be able to visually identify 




strength of our solution is to support the user in an automated form (Cohen et 
al., 2016).  
❖ Automatically blocking outgoing delivery of sensitive information to 
malicious parties: Although some users may not be able to visually identify 
whether a website that requests sensitive information is legitimate, which is the 
strength of our solution is to support the user in an automated form (Cohen et 
al., 2016). 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an in-depth overview of phishing activities and methods of 
phishing detection. The key approaches, results, strengths and weaknesses are 
identified with relevant implications for this work highlighted. More generally, it still 
suffer a bit from from beign too ong and not begin able to see the wood for the trees, 
but is definitely now less repitation.     
















Chapter 3 Research Design and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
A methodology in research is a systematic approach to extract features from a given 
sample to understand a given problem and various aspects of the research (Kumar, 
2013). For this study qualitative research is used to collect non-statistical features 
whilst a quantitative research approach is used to analyse numerical features and 
experimental results. This chapter will discuss the methods adopted in this study, 
including phishing techniques, feature extraction methods, intelligent systems, the 
knowledge model, the Adaptive Neuro Inference System algorithm (ANFIS), and 
phishing detection and web browser plug-in modelling. The chapter will also present 
details on the chosen website feature extraction methods and their reliability and 
accuracy, and also evaluate current knowledge models and phishing detection 
methods. In this approach, the process for identifying phishing website is illustrated in 
Fig. 3-1, the parameters utilised ANFIS by using features to optimise phishing website 
detection accuracy and minimise error rates with the assumption that a proper 
parameter tuning framework based on ANFIS using full features will enhance phishing 
detection accuracy in real-time. In the study, a web browser plugin for phishing 
detection will be developed that has a user warning interface that enhances the alerts 
given to users to ensure that they are effective in real-time. A toolbar will be 
implemented in MATLAB version 9.5 AppDesigner with a voice warning interface and 
text directives and other extensive features to improve phishing detection. 
   The vast progress in recent time that has been made in the development of data 
mining techniques has led to an extensive variety of algorithms that have been applied 
in the field of statistics, machine learning, pattern recognition and features extraction 
to form datasets for phishing detection (Zhang and Yuan, 2013). The relationships 
between association rules and classification rule algorithms can identify features or 




the vital features and factors that are inherent to it are identified the next step is to 
stipulate how the different elements of the phishing website are related to one another. 
This is done using fuzzy rules in the form of if…then statements that relay phishing 
website possibility to various levels of main phishing features based on the experience 
and knowledge of the software security developer.  However, in this study, instead of 
just employing an expert system, a machine learning approach is taken utilising a fuzzy 
inference system (FIS) which is optimised with ANFIS to generate a new phishing 
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Fig. 3-1: Methodology for Identifying Phishing Website 
    The scheme was used to automatically find the essential features that are related 
and the associations between different patterns of phishing features in the phishing 
website collection dataset.  Several different machine learning and classification 
techniques were used and implemented within MATLAB version 9.5, which includes a 
classification toolbox containing several different methods that can be applied to many 




(SVM) and K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN) classification algorithms are used to discover 
the relationships between the selected phishing elements. For the ANFIS algorithm, 
the neuro-fuzzy design toolbox was used as provided by Barraclough, Sexton and 
Aslam (2015). These classification algorithms were chosen because of the diverse 
approaches they use to create rules, and because their learned classifiers are easily 
understood (Çakıt and Karwowski, 2017). 
3.2 Source Selection and Their Patterns   
The current study builds on the previous work of (Barraclough, Sexton and Aslam, 
2015) and (Barraclough et al., 2013). For this present research three sets of website 
features were identified as sources and were processed in two phases. The first phase 
consisted of extracting 300 features from April 2016 until December 2017. This data 
comprised text and frame. The list of features later prunes down to 30 after identifying 
those that are best used for phishing classification. This was done by eliminating 
redundant features as identified in previous work (Barraclough, Sexton and Aslam, 
2015). The second phase increases the number of essential features to 35 using 
additional source (image) data, extracted from November 2016 to February 2017, 
hence makes three sets of input sources in total. The three sources are sub-divided 
as follows; the search index has four elements, the URL content has six parts, there 
are five elements for the web address bar and image identity, four elements for the 
domain identity, three features for the source code & JavaScript, and eight features for 
the page style and layout identity. The list is presented in Appendix A. 
3.2.1 Feature Extraction  
The purpose of the feature extraction process employed in this work is to extract 
website features in order to reduce the unique feature space for phishing detection. In 
other words, the unique features are reserved and changed into a new compact space 




uses principal component analysis (PCA) and latent semantic analysis (LSA). The PCA 
technique decreases the size of the data by changing the actual feature space into a 
smaller one (Vidal, Ma and Sastry, 2016). This is achieved by converting the real 
variables 𝑌 = [y1, y2, … , yn](where n is the number of the actual variables) into a new 
set of variables 𝑇 = [t1, t2, … , tp] (where p is the number of the new set of variables). 
The LSA technique is an innovation that is based on text classification. This approach 
analyses the relationship between a concept and a term contained in unstructured 
data, and it can correlate semantically related terms that are latent (Marcolin and 
Becker, 2016). These feature selection processes were followed (code in Appendix C) 
in order to find better features for more intelligent phishing detection in a dynamic 
approach that can achieve high true positive (TP) and low false negative (FN) results.   
   The features example use in the present study is the complete source from which 
website features were gathered for this study. For the identification of the features, 
journals and reported cases were carefully selected. Phishing website and legitimate 
website features were randomly selected to derive an unbiased representation of the 
large number of sources available. An account registration with PhishTank was 
completed to allow access to various information and tools, including archive websites 
that are maintained by community volunteers (PhishTank.com, 2012). The phishing 
websites from PhishTank consist of verified phishing and unknown phishing websites 
submitted within three years from 1st of June 2014 to 30th June 2016. The website 
archive maintained a total of 1,500.456 verified phishing sites by the middle of 2014. 
The chosen legitimate website source was randomly chosen, namely the Financial 
Service Authority (FSA) website, using search keywords. The FSA is a UK financial 
service institution known by users to be a legitimate website. The WHOIS website was 
also used as a source for a legitimate website. This website was accessed between 
April 2016 to June 2018 using search keywords, and whose features were used to 




   The three sets of inputs including text, image and frame were chosen randomly and 
combined as one feature called the ‘hybrid features’ in this study. Of the over 290 
features that were collected from phishing websites, 35 of these features were used 
for experimental purposes to analyse the performance of our ANFIS-based phishing 
detection method. These 35 elements can help to distinguish between legitimate and 
phishing websites. The three approaches are described in the following sections 3.2.2 
to 3.2.4. 
3.2.2 Text-based Features Extracting Approach 
The text-based approach depends solely on website content such as the search index, 
security & encryption, web address bar, domain identity and the source code to detect 
phishing sites. It can detect new phishing websites that are not yet blacklisted and that 
are targeted at unsuspecting users. The text features are related information available 
to the user and some key identifier of the websites. This exploration was conducted 
during the period of 2nd April 2016 to 30th September 2016.  
Search index features: 
❖ Page ranking: This feature is used to check the importance of the web page. 
By counting the number of quality links to a page, this can determine the 
importance of the site on the Internet.  
     The rule below was created to check whether the domain part of the website 
is among the top addresses listed on a Google search engine. If the site is not 
among these, then it is considered a phishing site, but if it is among them, it is 
judged to be a legitimate site. 
Rule: IF{
PageRank < 0.2 →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
❖ Google index: This feature is used to ascertain whether the URL of the website 




     The rule below is created to check whether the domain part of the website 
is listed on the Google index. If the site is not in the index, then it is considered 
to be a phishing site. Otherwise, it is a legitimate site 
Rule: IF{
Web page Indexed by Google →  Legitimate
Otherwise →  Phishing
. 
❖ Website traffic: This feature is used to measure the amount of data sent to 
and received by a visitor to a website.  
     The following rule is created to check the amount of data that is sent to and 
received from another website. According to Rami, McCluskey and Fadi (2015) 
if it is less than 100,000, the site is considered legitimate, but if the number is 
higher than 100,000, the website is considered to be suspicious otherwise, if it 
is 130,000 and above is considered a phishing site. 
Rule: IF{
Website Rank < 100,000 →  Legitimate
Website Rank > 100,000 → Suspicious
Otherwise →  Phish
 
❖ Statistical report: This feature is used to ascertain the usage of the website, 
such as the number of queries and website availabilities online. However, a 
new website may fail this check, so some other features are used to ascertain 
the legitimacy of such websites. 
 
Rule: IF{
Host Belongs to Top Phishing IPs or Top Phishing Domains →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
Security & encryption features: 
❖ Existence of “https” in URL: This feature is used to check whether the URL 
contains the https as most phishers use this to deceive the unsuspecting user. 
A website with a URL containing https after the top-level domain is considered 
to be a phishing site as it is rare that the https appears after the top-level domain 




is to use another website domain inside the actual link of the website (Google, 
2016).     
     The following rule is created to check whether the linked part of the website 
contains https after top-level domain; if it does contain the https, the site is 
considered phishing; otherwise it is judged to be a legitimate site. 
For example, the URL has https address: https://www.yahoo.com is more 




If The link Part has an https →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
❖ Long URL: This feature is used to check the length of the URL to determine 
whether the original website has the corresponding URL. A reliable and 
trustworthy website will always come with a short URL address than the one 
with a long URL address (Tan, Chiew and Sze, 2014). For example, the URL 
with a short address: http://www.yahoo.com is more dependable than this 
suspicious address: 
http://unitedstatesreferral.com/santos/gucci2014/gdocs/gucci.php?Acirc=A?A
?=A?Auffe0   
     The rule below is created to check the legitimacy of the URL, where a URL 
with a length of fewer than 54 features is likely to legitimate, a URL with 55 to 
75 features is deemed suspicious, and a URL with more than 75 is considered 
to be a phishing site. 
Rule: IF{
𝑈𝑅𝐿 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ < 54 →  𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = Legitimate
 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑅𝐿 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ≥ 54 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≤ 75 →  𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 →  𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = Phishing
 
❖ Use of the IP address: This feature is used to check whether the URL contains 
the IP address as most phishers use this to deceive the unsuspecting user. A 




site as it is rare that the IP address appears in legitimate websites because one 
of the methods to conceal the destination is to use the IP address of the 
website.     
     The following rule is created to check whether the domain part of the website 
contains IP address; if it does contain the IP address, the site is considered 
phishing. Otherwise it is judged to be a legitimate site. 
Rule: IF{
If The Domain Part has an IP Address →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
❖ Abnormal URL: This feature can be used to check the abnormalities in the 
URL against the information stored in the WHOIS database for legitimate 
websites. Then determine if the hostname in the URL matches the claimed 
identity as a URL is unique on the Internet for a legitimate website; its identity 
is usually part of its URL.   
     The following rule is created to ascertain whether the URL is abnormal or 
not. It specifies that if the hostname does not correspond to the URL, the site 
is a phishing site, else it is legitimate.  
Rule: IF {
The Host Name Is Not Included In URL →  Phishing 
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
❖ Abnormal request: This feature is used to determine whether there is a 
request from an external object within the web page, such as an image or video 
that has been loaded from another domain. In the case of a legitimate, official 
website, a considerable percentage of those URL is in its original domain.  
     The rule below is created to check the percentage of the URL that is loaded 
from another website. If it is less than 22%, the site is considered legitimate; if 
the percentage is higher than 22% but less than 61%, the website is deemed 





% of Request URL < 22% →  Legitimate 
%of Request URL ≥ 22% and 61% →  Suspicious
Otherwise →  feature = Phishing 
 
❖ Abnormal anchor: This feature is used to check whether the anchor element 
is like a tag <a> from an external link. This feature is treated as the request 
URL. A web page is suspicious when the domain of most of the URL looks 
abnormal compared to the domain of the page, and the anchor does not link to 
any page. 
     The following rule is created to check the percentage of the URL that is 
loaded from another website. If it is less than 31%, the site is considered 
legitimate; if the percentage is higher than 31% but less than 67%, the website 
is seen as suspicious, else it is considered to be a phishing site. 
Rule:  IF{
% of URL Of Anchor < 31%  →  𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
% of URL Of Anchor ≥ 31% And ≤ 67% →  Suspicious 
Otherwise →  Phishing
 
Web address bar features: 
❖ URL contains a prefix or suffix: This feature is used to check whether the 
dash symbol that is rarely used is in a valid URL. Phishers tend to add a suffix 
or prefix to the domain name that is separated by a dash (-) to make users feel 
that they are dealing with a legitimate web page, for example, 
http://www.online-paypal.com or http://www.barclaybank-card.com. From 
these examples, we can see that the word ‘online,’ which appears as a prefix 
before the legitimate PayPal domain name https://www.paypal.com is done to 
confuse the user.   
     The rule below is developed to check for the prefix (-) in a web page URL to 
determine whether the link contains the prefix.   
Rule: IF {
Domain Name Part Includes (−) Symbol →  Phishing





❖ URL contains a ‘@’ symbol: This feature is used to check for the @ symbol 
in the URL as it leads the browser to ignore everything preceding the @ symbol. 
In this context, if the format <userdata>@<hostdomain> is used, the browser 
ignores the <userdata> and directs the user to <hostdomain>. To further hide 
the URL, the @ symbol can be represented by its hexadecimal character code 
“%40”.   
     The rule below checks for the presence of @ symbol in a given URL, and if 
it is present, the site is considered to be a phishing site, else it may be 
considered legitimate. 
Rule: IF {
URL Having @ Symbol →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
❖ Use of URL shortening service: This feature is used to check whether a 
considerably smaller than average URL length still leads to the acquired web 
page. This check is achieved by using the https redirect on a short domain 
name. 
Rule: IF{
TinyURL →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
The following rule is created to ascertain whether the URL is shorter than the 
average length. It specifies that if the hostname does not correspond to the 
length of the URL, the site is a phishing site, else it is legitimate.  
❖ Some links are pointing to a page: This feature is used to check the number 
of links that are pointing to the web page.  
Rule: IF{
Of Link Pointing to The Webpage = 0 →  Phishing
  Of Link Pointing to The Web page > 0 and ≤ 2 → Suspicious
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
❖ Use of a non-standard port: This feature is useful as it can be used to check 




open, almost any service can run by phishers as they want.  As a result, user 
confidential information is threatened.  
Rule: IF{
Port # is of the Preferred Status →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
The following rule is developed to ascertain whether the use of non-standard 
port that is used for the combination on the Internet. It specifies that if the port 
does not correspond to the standard port use on the website is a phishing site, 
else it is legitimate.  
Domain identity features: 
❖ Age of the domain: This feature is used to extract the information from the 
WHOIS database and compare it with the information of a suspected phishing 
site. Most phishing websites are only live for a short period. 
Rule: IF {
Age Of Domain ≥ 6 months →  Legitimate
Otherwise →  Phishing
 
❖ DNS record: This feature can be used to check the identity of the domain in 
the WHOIS database records. If the DNS record is not found or is empty, the 
website is then classified as a phishing web page.  
Rule: IF{
no DNS Record For The Domain →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
❖ Domain registration length: This feature is used to check how the site is 
registered. Since phishing websites are live for a short period, this was 
assuming that trustworthy domains are usually paid for several years in 
advance. 
Rule: IF{
Domains Expire on ≤ one − year →  Phishing





The following rule is created to ascertain how long the domain has been 
registered. It specifies that if the time does not correspond to the original site 
and the expiration is less than a year, the site is considered a phishing site, 
else it is legitimate.  
❖ Sub-domain: This feature is used to check how the site is registered with a 
sub-domain. Since phishing websites do not mostly likely create sub-domain, 
this was assuming that trustworthy domains usually have sub-domain created 
for some of their services. 
Rule: IF{
subdomains Expire on ≤ one − year →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
Source code & Javascript features: 
❖ Redirect using “//”: This feature is used to check whether “//” exists within the 
URL path as this indicates that the user will be redirected to another website. 
     The following rule is created to check whether the URL has an additional at 
the front of the original URL, such as 
https://www.ebay.com//https://192.156.100.45.com/. If it does, the site is 
considered a phishing site. Otherwise, it is a legitimate site. 
Rule: IF {
the position of the Last Occurrence of "//" in the URL >  7 →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
❖ Submits information to email: This feature is used to check whether a 
website redirects the user’s information to a personal email instead of a server 
for processing. Phishers usually use this functionality to obtain confidential 
information by using the mail () or mailto: to trick the user into sending 
information to the fraudulent email address. 
     The rule below checks whether the page is rendered to a personal email by 





Using "mail ()" or "mailto:" Function to Submit User Information →  Phishing
Otherwise  →  Legitimate
 
❖ https: This feature is used to check for the existence of secure communication, 
whether the security certificate issuer is trusted, and for how long the security 
certificate has been issued. 
Rule: 
IF{
Use https and Issuer Is Trusted and Age of Certificate ≥  1 Years →  Legitimate
 Using https and Issuer Is Not Trusted  →  Suspicious
Otherwise →  Phishing
 
The following rule is created to ascertain whether there is a secure 
communication on the and the certificate of the secure communication is less 
than a year, and the issuer is trusted than the legitimate, else if it uses a secure 
certificate from an untrusted issuer, then it considered suspicious otherwise the 
site is a phishing site.  
3.2.3 Frame-Based Feature Extraction Approach 
Dissolute, online phishing detection using the HTML, source code and URL content is 
also explored. Three hundred legitimate and phishing website sources were randomly 
chosen from the Financial Service Authority (FSA) website, APWG and PhishTank 
website using keyword and the properties of websites using several features, which 
are outlined below. The legitimate websites are used to discriminate against phishing 
websites. Principal researchers in the field have used the legitimate ‘whitelists’ 
websites (Belabed, Aïmeur and Chikh, 2012; Li et al., 2014; Buber, Ö and Sahingoz, 
2017). This process was carried out between 1st October 2016 to 28th February 2017. 
➢ Iframe redirection: This feature is used to check the HTML tag used to display 
additional web pages in the current website. A phisher will take advantage of 





Using iframe →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
The following rule is developed to ascertain whether there is conserve 
information inside a tag used on the website to display information about the 
web page. It specifies that if the iframe does exit, then the site is a phishing 
site, else it is legitimate.  
➢ Disabled right-click: This feature is used to check whether the right-click 
function is disabled using the JavaScript so that users cannot save or view the 
web page’s source code. Sometimes the right-click function is also disabled on 
a fraudulent website that is opened in the menu browser window. 
     The rule below is created to check for this function on a web page to 
determine whether the page is rendered disabled by right-clicking. 
Rule: IF{
Right Click Disabled →  Phishing 
Otherwise → Legitimate
 
➢ Use of pop-up window: This feature is used to check whether users are asked 
to submit their personal information through a pop-up window, which is unusual 
to find on a legitimate website. Phishers use this technique for information-
gathering to make the request seem more reliable, and they use JavaScript so 
that the fraudulent pop-ups are reopened if closed until the user fills in the 
request form. 
     The rule below is created to check for this function on a web page to 
determine whether the page is rendered to a pop-up that requests user 
information.   
Rule: IF {
Popup Window Contains Text Fields →  Phishing
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
➢ Server form handler (SHF): This feature is used to check whether the domain 
name in the server form handler (SHF) is different from the domain name of 
the web page. Most e-banking websites usually contain an SHF, and most 





SFH is "about blank" Or Is Empty →  Phishing
 SFH Refers to A Different Domain →  Suspicious
Otherwise  →  Legitimate
 
➢ Website forwarding: This feature is used to check how many times a website 
has a redirect. Generally, a legitimate site does this one time, whereas a 
phishing site does this more than four times. 
     The rule below is created to check the number of times the URL is redirected 
to another website. It is less than one time; the site is considered legitimate; if 
the number is higher than two but less than four, the website is judged to be 
suspicious, else it is considered a phishing site. 
Rule: IF {
redirect Page ≤ 1 →  Legitimate
of Redirect Page ≥ 2 And < 4 →  Suspicious
Otherwise →  Phishing
 
➢ Link in script & meta: This feature is used to check that the tag on the website 
is linked to the same domain of the web page. Phishers can hide URLs by using 
script and meta to codes to conceal fraudulent sites. 
     The following rule is created to check the percentage of links to the actual 
domain of the website. If the percentage is lower than 17%, the site is 
considered legitimate if it is higher than 17% but less than 81%, the website is 




% of Links in " < Meta > ", " < Script > " and " < Link>" < 17%  →  Legitimate
% of Links in < Meta > ", " < Script > " and " < Link>" ≥ 17% And ≤ 81% →  Suspicious 
Otherwise →  Phishing
 
➢ Layout similarity: This feature is used to check the percentage of layout 
similarity of the web page. 
     The rule below is developed to check the percentage of layout similarity of 




percentage higher than 31%, but less than 67% the website looks suspicious, 
else it is considered a phishing site. 
Rule: IF{
% of Layout similarity < 31%  →  𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
% of Layout similarity ≥ 31% And ≤ 67% →  Suspicious 
Otherwise →  Phishing
 
➢ Style similarity: This feature is used to check the percentage of style similarity 
of the web page.  
     The rule below is designed to check the percentage of style similarity of the 
website. If the percentage is lower than 31%, the site is considered legitimate; 
if it is higher than 31% but less than 67%, the website is judged to be 
suspicious, else it is considered to be a phishing site. 
Rule: IF {
% of Style similarity < 31%  →  𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
% of Style similarity ≥ 31% And ≤ 67% →  Suspicious 
Otherwise →  Phishing
 
3.2.4 Image Identity Features Extration Approach 
An investigation also occurred as to whether the use of visual techniques would make 
phishing detection more efficient. Such techniques require both image analysis and 
image matching. Since considered that image matching would be a suitable approach 
for the detection of new phishing sites, we focused on image matching using the SIFT 
image matching algorithm for feature extraction. This process was also carried out in 
parallel with the frame features between the 2nd of November 2016 to 29th February 
2017. 
• Favicon: This feature is used to check the icon associated with a particular 
web page and to check whether the icon is loaded from a domain other than 
that shown in the address bar. 
Rule: IF{
Favicon Loaded From External Domain →  Phishing






The following rule is created to ascertain whether the small image from the 
address bar of a website is loaded from an external link. It specifies that if the 
image does not correspond to the site and it is load from another domain, then 
the website is a phishing site, else it is legitimate.  
• Image size: This feature is used to check the size of the images on the website. 
Rule: IF{
The Image Size Is Not Included In URL →  Phishing 
Otherwise →  Legitimate
 
• Alternative text: This feature is used to check whether a certain percentage of 
alternative text is used on the website. 
     The rule below is created to check the percentage of alternative text used 
on the website. If the percentage is lower than 22%, the site is considered 
legitimate; if it is higher than 22% but less than 61%, the website is deemed 
suspicious, else it is considered to be a phishing site. 
Rule: IF{
% of Alternative Text < 22% →  Legitimate 
% of Alternative Text ≥ 22% and 61% →  Suspicious
Otherwise →  feature = Phishing 
 
• Use of onMouseOver: This feature is used to check if JavaScript is used to 
show users a fake URL in the status bar. This function is used to conceal the 
real identity of a fraudulent URL in the status bar. 
Rule: IF{
onMouseOver Changes Status Bar →  Phishing
It Does′t Change Status Bar → Legitimate
 
 
The following rule is created to ascertain whether the site display abnormal 
content using JavaScript. It specifies that if the content change on the status 
bar and does not correspond to the URL, the site is a phishing site, else it is 
legitimate.  
• Login form: This feature is used to check whether there is an obstructive login 
form on the website.  
Rule: IF{
obscreLoginForm →  Phishing






The following rule is developed to ascertain whether there is an abnormal form 
or not on a web page. It specifies that if the website contains obscure login form 
does not correspond to the site, and then the website is a phishing site. 
Otherwise, it is legitimate.  
     All of the above features are used to compare legitimate websites against phishing 
sites. The features mentioned above are used with our machine learning algorithm to 
compare the clone website with the legitimate site in order to prevent users from falling 
victim to fraud when they perform their activities online. Moreover, since the phishing 
web website is short-lived, the domain identifies features such as the age of the 
domain, domain registration length, and DNS record are particularly crucial as these 
enable the system to distinguish a legitimate site quickly from a phishing website. 
3.2.5 Features Mining 
In this study, a subset of initially selected features is used for training, testing and 
validating the classifier (Abunadi, Akanbi and Zainal, 2013). The most popular feature 
selection methods in the literature are the Chi-square (x2), and information gain (IG).  
Chi-Square: 
The Chi-Squared test is used to determine whether there is a significant difference 
between the expected frequencies and the observed frequencies in one or more 
categories. The Chi-square statistic is the sum of the square of the difference between 
the experimental data and the data obtained by making a calculation based on a 
model, where each square is divided by the corresponding data obtained from the 
model. The Chi-square is used to evaluate features frequency, and this is done by 
computing the Chi-square statistics of classes to assign the best value for each feature 









where  𝑞𝑒,𝑚 is the symmetry capacity obtained by calculating from the model, and 𝑞𝑒 
is the experimental data of the steadiness in frequency. If the data from the model is 
similar to the experimental data, 𝑋2 will be a smaller number compare to the original 
value. If they are different, 𝑋2  will be a more significant number. Therefore, it is 
necessary also to analyse the dataset using the Chi-square test to confirm the value 
of the best-fit feature and the frequency at which they occur for the phishing the 
detection system.    
Information Gain: 
The information gain (IG) is one of the features ranking metric prominently used for 
many text features classification techniques that decreases the size of the features by 
calculating the value of each attribute and ranking them. In other words, IG selects 
elements through scores (Zeng, Jiang and Neapolitan, 2016). Information gain is one 
of the most comprehensive approaches to employ as a term importance criterion for 
text document data. This technique is applied to the feature after the Chi-square has 
been applied to improve the effectiveness of the features. It is based on information 
theory, and it expresses in term t in the following equation: 





𝑃(𝑡̅) 𝑋 ∑ 𝑃(𝑐𝑖|𝑡̅) log 𝑃(𝑐𝑖|𝑡̅)
|𝐶|
𝑖=1    (𝟑. 𝟐), 
where 𝑐𝑖 represents the i
th category, 𝑃(𝑐𝑖) is the probability of the i
th category, 𝑃(𝑡) and 
𝑃(𝑡̅) are the probability that the term t appears or not in the document, respectively, 
𝑃(𝑐𝑖|𝑡) is the conditional probability of the i
th grouping given that term t appears, and 
𝑃(𝑐𝑖|𝑡̅) is the conditional probability of the i
th grouping given that term t does not appear. 
     In this study, before a numerical value assigns to features, each term within the text 
is ranked in descending order according to its importance to the classification process 
by using the IG method. Feature mining aims to identify and examine the attributes 




mining technique in order to improve the overall performance of phishing detection 
schemes. The unusual characteristics that usually occur in phishing websites include 
the appearance of some different symbols in the URL and some irregularities in the 
HTML form and title elements (Zareapoor and Seeja, 2015). Therefore, the extraction 
of such attributes from these websites will enhance the ability of phishing detection 
tools (Choo et al., 2016).  
     The properties of a web page are based on its features, which can be extracted 
from the source code of the Internet page or removed from the URL (Abunadi, Akanbi 
and Zainal, 2013). The number of HTML form tags might act as an indicator for 
identifying a phishing website. The features of a URL can be in the form of multiple 
tokens that constitute double features, such as some dots, the length of the URL, the 
existence of an IP address in the URL and a URL with HTTP and an SSL (Mohammad, 
Thabtah and McCluskey, 2012). The classification of text is an enormous task because 
there is a large pool of words that needs to be checked, which makes it very hard to 
classify text quickly and comprehensively. Therefore, text reduction techniques are 
often used to reduce the size of the text using information gain (IG), or in other words, 
to transform the text data into a shorter, compact, and predictive format. The two main 
techniques that were used to reduce the size of text data are Chi-square and 
information gain. 
3.2.6 Feature Comparison  
The features are compared with the existing studies in feature-based approaches in 
terms of diversity and size. Overall, the outline of the features in this study was selected 
to reduce feature redundancy and use the efficient feature that best for phishing 
detection. In another instance, Haruta, Asahina and Sasase (2017), only consider two 
elements of website for phishing detection such as the visual similarity and CSS, while 
others considered image or JavaScript, whereas our new study consider all possible 




features. Therefore, the technique is used to develop a code that extracts this feature 
relevant features as the only method to get the source from the website. Also, features 
were extracted by using a knowledge-based on frame component. A manual 
download, exploring, identifying and recording was performed during the feature 
collection process. The strategy was used in order to facilitate accuracy and to reduce 
the complexity in developing a scheme that will detect phishing efficiently.     
3.3 Proposed Design  
The proposed approach is a features-based offline model. Features-based models 
utilise machine learning techniques: for example, one applies a Neuro-fuzzy system 
that functions similarly to a Mamdani fuzzy model, with three inputs. The Mamdani 
neuro-fuzzy system itself uses a supervised learning technique (back-propagation) to 
acquire the parameters of the membership functions (Nguyen, Nguyen and To, 2016). 
Functionality can be optimised by applying an adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system 
(ANFIS) that is functionality similar to the Sugeno fuzzy model with three sets of inputs, 
which applies hybrid techniques with back-propagation to obtain the membership 
functions and least-mean-squares estimation to fix the coefficients of the linear 
mixtures in the rule inferences (Çakıt and Karwowski, 2017).  
     The proposed approach for website phishing detection was based on using the 
aforementioned 35 features of the site which are stored in a local Excel table 
(Adebowale, 2019). The table is a knowledge model database stored offline and newly 
loaded site features are compared against the features stored in the knowledge model 
database. If this comparison is unable to detect any similarity, then ANFIS machine 
learning is used for the decision-making process. An offline version of the image 
dataset was collected using scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT) image matching 
to manage the features for image size, noise and illumination; these features were 
used to identify an object from among many other objects when attempting to locate 




dataset, which is used for training and testing. The phishing website data was collected 
from PhishTank and the WHOIS between 2nd of November 2016 to 29th February 2018. 
    Other machine learning techniques of relevance here include deep learning: one is 
to apply the Long short-term memory (LSTM) algorithm in the part of the structure of 
the scheme that takes the input from a URL as a character sequence and predicts 
whether the link is a phishing or legitimate website. In the Convolutional Neural 
Network (CNN) concept, the weights are shared in a temporal dimension, which leads 
to a decrease in computation time. The general matrix multiplication in the standard 
neural network (NN) is therefore replaced in the CNN. The images that are extracted 
from legitimate and phishing websites were collected from 10th August 2018 to 30th 
December 2018 numbered well over 10,000.    
3.3.1 Inputs Features 
The current work identified 352 main phishing website elements that can assist in 
distinguishing between legitimate and phishing sites. These features were used on the 
off-line modelling applying ANFIS which prunes the number down to 35 because of 
their uniqueness to phishing detection complimentary to the removal of redundant 
features, markedly improving the efficiency of the proposed scheme.     
3.3.2 Offline Intelligent Phishing Detection System Based on FIS  
The intelligent phishing detection system (IPDS) offline approach will have four 
essential components (Fig. 3-2) for learning and reasoning, which include; 
fuzzification, rule-base, inference engine and defuzzification.  Fuzzy inference systems 
can employ human expertise by loading this essential component as rules and 
performing fuzzy reasoning to deduce the overall output value. There two types of 
fuzzy inference system scheme: the Mamdani model and the Sugeno model 




as the standard the fuzzy methodology, and it was the first control system built using 
fuzzy set theory.  
   This process of generating membership value for the fuzzy variable using 
membership functions begins by taking the crisp inputs from the 35 characteristics and 
factors which indicate the fake phishing website and determining the level at which 
these inputs belong to each appropriate fuzzy set. The crisp input is always a numeric 
value limited to the universe of discourse, whilst the fuzzy detection model assigns 
degrees of membership to the decision-making process for identifying phishing 




























Fig. 3-2: Intelligent Phishing Detection System Architecture compose off-line and online 
Structure 




     The essential advantage of using fuzzy logic techniques is that they can use the 
linguistic variable to represent major phishing characteristics or indicators and their 
relations with possible phishing web pages. Descriptors which come in the form of 
high, medium and low qualifiers are assigned to a variety of values for each primary 
phishing feature indicator. The descriptor forms the basis for acquiring expert input, 
which is based on the vital phishing element that indicates the existence of a phishing 
website. The range assigned to the input is considered and divided into fuzzy sets. For 
example, the value of the linguistic variable for the pop-up window ranges from high 
and medium to low.  
 The level of fitting of the values of the variables to any selected class determines the 
level of membership. A membership function is built for each phishing feature indicator, 
and this defines how the curve at each point in the input space is mapped to a 
membership value between 10 and 100. As mentioned above, various values are 
assigned to phishing indicators, ranging from high to medium to low. On the other 
hand, the values for websites range from phishing to suspicious to legitimate. Also, the 
input values range from 10 to 100, while the output values range from 0 to 100.  
     The linguistic indicator is used to signify one of the critical phishing element 
indicators, the pop-up window. The plot of the fuzzy membership function for the pop-
up window is shown in Fig. 3-3 to 3-6 below. The x-axis in the plot illustrates the range 
of possible values for the corresponding critical phishing feature indicators of high, 
medium and low. The y-axis illustrates the level to which a value for the leading 
phishing element indicator is shown by the linguistic descriptor. The plot of the 
membership function of the pop-up window at a distance of 54 cm is considered low 
with a membership of 35%, but it is also considered to be medium with a membership 
of 65%. In other words, the distance of 54 cm for the pop-up window is considered 
both low and medium to varying levels of certainty, which is a distinctive aspect of 
fuzzy logic, in contrast to binary logic that artificially imposes black and white limitations 




which means that facilitating expert input and more reliable in place of experts’ 
understanding of the underlying dynamics (Aburrous et al., 2010). 
The range for this fuzzy variable is specified depending on the level of risk associated 
with the phishing feature. A legitimate website cannot allow too many pop-up windows 
that ask for vital information that can be used for phishing purposes. The unwanted 
pop-up is the reason there is a fuzzy set range that protects against such occurrences 
and phishing attacks with fuzzy values ranging from high to medium and low as 
appropriate. 
 
Fig. 3-3: Input Variable for Pop-up Window Component 
Table 3-1: Value Range for Pop-up Window 








Fig. 3-4: Input Variable for Using the IP Address 
Table 3-2: Value Range for Using the IP Address 
Linguistic value Numeric range 
Low [25.44 2.5 -1.39e-15] 
Medium [20.83 2.5 50.18] 
High [20.8 2.5 98.26] 
    The plot of the membership function of the using IP address at a distance of 50.18cm 
(Fig. 3-4) is considered medium with a membership of 40%, but it is also considered 
to be high with a membership of 60%. In other words, the distance of 50.18cm for the 
using IP address is considered both medium and high to varying levels of certainty 
(Table 3-2). 
   The plot of the membership function (Fig. 3-5) of the URL has “@” symbol at 94cm 
is considered high (see Table 3-3) with a membership of 60%, but it is also considered 
to be high with a membership of 40%. In other words, the distance of 94cm for the URL 





Fig. 3-5: Input Variable for URL has @ Symbol 
Table 3-3: Value Range for URL has @ Symbol 
Linguistic value Numeric range 
Low [25.4 2.5 3.38] 
Medium [20.8 2.5 52.38] 
High [20.8 2.5 94] 
   The plot of the membership function (Fig. 3-6) of the alternative text at 90.6cm is 
considered high (see Table 3-4) with a membership of 90%, but it is also considered 
to be high with a membership of 10%. In other words, the distance of 90.6cm for the 
alternative text is considered both high and low to varying levels of certainty 
 




Table 3-4: Value Range for Alternative Text 
Linguistic value Numeric range 
Low [25.4 2.5 1.76] 
Medium [20.8 2.5 48.27] 
High [20.8 2.5 90.6] 
   The same techniques are used for all the other essential phishing website feature 
indicators. The value that is assigned to the range of a fuzzy variable is derived and 
tuned from a series of phishing experiments done.    
3.3.3 Optimising Offline IPDS Base on ANFIS 
In order to optimise the feature-based offline model of this work cross-validation 
methods/experiments were undertaken, which is later present in chapter 4. However, 
a 5-fold cross-validation was optimal result which involved seven major experimental 
runs where five combinations of parameters were used to tune for a better solution. 
The ANFIS-based method involves the use of a network structure (see Fig. 3-2) that 
facilitates the systematic computation of gradient vectors, where it combines the least-
squares and the gradient descent methods by utilising a useful hybrid learning 
technique to derive the output error and optimise the detection of the phishing website 
(Çakıt and Karwowski, 2017). As mentioned earlier, the ANFIS is a model that accept 
features as an inputs selection and it trains the data using a least-squares application 
(Hosoz, Ertunc and Bulgurcu, 2011). The model that is most frequently used with the 
ANFIS is the Sugeno model and so is employed in this current research; it has 
differentiable functions that can learn the fuzzy inference primary system from data 
and it can be easily understood (Hosoz, Ertunc and Bulgurcu, 2011). The detailed 
features of each layer of the zero-order Sugeno fuzzy inference system with inputs x 
and y and two rules are as follows: 




AND   𝑥2 𝑖𝑠 𝐴2 
……. 
AND     𝑥𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝐴𝑚 
THEN    𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . . 𝑥𝑚) 
where 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . . 𝑥𝑚 are input variables; 𝐴1, 𝐴2, … . . 𝐴𝑚 are fuzzy sets, and y is either a 
constant or a linear function of the input variables. However, if y is constant, the zero-
order Sugeno fuzzy model, which the resulting of rule-based is specified, could be 
obtained by a singleton (Barraclough et al., 2013). In the study, the input of the fuzzy 
inference system is applied to the antecedence of the fuzzy rules (Table 3-5). 
Meanwhile, the fuzzy rule has multiple behaviours; the operator (AND or OR) is used 
to acquire a single number that signifies the result of the evaluation of the property of 
each phishing website feature indicator. The AND fuzzy operation intersection is used 
to determine the conjunction between the rule’s behaviour. 
   After identifying the risk associated with the phishing website and the important 
phishing features indicators, the next step is to identify how the phishing website 
probability varies as a functioning part of the phishing indicator. The fuzzy rules were 
developed in the form of if…then statements that relate to the varying level of possibility 
of a website being a phishing website based on an assessment of the leading phishing 
element indicators. Various resources were used to evaluate the features and factors 
of phishing websites and the associations and relationships between them to develop 
the scheme, such as an analysis of anti-phishing tools, website experiments, a detailed 
questionnaire, and web surveys. These available resources helped the author to 
become an ‘expert’ in building phishing website fuzzy rules. The rules are unified, and 
the membership functions combined into a single fuzzy sets output using ANFIS.    
   The ANFIS hybrid learning algorithm is used to tune the parameters of a Sugeno-
type fuzzy inference system using a combination of the least-squares and back-




used because they can represent phishing attack techniques and strategies. These 
features are used as training and testing input data for the neuro-fuzzy inference 
system so that it can generate the fuzzy if….then rules (Table 3-5) to differentiate 
between legitimate, suspicious and phishing websites. 
Table 3-5: Sample of Rules Used in Intelligent Phishing Detection 
Rule# (Component 
















1 Low Low Low Low Low Legitimate 
2 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Suspicious 
3 High High High High High Phishing 
4 Low Low High High Low Suspicious 
5 High Low Low High High Phishing 
6 Low Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Suspicious 
7 Low Moderate High Moderate High Phishing 
8 Moderate Low Low Moderate Moderate Suspicious 
9 High Moderate High Low Moderate Phishing 
10 Low Low Low Moderate Low Legitimate 
11 Low Low Moderate Low Moderate Legitimate 
12 Low High Low High Low Suspicious 
13 Moderate Low High Moderate High Phishing 
14 Low Low Low Moderate High Legitimate 
15 Low High High Low High Phishing 
      





Fig. 3-7: Block Diagram of Intelligent Phishing Fuzzy Inference System Structure 
     The structure of the intelligent fuzzy inference system has five function layers (Fig. 
3-7) that are used in the decision-making process as follows: 
Layer 1: Input Layer  
Each node in the input layer is assigned a parameter, which includes three 
membership functions. The neurons in this layer quickly transmit visible crisp 
indications straight to the next tier (GüNeri, Ertay and YüCel, 2011). Equation 
(1) below shows how this is done, where 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖, 𝑐𝑖  (i = 1, 2, …. nth) is the 
parameter set, 𝜇𝐴(𝑥)  is the membership function of fuzzy set 𝐴𝑖 and X is the 
input. As the value of the parameters in the set change, the shape of the bell-
shaped function varies (Fig. 3-8), so these types of a parameter is referred to 







        (3.3) 
Layer 2: Fuzzification Layer 
A node in the fuzzification layer acts as a membership function to represent the 
terms of the respective linguistic label, such as phishing, suspicious and 
legitimate, and it assigns a value for each key phishing feature indicator 
(Dariane and Azimi, 2016). The valid range of the inputs (X, Y) is considered 
















the fuzzification layer, and Gaussian membership functions are used with two 
parameters: variance and mean. Also, 𝜇𝐴𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜇𝐵𝑖 is the category of the fuzzy 
sets. The output function of this node is the product to which the input belongs 
and the given membership function. Equation 3.4 shows how the fuzzification 
of the inference system is determined. 
𝑂𝑖
2 = 𝑤𝑖 = 𝜇𝐴𝑖(𝑥) ∙  𝜇𝐵𝑖(𝑦),    𝑖 = 1,2      (3.4) 
Where the values A and B are the input parameters. Every node in this layer is 
a fixed node whose output is the product of all the incoming signals. Each 
node’s output represents the firing strength of a rule (Hosoz, Ertunc and 
Bulgurcu, 2011). The output is used to determine the number of rules in the 
next layer. 
Layer 3: Rule Generation Layer  
Every node in the rule generation layer is a fixed node labelled N. The 𝑖𝑡ℎ of 
this node is to calculate the ratio of the 𝑖𝑡ℎrule firing strength to the sum of all 
the rules' firing strengths. This is done by a rule-based layer that consists of 
if…then statements that are related to possible phishing sites at different levels 
that get an input 𝑤𝑖 from the individual fuzzification 𝑖
𝑡ℎnodes and calculate the 
strength of the rule they represent (Karaboga and Kaya, 2016), as shown in 
Equation 3.5  below. The output of this layer is called the normalised firing 
strength. 
𝑂𝑖
3 = 𝑤𝑖 =  
𝑤𝑖
𝑤1+𝑤2
,   𝑖 = 1,2,  𝑤𝑖 = input   (3.5) 
A sample of rule-based functionality is presented in Table 3-5.  
Layer 4: Normalisation Layer  
This layer is where normalisation occurs (Fig. 3-7). All the neurons in this layer 




The output neuron from the rule-based layer is fed into this layer, and the 
normalisation of the neuron’s firing strength is resolved. The power of the 
normalised firing neuron is the percentage of the firing strength as instructed 
and the sum of the firing force of every rule (Barraclough et al., 2013), as 
illustrated by Equation 3.6: 
 
𝑂𝑖
4 = 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑖𝑥 + 𝑞𝑖𝑦 + 𝑟𝑖),                     (3.6) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖 is the normalised firing strength from layer 3 and {𝑝𝑖, 𝑞𝑖, 𝑟𝑖} are the 
parameters settings, which are referred to as essential parameters (Hosoz, 
Ertunc and Bulgurcu, 2011). 
Layer 5: Defuzzification Layer  
The fifth and final layer is the defuzzification layer (Fig. 3-7). Here the neuron 
combines the sum of all the output neurons and produces the ANFIS output, 
as shown in Fig. 3-8. The single node in this layer calculates the total output as 
the summation of the contribution from each rule. The input for the 
defuzzification process is the aggregate output of a fuzzy set, and a result is a 
number. The output is the phishing website risk category, which is defined in 
the fuzzy set as phishing, suspicious, or legitimate. The fuzzy output set is then 
defuzzified to arrive at a scalar value, as shown in Equation 3.7:     
𝑂1
5 = 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑖 =
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖
     (3.7) 
in which the three risk categories are defined as follows: 
• Legitimate: The highest guarantee that the website is a legal, genuine 
web page, and there no reason to think otherwise so that a user can 




• Suspicious: There is reasonable doubt about the authenticity of the 
website, and some level of caution should be exercised when dealing 
with this site because it could be risky using it. 
• Phishing: This is the highest guarantee that the website is a fake 
phishing website that will hack all the user’s confidential information 
when he/she is using the website to conduct his/her online activities.       
 
Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5
Input Fuzzification Rule layer Normalization Defuzzification 
 
Fig. 3-8: Intelligent Phishing Detection Fuzzy Inference System Structure 
3.4 Evaluating IPDS Modelling and System Detection 
In this work, it was determined that a reasonable phishing detection rate could be 
achieved based on seven criteria (Shahriar and Zulkernine, 2012): the search index, 
URL content, web address bar, image identity, domain identity, source code & 
JavaScript and page style & layout identity. The selection of phishing features requires 
careful deliberation. Table 3-6 shows that there are a different number of components 
for each criterion. The grouping process was undertaken to simplify the fuzzy model 
since dealing with 35 website phishing features as a whole can make the fuzzy rule 
evaluate very complicated and time-consuming. This was the group and categorised 




four elements, the security and encryption have eight, the URL content has six parts, 
while there are five elements for the web address bar and image identity, four elements 
for domain identity, three features for source code & JavaScript, and eight for page 
style & layout identity. Therefore, there are 35 critical components in total. These 
elements were selected as the best for the detection of phishing and to improve the 
time of discovery too.  
   A laying process was also implemented in these phishing websites to enhance and 
improve the result of the phishing website detection output. As illustrated in Table 3-6, 
the proposed intelligent phishing detection scheme has three layers. The first layer 
contains only the text identity component with the search index criterion with a weight 
equal to 0.3, while the URL content criterion is assigned a weight equal to 0.3 due to 
its importance; a user could follow this link to a vulnerable site. The security and 
encryption are assigned a weight of 0.2. The web address bar, image identity, domain 
content, page style & layout identity and source code & JavaScript each have a weight 
equal to 0.1. A weight assigned to those features according to their influence and 
frequency using the Chi-Square and some literature. 
    The seven criteria were prioritised according to their importance by using weights to 
rate each criterion. The rankings and weights were determined from a case study, 
website phishing experiments, an analysis of anti-phishing tools, a web survey, 
phishing quizzes, phishing expert feedback, and the results of a detailed questionnaire. 
Different parameter values were used in order to identify the most efficient detection 
approach. The parameter values that were found to provide the best result in our model 
were as follows, where: 
Crisp text is represented as: 
𝑑1= URL content 




𝑑3= Security & encryption 
𝑑4 = Domain identity 
𝑑5 = Source code & JavaScript 
The crisp frame is represented as: 
𝑔1= Page style & layout identity 
The crisp image is represented as: 
ℎ1= Image identity  
The intelligent phishing detection rating 𝑍1 is calculated from the weight parameters as 
follows: 
𝑧1  = (0.3 ∗ 𝑑1) + (0.2 ∗ 𝑑2) + (0.1 ∗ 𝑑3) + (0.1 ∗ 𝑑4) + (0.1 ∗ 𝑑5) + (0.1 ∗ 𝑔1) + (0.1 ∗
ℎ1)   (3.8) 
However, it should be noted that when selecting the best phishing features, it is also 
essential to take into consideration that phishing strategies and techniques change 
with time. Thus, the number of features that could be used for modelling a phishing 
detection system can vary over time. The architecture of the fuzzy logic inference-
based phishing detection model is shown in Fig. 3-8. As shown in the structure figure, 
the final output website phishing result for this fuzzy model relies on evaluating the 
fuzzy outputs of these three layers and then combining those results.  
   There are some challenges attached to phishing websites post-classification. The 
most challenging concern is the use of the phishing website material and date as a 
form of information, which has the net effect of increasing the false-negative rate. The 
age of the dataset is the most substantial problem, primarily regarding the phishing 
quantity. This is because some phishing websites are short-lived, sometimes lasting 
only 48 hours (Barraclough et al., 2013). 




Table 3-6: Components and Layers of Phishing Website Criteria 
Criteria No. Component Layer No. 
Search index 
(weight = 0.3) 
1 Page ranking 
Text layer 
Sub-weight = 0.3 
2 Google index 
3 Website traffic 
4 Statistical report 
Security & encryption 
(weight = 0.2) 
1 Long URL 
Text layer 
Sub-weight = 0.2 
2 Using the IP address 
3 Abnormal URL 
4 Abnormal request 
5 Abnormal anchor 
6 Existence of “https” in URL 
Web address bar 
(weight = 0.1) 
1 Adding prefix or suffix 
Text layer 
Sub-weight = 0.1 
2 URL has “@” symbol 
3 Using URL shortening services 
4 Some links are pointing to a page 
5 Use of a non-standard port 
Domain identity 
(weight = 0.1) 
1 Age of the domain 
Text layer 
Sub-weight = 0.1 
2 DNS record 
3 Domain registration length 
4 Sub-domain 
Source code & JavaScript 
(weight = 0.1) 
1 Redirect using “//” 
Text layer 
Sub-weight = 0.1 
2 Submitting information to an email 
3 https 
Page style & layout similarity 
(weight = 0.1) 
1 Iframe redirection 
Frame Features Approach 
Sub-weight = 0.1 
2 Disabling right-click 
3 Using a pop-up window 
4 Server form handler (SHF) 
5 Website forwarding 
6 The link in script & meta 
7 Layout similarity 
8 Style similarity 
Image features 
(weight = 0.1) 
1 Favicon 
Image Features Approach 
Sub-weight = 0.1 
2 Image size 
3 Alternative text 
4 Mouse over 
5 Login form 
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Links in <meta> & <script> 
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Using URL shortening services
Abnormal Request URL
 Abnormal URL of Anchor
Using pop-up window
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Existence of  https  in URL
Page Style & Layout Identity












   The above approaches are implemented using MATLAB Version: 9.5 fuzzy logic 
toolbox, which runs on Windows 10 64bit computer with Intel Pentium 3.2GHz and 
4GB memory. Features were extracted and normalised to a standard value ranges 
from 0 to 1 on the y-axis and standard range of 10 to 100 on the x-axis in order for the 
features to be transformed into features suitable for MATLAB. The MATLAB Version: 
9.5 was used because it meets the proposed set objectives.   
3.5 Offline Intelligent Phishing Detection System based on Deep 
learning  
A deep learning (DL) algorithm is categorised as a type of unsupervised machine 
learning algorithm that learns from the data on its own and designs a scheme for future 
use. This type of algorithm has a high probability of detecting newly generated phishing 
URLs and does not need manual feature engineering. In recent times artificial 
intelligent technology has come to power many aspects of modern society, ranging 
from social networking and web searching to content filtering and e-commerce 
websites. It also has a presence in consumer products such as cameras and 
smartphones (Sundermeyer, Schlüter and Ney, 2012). 
     In the current approach, a deep learning algorithm was used in a phishing website 
detection system that was based on long short-term memory (LSTM) and the 
convolutional neural network (CNN). In this system, CNN and LSTM were combined 
to detect a variety of website elements in order to attempt to identify phishing websites 
more accurately. Long short-term memory was used to detect extracted features such 
as the text and frame content of the web page, while the CNN was used to analyse the 
image features of the website (Xu, Li and Deng, 2015).  
3.5.1 Deep Learning CNN+LSTM Structure 
LSTM is an adaptive recurrent neural network (RNN), where each neuron is 




behalf of an internal structure. It also uses multiplicative units as gates to control the 
flow of information. The central components of the LSTM architecture are the memory 
cell, which can maintain its state over some time, and non-linear gate units which 
regulate the information input and output flow of the network (Greff et al., 2017). Based 
on the insights derived from secure networks, it is considered that because the LSTM 
neuron consists of internal cells and gate units, one should not only look at the output 
of the neuron but also at the internal structure to design original features for LSTM so 
that it can address classification problems (Hakkani-Tür et al., 2016). 
   Figure 3-9 shows the architecture of an LSTM in which there are three bidirectional 
LSTM layers, two feed-forward layers, and a Softmax layer that gives the predictions. 
This fully connected architecture allows us to take advantage of the inherent 
correlations among connections. Before the second layer in the network, co-
occurrence exploration is applied to the connection to learn from the input features. 
Lastly, back-propagation is applied to the LSTM layer to allow more effective learning 
(Zhu et al., 2016).    
Input: The input layer is the entry point for the architecture, which is fully connected to 
the LSTM layers. The LSTM is its memory cell, which eventually acts as an 
accumulator of the cell if the input gate is activated. Also, the prior cell status could be 
forgotten in this process if the forget gate is on. However, the latest cell output will be 
propagated to the final state will be further controlled by the output gate. The 
advantage of using the memory cell and gate is to control the flow of information in the 
gradient will trapped in the cell and be prevented from vanishing too quickly, which is 
a critical issue in the RNN model (Zhu et al., 2016).    
Softmax layer: This function calculates the probability distribution of the 𝑘  output 
classes. The layer uses the softmax function to predict the class in which the input 




that the network outputs are all between 0 and 1 and that the sum equals one at every 
timestamp, as shown in Equation 3.9 below where 𝑥 is the net input.  




  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑗 =  1, … . .  𝑘             (3.9) 
   The features of the phishing website URLs were collected from PhishTank and those 
of legitimate sites were obtained from Common Crawl. The data consisted of various 
types of information, but we only extracted the URL and the target site information for 
the categorisation (Table 3-7). Then the data was tokenised to separate each URL into 
a series of separate words, all of which were set in lowercase. The tokenised data was 
then encoded to make it available for training, where the maximum length was set to 
75 according to the format, we followed in the later section. 
 
 



























There are three main components in the learning process of a CNN: equal 
representation, sparse interaction and parameter sharing (Goodfellow, Bengio and 
Courville, 2016). The CNN is different from the standard NN, which draws out the 
connection among the input and output units from matrix development. 
     In contrast, CNN decreases the computational load with a thin interface where the 
kernels are made slighter than the inputs and are used for the entire image. Also, in 
the CNN, the idea behind parameter allocation is that, rather than learning a detached 
set of parameters at each location, the CNN only needs to learn a set of features, 
which allows the CNN to perform better than the NN. Also, CNN has a beneficial 
property called equivariance, which works with parameter distribution so that every 
time the input changes the output follows suit. Hence, the CNN requires fewer 
parameters than legacy NN algorithms. This requirement leads to a reduction in 




   The components of the standard CNN layers are illustrated in Fig. 3-10. The figure 
shows how the input image is convolved with trainable filters with possible offsets to 
produce feature maps in the first c-layer. The filters contain a layer of connection 
weights. In a real sense, there are four pixels in the feature map in a group. These 
pixels pass through a sigmoid function to produce additional feature maps in the first 
layer. This process is continued to obtain the feature maps in the following c-layers 
and convolved layers. Then, at the end of this process, the values of these pixels are 
rasterised and displayed in a single vector as the input of the network (Arel, Rose and 
Karnowski, 2010).  
   The layer that is responsible for the gathering of features when the input of each 
neuron is connected from the previous layer is called the c-layer. After the local 
features are extracted, the positional association can then be identified. Also, the 
function kernel has a slight influence over the activation function that is used by the 
sigmoid function to achieve scale invariance. Hence, the model uses the filter to 
connect the series of overlapping available fields and converts the 2D image set from 
the input to a single element in the output.   
 
Fig. 3-11: Intelligent Phishing Detection Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) System 




       However, when overfitting occurs, a pooling process called sub-sampling is 
utilised to decrease the total size of the signal. This solution has been used for data 
size reduction in audio compression (Mathieu, Henaff and LeCun, 2013).    
 The three layers of the CNN architecture are described in more detail below:  
Convolution Layer:  
This layer contains filter kernels which slide across the image. The kernel is the 
matrix to be convolved with the input image, and stride length controls how 
much the filter convolves the input image. This layer performs the convolution 
of the input image with the kernel by using Equation 3.10. The output of the 
convolution is called the feature map. 
     The convolution operation is as below: 
𝒋𝒌 = ∑ 𝒔𝒏𝒆𝒌−𝒏
𝑵−𝟏
𝒏=𝟎         
 (3.10) 
where 𝒔 is an image, 𝑒 is the filter, and 𝑁 is the number of elements in 𝒔. The 
output vector is 𝑗. The subscripts represent the 𝑛𝑡ℎ element of the vector. 
Pooling Layer:  
This layer is also called the sub-sampling (Fig 3-10) layer. In order to prevent 
overfitting, the pooling operation is used to reduce the dimension of the output 
neurons from the convolution layer and thus reduce computational intensity. 
This study used max-pooling operation. The max-pooling operation picks only 
the best value in each feature map in order to reduce the number of output 






Fully Connected Layer: 
The previous activation layer is fully connected to this layer. The activation 
function is always employed after the convolutional layer. The activation 
function is the operation that maps the output to a set of inputs.  
     There two types of activation function:       
1. Softmax: This function calculates the probability distribution of the 𝑘 output 
classes by using Equation 3.11. The fully connected layer uses the softmax 
function to predict the class to which class the input image belongs 
(legitimate, suspicious or phishing). 




  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑗 =  1, … . .  𝑘       (3.11) 
where 𝑥 is the net input value. Note that the output values of 𝑣 are between 
0 and 1, and their sum is equal to 1.  
2. Rectified linear activation unit: The rectified linear function is an 
established activation unit for deep learning (Saif, El-Gokhy and Sallam, 
2018). This type of activation function is used to apply non-linearity to the 
network structure.  
The Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) approach reduces the weights, thereby 
decreasing the complexity of the network. Consequently, the feature extraction 
procedure in a standard learning algorithm can be enhanced by directly importing 
images into the network as raw inputs. The use of this type of model for the training of 
the architecture layers led to the success of the first DL algorithms.  
      Below in Fig 3-11 are some examples of images that were used to train the CNN 





Fig. 3-12: Sample Images Used for the Training of CNN 
3.6 Online Plugin Approach 
This section describes the approach taken to building a useful features-based on-line 
toolbar for phishing detection. An off-line detection model was develop using ANFIS 
with voice generation user warning interface algorithm incorporated with a clear text 
directive and colours status with 35 comprehensive features are utilised to alert users. 
The 35 comprehensive features illustrate in Table 3-6, was used to develop a 
knowledge model that runs at the background as a toolbar comparing all the requested 
website against the 35 features to check whether the requested website is legitimate, 
suspicious or phishing. The feature-based online model has three essential parts, 
including extractor algorithm, knowledge model and user warning interface. 
    The extractor algorithm is used to extract the required feature on the current website. 
The knowledge model is used to compare the extracted feature to determine if the 
website is phishing, suspicious or legitimate. The user warning interface has three 
modules, and the first is the voice generation with text directive with a red colour status 
if the requested site is a phishing web page. The second is the text direction with voice 
generation and amber colour status if the requested site is suspicious, while the third 
is the voice generation with text directive with green colour status if the requested site 
is legitimate page. The plugin is implemented in MATLAB version 9.5 AppDesigner 
toolbox. The online toolbar was tested and evaluated with 1000 phishing websites, 100 
suspicious and 1500 legitimate websites. The average results achieved is 93.28% 
accuracy, which indicates a higher performance with the use of hybrid features of 




3.7 Classification in Machine Learning   
Decision Trees (C4.5 Algorithm) 
A decision tree is an approach that can be used for prediction and classification 
(Machado and Gadge, 2017). An example of the use of a decision tree is phishing 
classification, where the phishing dataset is provided to determine the actual category 
each data belong either legitimate or phishing website. Usually, a good analyst seldom 
needs to ask all the questions to get to the correct answer. In phishing website 
classification, the decision tree acts as the analyst and represents a series of 
questions, where the answer to the first question determines the next question to be 
asked and so on. In the making of a decision in the algorithm, the features of interest 
are entered in the root node, and then branches for each possible value of these 
features are built. This procedure is used recursively until all the features in the root 
node end up in the same class or the tree is unable to split into any further branches 
(Machado and Gadge, 2017). The categorisation of the various features is a crucial 
task because it affects the distribution of the classes in each division. The decision tree 
algorithm procedure can be employed in various ways to build any scheme. When the 
tree has been built, each route from the source node to each of the end nodes 
characterises a rule. The behaviour of the rule is driven by the route from the source 
node to the end node, and the result is the standard class that is allocated by the end 
node. Various trimming approaches can be used to streamline the rules and to remove 
needless ones. Trimming the tree involves either substituting some sub-trees with end 
nodes or moving some nodes upwards to swap them with nodes that are higher up in 
the tree and more advanced (Abdelhamid, Thabtah and Abdel-jaber, 2017). In both 
processes are examples of post-trimming techniques use to make an algorithm to 





The Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER) 
algorithm 
The repeated incremental pruning to produce error reduction (RIPPER) algorithm is a 
rule-training algorithm that was developed by William Cohen (Abdelhamid, Thabtah 
and Abdel-jaber, 2017). The RIPPER algorithm works as follows: First, the training 
dataset is separated into two sets: a pruning set and a set with the most considerable 
reduction of error. The RIPPER then develops its classifier using these two sets by 
constantly injecting rules at the initial stage from a new ruleset. The rule-generating 
algorithm starts with a clear rule and then heuristically adds one condition at a time 
until the rule has no error rates when applied to the growing set. First, a new stopping 
criterion for creating rules has been introduced in RIPPER. The algorithm stops 
injecting rules by following the minimum description length (MDL) principle when after 
a rule is injected into the algorithm, the total categorisation length of the rules set, and 
the training data is predicted. If the description length is higher than the lowest MDL 
obtained so far, RIPPER stops inserting rules. The MDL adopts the top perfect set of 
rules and data that is the one with reduces the size of the scheme and the quantity of 
essential information for recognising exemptions that are related to the scheme 
(Abdelhamid, Thabtah and Abdel-jaber, 2017). 
The Prism Algorithm 
The prism algorithm can be described as a covering algorithm for building classification 
rules. A covering algorithm begins by taking one class from among the existing ones 
in the training dataset and then seeks a way of covering all the instance in that class, 
while at the same time eliminating those that are not in that class. This approach is 
used to attempt to create rules with the best accuracy by injecting one condition at a 
time into the existing rule behaviour. The prism algorithm chooses at each iteration the 
condition that makes the most of the probability more desired for classification. The 




continues to build once a rule is derived, and the rules for the current category until all 
instances related to the class are achieved. After this occurs, another class is 
designated, and so on. The prism algorithm usually produces seamless rules with a 
0% error rate and calculates the accuracy of its rules using an accuracy formula.  
   Without taking any influence on any existing rules and work independently, the prism 
algorithm has an advantage over the decision tree in that, in the former, a rule can be 
injected into the created rule set at a later point in time, whereas adding a route to a 
tree structure may necessitate a redesign of the whole tree (Verma and Rai, 2015). 
Nevertheless, unlike decision trees that classify an instance by using rules formed and 
reading them directly from the tree, the prism algorithm might suffer from some 
problems because of the separateness of the rules, where, for example, an instance 
may turn out to be related to more than one rule and different classes. 
The Projective Adaptive Resonance Theory (PART) Algorithm 
In contrast to the RIPPER and decision tree algorithms which both have a two-phase 
approach to the creation of rules, the projective adaptive resonance theory (PART) 
algorithm creates rules one at a time and thus avoids the comprehensive pruning 
phase (Cohen, Nissim and Elovici, 2018). The decision tree algorithm employs a 
divide-and-overcome approach to set rules, while the RIPPER algorithm uses a 
separate-and-overcome tactic to derive rules. On the other hand, the PART algorithm 
combines both of these methods to find and produce rules. It employs the separate-
and-overcome approach to create a set of rules and uses the divide-and-overcome 
approach to develop partial decision trees. However, while the PART algorithm 
develops and trims a partial decision tree in the same way as a decision tree does, 
rather than build a whole decision tree, it instead develops some partial decision trees. 
The PART algorithm also differs somewhat from the RIPPER algorithm in terms of how 
it creates rules. In the PART algorithm, each rule links to the end node with the most 




rules are built in an acquisitive manner; the RIPPER algorithm starts from a clear rule 
and adds condition until the rule has no error rate and then this process is repeated for 
other rules.  
Neda Abdelhamid, Aladdin Ayesh, Fadi Thabtah (2017) conducted experimental tests 
using the decision tree, RIPPER and PART algorithms on different datasets and 
showed that notwithstanding the ease of using PART, it can produce sets of rules that 
are as accurate as those produced by the decision tree and that are more accurate 
though more complex than those of the RIPPER algorithm. 
The Classification Based on Association (CBA) Algorithm 
Classification and association rule detection are two of the essential tasks in data 
mining. Association mining is used to discover descriptive information from datasets, 
while classification focuses on developing a classification scheme for labelling new 
data. However, both design detection and classification association rule mining are 
essential to real-world data mining applications. If these two related tasks could be 
combined somehow, this would result in huge savings time and greater convenience 
for the user. Hence, substantial efforts have been made to combine these two methods 
into one system. In recent years, a comprehensive study has been carried out to 
integrate both techniques (Abdelhamid, Thabtah and Abdel-jaber, 2017).  
   Association rule mining and classification are analogous tasks, with the exception 
that the critical objective of classification is the prediction of class labels, whereas the 
main aim of association rule mining is to describe the relationship between feature 
values in a dataset. In the last few years, association rule mining has been used 
effectively to develop an accurate classifier, which has resulted in a new technique 
known as associative classification (AC) (Tripathi, Nigam and Edla, 2017). Associative 





   The AC algorithm utilises association rule detection approaches in the classification 
of datasets. Numerous studies (Jeeva and Rajsingh, 2016; Tripathi, Nigam and Edla, 
2017; Wang, Kannan and Ulmer, 2013) have indicated that AC techniques can extract 
more accurate classifiers than legacy classification approaches such as the decision 
tree (Machado and Gadge, 2017) and (Abdelhamid, Thabtah and Abdel-jaber, 2017) 
and probabilistic (Ramanathan and Wechsler, 2012) approaches. 
   The CBA algorithm was the first to use association rules for feature classification 
(Abdelhamid, Ayesh and Thabtah, 2014). This algorithm produces a unique subset of 
association rules called class association rules (CARs). The variance among the 
association rules and CARs denotes the significance of the rules. The significance of 
the CARs is only restricted to the class label value. Therefore, the process of CAR that 
is called rule-item is X→ C, where C is a set of all class labels. There are two parts to 
the CBA algorithm: a classifier constructor named CBA-CB and a rule producer named 
CBA-RG. In the CBA-RG part, all frequent rule-items are created by using a procedure 
that is like that used in association rule mining. In the CBA-CB, all recurrent rule-items 
from the CBA-RG are graded in decreasing the order of importance.   
   A training dataset contains the activities used in the procedure of selecting the rules 
for the classifier; the algorithm repeats the process through each rule beginning with 
the first-order rule to find all the transactions comprising all features in the behaviour 
of the existing rule. Although at least if the rule covers one activity is classified 
effectively with this rule, the rule is nominated into the classifier, and all these activities 
enclosed in the rule is removed from the dataset, else the rule is trimmed. This 
procedure ends when either all of the rules are used, or no transactions are left in the 







Support Vector Machine (SVM) Algorithm 
In recent times, Support Vector Machine (SVM) is one of the popular classifiers used 
for dataset classification and label them in different categories. The purpose of using 
the SVM is to locate the optimal separating hyperplane between two or more classes 
by locating the closest points between the maximum margin. Assume we have a linear 
discriminating function and two phishing features with a target value -1 and +1. The 
discriminating hyperplane will be determined by: 
𝑠′ + 𝑠0  ≥ 0  𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖 =  +1;                          (3.12) 
𝑠′𝑥𝑖 +  𝑠0  < 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖 =  −1                          (3.13) 
Then the distance of any point x to hyperplane is | 𝑠′𝑥𝑖 +  𝑠0| /|| s || and the distance to 
the starting point is | 𝑠0| / || s ||. 
   The SVMs are very powerful and commonly used in classification, but they suffer 
some drawbacks. The algorithm uses high computational power to train the dataset. 
Also, the algorithm is sensitive to the noisy dataset and subdue to overfitting.    
   The above algorithms were considered in our study using them to conduct the 
various experiment and discover that the SVM and KNN have better performance than 
other compare to ANFIS and the deep learning algorithm the CNN-LSTM. Both SVM 
and KNN was used as a reference to compare the results of this study in chapter 4.   
3.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented a description of the research methodology, including the choice 
of feature extraction and analyses methods based on appropriate literature sources. 
The extracted data from all the sources used in this study were used as input including 
the image, frame and text features that were identified as being the most important for 




comprising the sets of inputs that were chosen to give a reasonable representation of 
phishing methods and approaches, and later five combinations of parameters were 
used in the parameter tuning framework. Out of the total number of sources, including 
documentary sources that were classified, the proposed system was able to achieve 
a 98.3% success rate in the identification of legitimate and illegitimate websites. The 
system should restore online user confidence in their activities online. The work does 
not raise any ethical concerns about personal information as no features about 
individuals that might enable their recognition were collected.  
    Some of the work in this chapter has been published by the author as part of his 
doctoral research; the full citation is: Adebowale, M. A., Lwin, K. T., Sánchez, E. and 
Hossain, M. A. (2019) 'Intelligent web-phishing detection and protection scheme 
using integrated features of Images, frames and text', Expert Systems with 
Applications, 115, pp. 300-313. 
Chapter 4 will present the implementation of the system and the experimental setup 




















Chapter 4 Implementation and Evaluation of an IPDS 
In the previous chapter, research methodology was present that describes features-
based online and offline approaches for phishing detection. The chapter also includes 
the sources selection method and features extraction. Features were analysed, and 
the advantages and the disadvantages are considered, various machine learning 
approaches were also studied and the ones with relatively good performance were 
chosen for adoption. In the proposed model, images, frames and text features are used 
to improve the detection of a phishing website. The key challenge is to develop an 
intelligent plugin using the ANFIS algorithm combined with a knowledge model and 
feature inputs. To accomplish this objective various phishing detection algorithms, 
learning design and feature extraction techniques have been explored for phishing 
website detection as described in chapter 3. A smart system is improved by using a 
supervised machine learning algorithm. The cross-validation will involve k-fold or 
holdout using the ANFIS and another classifier to train and test the phishing detection 
system on the website features. The entire detection system can then be deployed as 
a web browser plug-in. Although the existing text-based features approach applying 
machine learning techniques developed elsewhere (Barraclough et al., 2013; 
Barraclough, Sexton and Aslam, 2015) the attempts to detect phishing website still 
have error rates that need to be addressed. Also, work using visual similarity and text 
still suffer from errors (Haruta, Asahina and Sasase, 2017; Zhang et al., 2011). The 
solution proposed in this current work combines all three elements of the website, the 
image, and the frame and text to improve accuracy and reduce error rates. In addition, 
this chapter presents the system architecture and experimental procedures from the 
methodology described in the previous chapter that includes training and testing with 
validation results.  
    Fig. 4-1 is the modified form of an online phishing detection system architecture 




extraction based on hybrid feature inputs (sources) which include image features of 
the website, frame that includes the source code, and tags and cascaded style sheet 
(CSS). This also includes the text content of the website. These three hybrid input 
features were used to extract 35 comprehensive features. These features are utilise 
hybrid and adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) machine learning 
techniques and fuzzy rules during training and in online plugin system development.  
Knowledge 
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Fig. 4-1: Intelligent Phishing Detection System Structure (Barraclough, Sexton and Aslam, 
2015) 
In this case, these techniques were used to classify if a website is legitimate, 
suspicious or phishing in real-time. If a phishing website is detected, a sound alarm is 
generated to alert the user. If the site is phishing, a red colour status is activated 
together with a text-based risk explanation to inform the user of the threat. Also, if the 
site is suspicious, that if more than 50% (but less than 100%) of the content is dubious, 




situation where the ruleset is violated, a warning is generated to alert the user. If the 
threat is less severe i.e. between 25% and 50% then the user can continue. However, 
if it is highly likely that sensitive information will be stolen, then the process is 
automatically stopped, and the fake website does not acquire the user’s confidential 
information. The system is presented in Fig. 4-1 above. 
4.1 Intelligent System 
Intelligent phishing detection solutions have been proposed in recent years that include 
text-based approaches (Aburrous et al., 2010; Barraclough et al., 2013; Zhuang, Jiang 
and Xiong, 2012) but need the additional robustness provided by utilising additional 
frame and image features. One such approach is to  use a web browser for phishing 
detection that incorporates a toolbar (Aggarwal, Rajadesingan and Kumaraguru, 2012; 
Dunlop, Groat and Shelly, 2010; Ghosh, 2013; Kalola, Patel and Pandit; Microsoft, 
2015) incorporating anti-phishing icon functionality such as the blocking the source. 
Another approach involves checking visual similarity such as using the EMD algorithm 
to predict whether website legitimacy (Zhang et al., 2011; Kumar and Kumar, 2015b; 
Haruta, Asahina and Sasase, 2017). 
     On the other hand, a server-side solution approach involves a two-factor verification 
which ensures that users know the secret OTP before they are allowed to continue 
using the website. In the current model parameter optimisation methods are assigned 
to the hybrid features (backward propagation and least-squares) using the ANFIS 
algorithm to determine the level intelligent detection, supplemented later by a deep 
learning algorithm to improve the robustness of the scheme.  
4.2 Knowledge Model 
Knowledge is one of the primary requirements of decision-making. Using a knowledge 
model for phishing detection is an excellent idea as it leads to practical and efficient 




the classification and prediction process. The model will consist of an expert system 
and official websites (Aggarwal, Rajadesingan and Kumaraguru, 2012). These two 
elements of the system design will enable quick verification of a website’s legitimacy. 
It is anticipated that the validity provided by the knowledge model will enable the 
system to perform in an efficient manner that will reduce the time needed by the 
proposed intelligent phishing detection scheme (IPDS) to perform its prediction task. 
This is system may be described as IPDS (Fig. 4.1) which the knowledge model is 
stored in an Excel sheet format that is updated every 5 minutes. 
4.3 Conceptual Framework Using ANFIS  
The overall conceptual block diagram of the proposed intelligent phishing detection 

















Fig. 4-2: Conceptual Block Diagram of IPDS based on Image, Text and Frame Features 
This block diagram illustrates the process of acquiring the website features and feeding 
them into the fuzzy inference system for training, testing and validation purposes. Then 
the ANFIS using fuzzy IF…THEN rules are applied to distinguish legitimate, suspicious 
and phishing websites accurately in real-time. The conceptual block diagram of the 




defined in Barraclough et al. (2013) is presented in Fig. 4-3. For this study the 
classification will utilise k-fold cross-validation the entire feature dataset for training 














Fig. 4-3: Conceptual Block Diagram of Intelligent Phishing Website Detection Classification    
4.3.1 ANFIS Dataset 
The dataset was collected between April 2016 and May 2018, and the datasets had 
35 attributes for a total of approximately 2,456 website hits and a total number of 
13,056 datasets sample (Adebowale, 2019). The features were assigned weights, 
where the value of the legitimate sites which had little risk was assigned a weight of 
0.1; those that had a medium risk and considered suspicious were assigned a weight 
of 0.3, and those with a high risk that were judged to be phishing sites were given a 





The extraction of features is a significant part of this research as they are used to 
create our models and produce If-then fuzzy rules to train and test the scheme. 
Furthermore, these features are also used in the online toolbar to keep track of current 
websites against the set of features in order to classify them as phishing, suspicious 
or legitimate sites accurately in real-time.  
Disadvantages:  
Phishing methods are enhanced frequently, so this may put pressure on the available 
features list as needs to be continuously updated to remain relevant and accurate. To 
address this issue, an automated system is developed that allows the phishing 
knowledge model to be updated every 5 minutes when new phishing sites are added 
to the PhishTank and some other sources, after which an Excel file is created to store 
the update as a query with the function to perform a search to return the returning 
variables. However, it should be noted that the Excel query function cannot simplify a 
new phishing phrase until an expert manually identifies it because such phrases evolve 
frequently.   
4.3.2 CNN+LSTM Dataset 
The proposed IPDS uses two DL layers to classify phishing websites by applying LSTM 
on the text and frame content and the CNN on the images. Thus, the model can easily 
explore the richness of the words embedded in the website’s URL as well as the 
images on the site. The performance of the proposed model was tested by applying it 
to a phishing dataset that consisted of one million URLs taken from PhishTank and a 
legitimate site Common Crawl as well as over 10,000 images from legitimate and 
phishing websites that were personally collected from various e-commerce and e-




using holdout cross-validation; 70% and 30% of the dataset was used for these 
purposes, respectively. 
4.4 ANFIS Experiment Setup 
During the training phase, the algorithm learns and extract features from the data file, 
reads them and uses them to create fuzzy rules (Abunadi, Akanbi and Zainal, 2013). 
Various methods have been put forward in the literature for the training of fuzzy 
models. These include 2-fold (Barraclough et al., 2013) cross-validation, 5-fold cross-
validation, 10-fold cross-validation and 20-fold cross-validation. In this study, the 5-fold 
cross-validation method was employed to train and test the accuracy and also the 
robustness of the algorithm. The five-fold cross-validation procedure involves dividing 
the dataset into five parts, four for training and one for testing. The five-fold cross-
validation method was chosen due to its effectiveness for common datasets 
(Barraclough, Sexton and Aslam, 2015). The five-component input parameter also 
includes three membership functions. Also, the generalised bell-shape membership 
function was chosen for various ranges on the x-axis and y-axis. In order to improve 
the model’s effectiveness and overcome the problems of a long operational time and 
a high false-positive rate, a hybrid method for parameter optimisation was applied 
using 10 epochs and a zero-tolerance error set (Aburrous et al., 2010). 
     The neuro-fuzzy designer toolbox and classification learner toolbox in MATLAB 
Version 9.5 were used for the experiment. The parameters in the neuro-fuzzy designer 
(Fig. 4-4) were set as follows: the number of epochs was set to 10, the error rate was 
set to 0, and the optimisation method was set to hybrid, and also, various cross-
validation has used the results were presented in Table 4-5. 
     Of the 35 features derived from the experimental datasets, 22 were text-based, 8 
were frame-based, and 5 were image based. The full datasets were divided into 7 




layer in random order for training. During the training phase, the errors were corrected 
by back-propagation. The inputs are processed through the inference systems and the 
neural network, with the rules provided to decide throughputs to the output layer and 
this was repeated in such a way that the dataset is used once. The error rates are 
recorded in Table 4-6.  
     After the training phase had been completed, the testing phase was conducted. 
The testing phase followed the same procedure as the training phase. The actual 
decision process at the authentication stage is the last output by which the system can 
compare the features to decide if the site is phishing, suspicious or legitimate. Here 
too the procedure was also repeated for each input dataset such that the datasets 
were only used once. The average error rate was calculated by summing up the error 
rates and then dividing by the number of data, and this rate was used to measure the 
performance of the proposed algorithm (Table 4-6).  
 
Fig. 4-4: Parameter Settings Used for Neuro-Fuzzy Designer (Source: own) 
     In this study, an SVM and KNN was also used to validate the result of the hybrid 
feature selection process. The SVM has already been used efficiently in the 




Wang, 2012). The SVM can target a useful training dataset that allows accurate 
classification of small training sets (Adewumi and Akinyelu, 2016). Hence an SVM was 
used in this study to validate further the hybrid features utilised in the experiment. 
Moreover, KNN was used as an instance-based learning algorithm because it is 
beneficial for a variety of problem domains in which the original scores are not known 
(Babu, Nirmala and Kumar, 2010). Furthermore, KNN has been applied to text 
classification since the early days of data mining research and has been shown to 
produce a better result than a variety of other machine learning algorithms (Jain and 
Gupta, 2016b).  
     The quadratic SVM and KNN in the MATLAB version 9.5 classification learning 
toolbox was explicitly used to compare the model. The toolbox was loaded with the 35 
features that were extracted in this study. The features used for training and testing 
and the result that was obtained were tabulated using a confusion matrix analysis (Fig. 
4-5). The results of the training and testing are presented in Table 4-6. In addition, to 
validate the proposed approach, the results were compared with those of other 
machine learning algorithms Tables 4-1 to 4-4. 
4.4.1 Performance Measure  
A performance measurement in feature classification is essential in assessing the 
quality of the learning model. The performance measurement can be defined as the 
procedure of quantifying the accuracy and efficiency of an action using a metric that is 
associated with the action. Various measures have been described in the literature 
that can be used to make an improved decision overall or a particular area of 
application (Gupta and Shukla, 2015). In line with the above, an evaluation of the 






True Positive Rate: 
The True Positive (TP) rate denotes the percentage of phishing websites that are 
correctly classified as a phishing site or the percentage of URLs that were correctly 
classified as a phishing URL. The higher the percentage, the better the performance 





)  𝑋 100%             (4.1) 
False Negative Rate: 
The False Negative (FN) rate represents the percentage of phishing websites/URLs 
that are classified wrongly as a legitimate website/URLs. The lower the percentage the 





)  𝑋 100%         (4.2) 
True Negative Rate: 
The True Negative (TN) rate denotes the percentage of legitimate websites/URLs that 





)  𝑋 100%      (4.3) 
False Positive Rate: 
The False Positive (FP) rate indicates the percentage of legitimate websites/URLs that 
are classified correctly as a phishing site/URL. The lower the percentage, the better 








)  𝑋 100%     (4.4) 
Accuracy: 
The accuracy measurement is the simplest and most common measure used to 
evaluate a classifier (Pradeepthi and Kannan, 2014). The accuracy of a model is 
denoted by the percentage of correct predictions it makes or by the percentage of 
misclassification errors it makes. The following formula calculates the accuracy of the 
proposed detection and classification model:  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
(𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁)
(𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑁)
           (4.5) 
Precision:  
Precision is the proportion of correct classifications made by the classifier. If there are 
a large number of classifications into a given category where many should not be there 
then this lowers the precision (Pradeepthi and Kannan, 2014).  The precision is 
calculated by the following:  
Precision =  
𝑇𝑃
(𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃)
                     (4.6) 
The precision measure is what machine learning, data mining and information 
retrieval research studies focus on primarily, but this measure is entirely ignored in 
receiver operation characteristics (ROC)6 analysis (Powers, 2011). 
Recall: 
The recall contrasts with the precision in recording the number of correct classifications 
as a proportion of all positive classifications included the miss-classified (false positive) 
outputs. The recall is calculated by the following:  
 
6 In statistics, a receiver operating characteristic curve, or ROC curve, is a graphical plot that illustrates 
the performance of a binary classifier system as its discrimination threshold is varied [Online] 
Wikipedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Receiver_operating_characteristic [Accessed on 







                           (4.7) 
F-Measure:  
The F-measure is the harmonic mean of recall and precision. The F-measure is 
calculated by:  
𝐹 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 =  
2×𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛×𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
          (4.8) 
The F-measure effectively references the TP to the arithmetic mean of the predicted 
positives and the actual positives in proportion to a specific agreement in the actual 
class and the set-Dice coefficient (Powers, 2011). 
Although a confusion matrix integrates all the performance measures of the 
classification algorithm, additional meaningful results can be extracted from the matrix 
to reveal the performance measures Fig 4-5. 
 
Fig. 4-5: Confusion Matrix for Phishing Dataset 
4.5  Discussion of the Results and Analysis  of ANFIS Experiment 
The purpose of cross-validation was to examine the overall performance of the three 
inputs on multiple training and testing standard machine learning techniques. This 
section presents descriptive statistical results for the intelligent phishing detection 
model experiments. The results of the experiments are shown in Tables 4-1 to 4-4 




measures. All measures are presented as percentages. The overall average training 
accuracy was 98.55% for text features, 98.06% for frame features, 97.2% for image 
features and 98.3% for hybrid features. 
Table 4-1: Classification Result Using Text Features  
    Algorithm Accuracy % Recall %  Precision %  F-measure % 
ANFIS 98.55 98.51 98.58 98.54 
KNN 95.50 95.45 95.54 95.49 
SVM Quadratic 94.30 94.29 94.31 94.29 
Table 4-2: Classification Result Using Frame Features  
     Algorithm Accuracy % Recall %  Precision %  F-measure % 
ANFIS 98.06 98.02 98.08 98.02 
KNN 59.59 59.20 59.60 59.39 
SVM Quadratic 59.99 59.90 60.10 59.99 
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 show that the KNN and SVM have a low accuracy result compared 
to the ANFIS algorithm, for a detection time of 52.6 seconds. 
Table 4-3: Classification Using Image Features  
     Algorithm Accuracy % Recall %  Precision %  F-measure % 
ANFIS 97.20 97.18 97.22 97.18 
KNN 59.20 59.19 59.21 59.20 
SVM Quadratic 63.30 63.29 63.32 63.30 
Table 4-4: Classification Using Hybrid Features  
     Algorithm Accuracy % Recall %  Precision %  F-measure % 
ANFIS 98.30 98.26 98.31 98.28 
KNN 96.10 96.05 96.14 96.09 






Table 4-5: ANFIS Cross-Validation 
ANFIS Cross-Validation Data Source Result  
 Image Text Frame Hybrid 
2-fold  96.71 93.49 95.44 94.23 
5-fold  97.20 98.55 98.06 98.2 
10-fold 95.03 91.35 95.1 92.53 
     Table 4-6 presents the result of applying the ANFIS 5-fold cross-validation method 
with five features as input. The first column lists the seven feature sets. The Test error 
column presents the total testing errors derived from the standard testing error results 
for each feature set. The next three columns collectively headed Training error 
presents the total training errors derived in a similar way, summarized as a Training 
error% in the next column. The average Training error can be seen to be 1.7%. The 
final column shows that the model had an overall training accuracy of 98.3% using 5-
fold cross-validation with an average time of 26.72 seconds. Note that the ANFIS stops 
learning when the tolerant limit of testing error is reached (Karaboga and Kaya, 2016).  
 Table 4-6: ANFIS 5-fold Cross-Validation Method with Five Feature Input 
Result 
summary 
























































The results of the proposed scheme were compared with the approach proposed by 
Abdelhamid et al. (2014), which used multi-label classifier-based associative 
classification (MCAC) to produce an 94.5% accuracy. It was also compared with the 
method suggested by Barraclough et al. (2013) for phishing detection using neuro-
fuzzy, which obtained 98.55% accuracy (Chart 4-1) for text-only feature detection. 
However, the present experiment included fine-tuning of the features arranged 
together in the same attack pattern for training and testing and assigning different 
weights with a reduction in some functions by removing the redundant elements used 
in their model. 
 
Chart 4-1: Experimental result for ANFIS, SVM and KNN classification 
4.6  ANFIS Limitations 
Even though the ANFIS is the most popular algorithm for feature-based fuzzy 
modelling, it still has some limitations. The most common one relates to the input type 











































work should identify other possible parameter combinations to expand the framework 
to make it more effective.  
     The two most important conclusions to draw from this ANFIS approach are:  
❖ The ANFIS is a first order Sugeno fuzzy model. The ANFIS is a NN with five layers: 
input, fuzzification, fuzzy rule, normalisation and defuzzification (Çakıt and 
Karwowski, 2017). 
❖ The ANFIS utilises a hybrid learning algorithm that aggregates the result of the 
least-squares estimator by using the gradient descent method. A training set of 
inputs is presented in the forward pass, after which, neuron outputs are calculated 
for each layer. The subsequent parameter rules are identified by using a least-
squares estimator, while the error signals are propagated backwards and the 
antecedent parameter rules are updated according to the chain rule (GüNeri, Ertay 
and YüCel, 2011). 
4.7 Conceptual Framework Using Deep Learning 
The overall conceptual framework for the intelligent phishing detection system (IPDS) 
uses deep learning as presented in Fig. 4-6. The concept involves using two deep 
learning algorithms, namely LSTM and CNN on different types of features that have 
been extracted from websites in order to better predict phishing activities. The feature 
extraction step and machine learning are applied in the initial stage in the classification 
process. A block diagram of the proposed anti-phishing detection system is shown in 


















Fig. 4-6: Conceptual Block Diagram for Intelligent Phishing Detection System (IPDS) 
     The block diagram of the IPDS in Fig. 4-6 above illustrates the process of acquiring 
the website features and feeding them into the deep learning system for classification 
purposes. Then, the trained LSTM-CNN network is applied to distinguish accurately 
between legitimate, suspicious and phishing websites in real-time. Websites are 
assessed separately to ascertain whether they are legitimate or fake (phishing). The 


















4.7.1 LSTM+CNN Experiment Setup and Results 
The raw data from both the images and the URLs contained a lot of background 
information and varied in length and size. Therefore, pre-processing was necessary to 
make the data available for training the model. For the CNN architecture, images from 
the sites were cropped based on the springing-box and merely removed the wrong 
image. For the LSTM architecture, several URLs were collected and saved in Microsoft 
Excel format as comma-separated-values with only the URL in one column and their 
category label in the other column as shown in chapter three (see Table 3-7). 
     The model was developed in MATLAB version 9.5 using the deep learning toolbox. 
For the CNN architecture, there were three categories of data. The AlexNet CNN was 
used, which is eight layers deep and can classify an image into over 1,000 object 
categories. The network has a wide range of images as well as many learned rich 
features. The AlexNet network has an input image size of 227-by-227. In order to take 
advantage of the architecture the pre-trained network was retrained with the images 
obtained from various websites for the network so that it would be able to classify new 
images. The AlexNet network was edited using the MATLAB deep learning toolbox.  
Pre-trained learning and the fully connected layer output size were changed to a three-
fold classification of legitimate, suspicious and phishing categories. Both the bias 
learning rate factor and the learning rate factor were set 10. The first classification layer 
was deleted, and the new layer was connected. The newly connected classification 
layer was analysed, and the report showed zero errors. The new network was then 
exported into the deep network design. After that, the extracted image dataset was 
loaded into the image data storage and processed to extract the speeded-up robust 
features (SURF) from all the images using the grid method to create a bag of features 
where the data was split into 70% for training and 30% for validation using holdout 
cross-validation. The images were resized to match the sizes of those in the pre-




network layer from the toolbox were used to train image and set the options. Then 
clustering was used to create a 1000-word visual vocabulary (Fig. 4-8). The model 
took 130 sec to complete one epoch of the training procedure.   
     For the LSTM architecture, the dataset was partitioned, and holdout cross-
validation was set to 70% for training and 30% for validation. The URLs were tokenised 
to separate each URL into a series of separate words, all of which were set in 
lowercase. The tokenised data was then encoded to make it available for training, 
where the maximum length was set to 75, the hidden size was set to 180, and the 
embedding dimension was 100 with the fully connected network. The training options 
were set (Fig. 4-9) to adam; epoch = 10, gradient threshold = 1, learning rate = 0.01 
and verbose = false. By doing this, the network architecture layer was modified to 
achieve better training accuracy.  
 
Fig. 4-8: Training Dataset Word Vocabulary (Source: Own) 





Fig. 4-9: CNN-LSTM Training and Validation Process (Source: Own) 
   The evaluation of the proposed method was performed based on traditional feature 
engineering, plus the classification algorithm methodology presented in section 4.8. As 
described earlier the total average training accuracy of the scheme was 93.28% (Table 
4-7). The training achieved relative performance in CNN with 92.55% and that for 
testing was achieved by LSTM with 92.79% (Chart 4-2). The results showed that the 
average accuracy of the model was high, at 93.28%. The results show that some level 
of improvement in phishing detection was achieved through the use of hybrid features 
by combining the images, text and frames of a site with the use of a hybrid DL 
algorithm. 
The results also provide information about the usefulness of unsupervised pre-training 





Table 4-7: Classification Result for CNN, LSTM and IPDS (CNN+LSTM) 
Algorithm Accuracy % Recall %  Precision %  F-measure % 
CNN 92.55 92.51 92.58 92.54 
LSTM 92.79 92.78 92.81 92.80 
IPDS (CNN+LSTM) 93.28 93.27 93.30 93.29 
 
 
Chart 4-2: Experiment Result for Deep Learning by CNN, LSTM and IPDS (CNN+LSTM) 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter hybrid features from diverse sources are discussed, the ANFIS and the 
CNN-LSTM algorithm was used for experimental setup. The study reflects the 
effectiveness of the hybrid features approach using ANFIS and CNN, and the LSTM 
deep learning algorithm is an essential driver to the high model performance. This 
chapter has contributed to the anti-phishing detection research by present the use of 
a hybrid feature which include image, frame and text. These three sets of input have 
just been introduced as single hybrid features for the first time. The three elements are 
used because they represent the whole structure of a website. Although the scheme 
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be pre-specified to solve a given problem. Ultimately online user confidence will 
increase in performing transactions online.   
   Note that some content of this chapter has been reported by the author in Expert 
Systems with Applications, Journal of Enterprise Information Management and 
IEEExplore conference paper, namely>  
Adebowale, M. A., Lwin, K. T., Sánchez, E. and Hossain, M. A. (2019) 'Intelligent 
web-phishing detection and protection scheme using integrated features of Images, 
frames and text', Expert Systems with Applications, 115, pp. 300-313. 
M. A. Adebowale, K. T. Lwin and M. A. Hossain, "Deep Learning with Convolutional 
Neural Network and Long Short-Term Memory for Phishing Detection," 2019 13th 
International Conference on Software, Knowledge, Information Management and 
Applications (SKIMA), Island of Ulkulhas, Maldives, 2019, pp. 1-8. 
M. A. Adebowale, Lwin, K. T. and Hossain, M. A. (2020) 'Intelligent phishing detection 
system using deep learning algorithm', Journal of Enterprise Information Management,  















Chapter 5 Implementation and Evaluation of Phishing 
Detection Toolbar 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the hybrid feature-based offline scheme was developed and 
tested using the adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) optimisation 
approach with a deep learning convolution neural network (CNN) utilising long short-
term memory (LSTM). The section of the extraction and the dataset was briefly 
described. The experimental procedures and results were also presented, analysed 
and discussed. 
    The evaluation of the proposed method was performed based on traditional feature 
engineering, plus the classification algorithm methodology presented in section 4.8. 
Features were created based on the URLs, image features and website elements. The 
CNN and LSTM classifier were trained using one million URLs and over 10,000 images 
to build the model. A Toolbar concept was developed using a deep learning (DL) 
algorithm against legitimate, suspicious and phishing websites. The results showed 
that a voice-generating user warning interface with a green colour status and a text 
showing a warning was generated within 25 seconds before the page loaded to give 
the user a warning.  
5.2 System Architecture Design and Theoretical Definitions  
The MATLAB version 9.5 AppDesigner toolbox was used to create a graphical user 
interface to evaluate the model. The checking process involved the user entering the 
URL link into the textbox. When the check button is pressed, the colour of the traffic 
light changes to correspond to the classification of the URL and the text also displays 
the classification value. Fig. 5-1 shows the result for a phishing site; Fig. 5-2 shows the 




5.3 Time-Based and Accuracy-Based Tests 
In this experiment, standard assessment metrics were applied to assess the 
performance of the developed detection toolbar for phishing websites using real-time-
based and accuracy-based evaluation methods (Xiang et al., 2011). The time-based 
method explores performance under conditions that are similar to those found in a real-
world situation, while the accuracy-based method assesses overall performance on 
the available dataset. Both of these methods were implemented in order to evaluate 
the new method rigorously. 
     Due to the advances in technology and the adoption of new techniques, phishers 
have been able to improve their forged websites so that they now have high similarity 
with legitimate sites in terms of content. In tests, the current state-of-the-art solutions 
have been able to obtain 70% to 98% accuracy (see Table 2-1) in identifying legitimate 
website. However, these solutions must perform well in the real world, so there needs 
to be a significant improvement of 0.5% or higher (Shirsat, 2018). Moreover, their level 
of accuracy in identifying suspicious websites should be higher still, and their accuracy 
in detecting phishing websites should be even higher (Government Communication 
Headquarter. (GCHQ, 2018).  
     For the present research, three series of experiments were performed for each 
evaluation method, testing them against legitimate, suspicious and phishing websites. 
In the time-based evaluation process, the time-to-classify point was recorded against 
all the legitimate datasets, suspicious datasets and phishing datasets. Then the 
process was also repeated several times to determine the average time to each 
classification at an interval. In the accuracy-based assessment, all the legitimate 
datasets, suspicious datasets and phishing datasets were utilised to test the toolbar. 
     The accuracy of the model was tested using the holdout cross-validation strategy. 




proposed IPDS (CNN+LSTM) was 93.28% (Table 5-1). The classification achieved a 
relative performance in CNN with 92.55% and that for testing was achieved by LSTM 
with 92.79% (Table 5-1). 
Table 5-1: Relative Performance of CNN, LSTM and IPDS (CNN+LSTM) 
Algorithm Accuracy % Recall %  Precision %  F-measure % 
CNN 92.55 92.51 92.58 92.54 
LSTM 92.79 92.78 92.81 92.80 
IPDS 93.28 93.27 93.30 93.29 
 
 
Chart 5-1: Relative Performance of Algorithms in Chart Form 
5.3.1  Testing of the Toolbar Application on Phishing Websites 
To evaluate the toolbar concept, it was tested on 2,600 websites including legitimate, 
suspicious and phishing websites. First, it was tested on 1,000 phishing websites. The 
LSTM-CNN algorithm runs in the background as a knowledge module. When a URL is 
typed into the address bar (Fig 5-1), the algorithm inspects whether the requested 
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the deep learning classification algorithm. If a match is detected, and it is a phishing 
site, in order to alert the user a red colour status with a voice-operated user warning 
interface is activated and a text is generated showing that the status of the URL is 
“phishing”.  
     The above procedure was repeated up to 1000 times with different URLs, so all the 
phishing URLs were tested. The performance of the toolbar in each case was observed 
and recorded, and besides, screenshots were taken to validate the results. An example 
of a screenshot of a phishing website result is shown in Fig 5-1. The rest of the 
screenshots are presented in Appendix D. This part of the experimental effort was 
carried out over 8 hours per day for five consecutive days. As regards the time-based 
assessment of the toolbar’s ability to detect a phishing website, the voice-generating 
user warning interface with a red colour status and a text showing an alert were 
generated within 25 seconds to warn the user before the page loaded. 
 
Fig. 5-1: Testing of the Application on Phishing Websites 
5.3.2 Testing of the Toolbar Application on Suspicious Websites 
The toolbar also evaluated on 100 suspicious URLs. As previously mentioned, the 




procedure is followed as in the testing of the toolbar on phishing websites that 
described in the previous section, but in this test, the algorithm checks whether the 
URL requested is a suspicious website by relating the newly typed URL against the 
stored features in the IPDS. If a match is detected, and it looks like the URL is a 
suspicious website, the user warning interface included in the model shows an amber 
colour status and, besides, a text description is generated stating that the URL is 
“suspicious” (Fig. 5-2) in order to alert the user to exercise caution. This process was 
repeated 500 times on all 100 URLs and the performance was observed and recorded 
(Table 5-2). An example of a screenshot of suspicious website results shown in Fig. 5-
2. The rest of the screenshots are presented in Appendix E This task required 8 hours 
per day over two days to perform because the finding shows that there is a little and a 
reasonable number of suspicious online websites which make this challenging task as 
they are short-lived. As regards the time-based assessment of the toolbar’s 
performance in identifying a suspicious website, the voice-generating user warning 
interface with an amber colour status and a text showing a warning were generated 
within 25 seconds to alert the user before the page loaded. 
 






5.3.3 Testing of the Application on Legitimate Websites 
The toolbar was also tested on 1,500 legitimate URLs. As stated above, the LSTM-
CNN algorithm runs in the background as a knowledge module. The same procedure 
as that used to test the toolbar’s performance on phishing and suspicious websites 
was used, but in this instance, the algorithm checks whether the URL that has been 
requested is a legitimate website by relating the newly typed URL in text box against 
the stored features in the IPDS. If no match is found, then it is a legitimate website, 
and the user warning interface displays a green colour status (Fig. 5-3). At this point, 
it is safe for the user to continue in their task with peace of mind that the site to which 
they are submitting their confidential information is legitimate.  
     In the experiment, this procedure was repeated 600 times with validation dataset 
consisting of URLs so that most the URLs were tested to validate the performance of 
the toolbar and in each case, the result was observed and recorded (Table 5.2). Figure 
5-3 shows an example of a screenshot of one of the results produced by the toolbar 
for a legitimate site. The rest of the screenshots are provided in Appendix F. As regards 
the time-based assessment of the toolbar’s ability to detect a legitimate website, the 
voice-generating user warning interface with a green colour status and a text showing 
the result was generated within 25 seconds before the page loaded. The next section 





Fig. 5-3: Testing of the Application on Legitimate Websites 
5.4 Evaluation of the Accuracy-based and Time-based Results   
The most essential and standard evaluation metrics used for this online phishing 
website detection plugin experiment is the real-time based feature and the accuracy-
based evaluation method (Bayani, 2013). This section focuses on the accuracy and 
speed at which the proposed phishing detection toolbar works, because not only is the 
accuracy of the warning important, the warning interface needs to be able to alert users 
quickly in real-time. 
   On the one hand, the inclusion of a voice-generating user warning interface, as well 
as text directives, made a significant improvement to the effectiveness of the proposed 
application. While the accuracy-based method is measuring the performance of the on 
the available dataset, the time-based method is to explore the performance of the 
plugin on a real-world scenario.  On the other hand, the experiments showed that the 
overall performance of the intelligent phishing detection system was active at both the 
time-based and accuracy-based level. Suitable testing was done to assess the overall 
performance of the intelligent phishing detection. 
   The existing solutions obtain between 70% to 90% accuracy on the testing with the 




evolution of the method, validating the scheme against phishing, suspicious and 
legitimate datasets. 
5.4.1 Validating of Performance  
In order to validate the performance of the plugin, a total of 1,000 phishing websites 
were used to evaluate the performance of the plugin in terms of time taken and 
accuracy. Overall, the toolbar was able to achieve an average accuracy of 93.28%, as 
shown in Table 5-2. Then in Table 5-2 column 4 roll 2, shows the performance of the 
phishing detection with 93.8% true positives and in column 5 roll 2, 6.2% true negative 
this has taken into consideration using 1000 phishing URLs with an accuracy of 93.5% 
in column 3 roll 2. Also, the toolbar achieved 94.5% accuracy shown on column 3 roll 
3, with 94.8% true positives column 4 roll 3and 5.2% true negative in column 5 roll 3 
when tested on 100 suspicious datasets. Meanwhile, when the plugin is tested on 
1,500 legitimate websites, the phishing detection toolbar achieved 91.8% accuracy 
column 3 roll 4, was recorded with true positives of 92% column 4 roll 4 and 8% real 
negative in column 5 roll 4. However, accuracy varies from a minimum of 91% to a 
maximum of 94%, which caused significant variation in the accuracy results across the 
testing datasets. 
Table 5-2: Test Results for Phishing Website Detection by Toolbar Application 
Status No. of Websites Accuracy % TP% TN % Average Result % 
Phishing 
websites 







100 94.5% 94.8% 5.2% 
Legitimate 
websites 








5.4.2 Time-Based Performance 
In order to confirm the scheme on time-based performance, the toolbar was validated 
against the legitimate, suspicious and phishing websites. The average time for a 
website to load its content is typically 60 seconds as reported by one researcher on 
his system (Aburrous et al., 2010). This load time allowed the tool bar plug in to be 
designed to schedule the detection in various stages to present a decision in real-time 
(see Table 5-3). The table reflects the first check of the plugin to appear in 10 seconds, 
checking for most used features of the phishing website at the initial stage. Hence, if 
any of these features were found on the web page, the user is alert accordingly. Then 
the plugin goes to the second stage to verify the site against the list features in the 
second stage in Table 5-3, which the result should be decided within 25 seconds. The 
third stage is the graphic checking state which takes the most time to load, and so was 
scheduled to be the last check. When a phishing website was requested, the plugin 
alerted the user within 25 seconds before the interface loaded its result using a voice-
operated user warning interface with a red colour status and a text showing the status 
of a phishing website. Compared to the time needed to detect a phishing site, the 
plugin needed a more extended period to determine whether a URL was a link to a 
legitimate website. The plugin took an average running time of 30 seconds before the 
interface loaded its result, showing that the URL was a legitimate site. This is because 
phishing URLs have some unique features that can be easily identified by the scheme. 
   Based on the above results of testing and validating the design concept on legitimate, 
suspicious and phishing websites, this study has demonstrated the accuracy of the 
scheme using the proposed algorithm. To the user’s knowledge this study is the first 
to consider the LSTM-CNN algorithm for use in phishing detection and the first to use 
a comprehensive set of features that includes image, test and frame content from all 




Table 5-3: Real-time detection stages 
First level check Time 













Adding Prefix or 
Suffix Separated by 










The Existence of 
“HTTPS” Token in 
the Domain Part 
of the URL 
Second level check  
Domain Registration 
Length 
Request URL URL of Anchor Submitting 
Information to 
Email 




Age of Domain DNS Record Website Traffic  PageRank Google Index 
Number of Links 

















Third level check  
Favicon Image Size Alternative Text Mouse over Login Form 15s 
 
   The approach presented in this study is not directly comparable with existing works 
because none of those works uses all the possible features of the image, frame and 
text content in terms of size and range. The majority of the previous studies used 
precise elements of websites such as blacklists and text features to develop anti-
phishing toolbars (Bottazzi et al., 2015). For example, Sharma, Meenakshi and Bhatia 
(2017) surveyed ten toolbars and found that the existing toolbars mostly use text 
features and blacklists. Among the existing toolbar that uses URL features and 
blacklists are shown in section 2.4, Table 2-1 and 2-2 with an average of 94%. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
The results of this research demonstrated that using the hybrid features of a website 
with some directives can alert users accurately, effectively and in real-time to the 




improve the false negative error rate. This is in line with existing research in phishing 
detection that has found that URLs alone do not represent all of the characteristics of 
phishing techniques (Li et al., 2019). Also, the fact that legitimate sites had a disparity 
in detection accuracy was because some spam was malicious and contributed to the 
false positives.  
     This study demonstrates that the fundamental requirement for accurate 
performance in phishing detection is a combination of comprehensive features, ANFIS, 
a deep learning algorithm and a warning system that can be activated in real-time. The 
new form of the user interface toolbar approach is a novel contribution to existing 
knowledge and could be extended/generalised to detect malicious emails and/or 
developed into a commercial product. 
     Finding many live unknown websites for testing was an unexpectedly difficult issue 
as the life span of phishing websites is typically only 48 hours. However, 100 
suspicious websites were used as representative examples. It is essential to clarify 
that the features that were used in this research were up-to-date and active at the time 
of writing. However, phishing techniques evolve rapidly, so regular updating with new 
phishing characteristics is recommended to ensure that the system remains accurate.  
    Some of the results presented in this chapter have been reported by the current 
researcher journals and conference paper. 














Chapter 6 Conclusion & Future Work 
6.1 Concluding Remarks  
Phishing is a significant problem that leads to identity theft, and it requires an efficient 
and proactive solution. Although phishing attacks are often simple in design, phishers 
are very active, and attacks are becoming more complex, so they have caused millions 
of pounds’ worth of damage in recent years. Due to the growing severity of the problem 
this technically challenging and academic area was chosen as the focus of this 
research which aimed to extend the current approaches to phishing detection by using 
the adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) algorithm. 
   However, there are two main issues associated with using ANFIS which this current 
research addresses. First, it is more complicated because it must have a single output 
obtained by using weighted average defuzzification. Second, all the output, whether 
constant or linear, must have the same membership function (Barraclough et al., 
2013). Another issue prior to the current work is that no recent studies have used text, 
frame and image features together to automatically detect phishing websites in real-
time.  
6.2 Research Achievement 
This study presents an intelligent phishing detection and protection scheme (IPDS) 
that was developed by employing a new approach using the integrated features of 
images, frames and text of phishing websites mentioned in the objective. 
    The aim of the study was to use an efficient ANFIS algorithm to develop the offline 
IPDS, tested and verified for phishing website detection and protection. Also to meet 
the set object various experiment were conducted, and the results validate that the 
proposed approach was able to achieve an accuracy of 98.3% (See Table 4-6) which, 




detection and protection, this work being presented by the author in two of the Tier 
One journal publications, namely ‘Expert System with Application’ (ESWA) and 
published in 2019 and Journal of Enterprise Information Management in 2020.  
   The offline real-time approach using ANFIS was able to classify a phishing website 
in an average of 30 seconds less than the average time of 60 seconds (Barraclough 
et al., 2013) for a web browser to load on the user system, and thus is a practical and 
viable add-on tool for browser functionality, which was part of the aim of the research.  
     This study also explored the efficacy of the deep learning approach, which is part 
of the set objective to explore relevant algorithm for the detection of phishing, this 
revealing the advantages and disadvantages of both the convolutional neural network 
(CNN) and long short-term memory (LSTM) methods. On the one hand, the 
LSTM+CNN algorithm was also used to develop an offline approach for phishing 
detection but had a smaller detection accuracy of 93.28% compared to that of the 
ANFIS algorithm.  
   The LSTM+CNN algorithm performed faster than the ANFIS algorithm in the 
classification of phishing and legitimate websites with an average of 25 seconds. On 
the other hand although it is faster the prediction performance is on average slightly 
lower than that of ANFIS. Given the faster performance the LSTM+CNN model was 
later used to develop a browser-plugin this fulfilling one of the researches aims and 
objectives.  
   The plugin was tested with over 2,000 websites reporting an average detection 
accuracy of 93.28% within 25 seconds in real-time. The results of using the 
LSTM+CNN algorithm have been presented at the conference of Software Knowledge 
Information Management and Application (SKIMA 2019), 26th to 28th August 2019 in 
the Island of Agulhas, Maldives. The work was also later published in IEEEXplore 





   The dataset collated for use in this current work has been made available online, at: 
“Adebowale, M. A. (2019) 'Phishing Detection Dataset' (Version 2) [Numeric Data]’ and 
accessible at: http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/gt7xdbs3kt.1 e.g. accessed: 25 November 
2019).  
6.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
The primary contribution of this study is the integration of hybrid features from text, 
images and frames that were extracted from various websites and then used to 
develop a robust ANFIS solution. First, a hybrid feature selection approach for use in 
the detection of website phishing attacks was developed. The method is based on a 
combination of content-based and visual-based approaches. The hybrid feature 
selection approach uses legitimate and non-legitimate websites and an associated 
artificial intelligence algorithm to develop an integrated method to address these 
elements and is referred to in this work as the Intelligent Phishing Detection and 
protection Scheme (IPDS).  The hybrid approach used a dataset containing one million 
legitimate and phishing websites from the PhishTank and Common Crawl datasets to 
validate the scheme as well as 10,000 images that were collected from both phishing 
and legitimate websites. The 10,000 images and the 13,000 features dataset were 
used to build the knowledge model, which has been placed in the public domain as a 
resource for other researchers to develop their own contributions to knowledge in the 
field of phishing detection solutions, 
   The features from a previous study (Barraclough et al., 2013) were optimised from 
over 300 features in their solution. One significant achievement of the present solution 
is that it reduces the number of features in their text model to 22 by removing the 
redundant ones and including 8 frame features and 5 image features for a better 
optimised solution of 35 hybrid features in the current study. The reduction in the 
number of features makes this much faster in terms of time-to-prediction. The 




various colours representing the category of detection. A green colour indicates a 
legitimate site, whilst an amber colour represents suspicious ones, and a red colour 
indicates a phishing site. There is also an audible (voice) warning of relevance to a 
visually impaired person. The protection interface also advises the user on what to do 
next such as to terminate the process if it discovers that the site is phishing or 
suspicious.     
     The main conclusion of applying the IPDS approach that is proposed in this study 
is the achievement of an excellent classification accuracy of 93.28% for identifying 
phishing websites. Previous chapters discussed the success in enhancing both the 
offline model and the online toolbar for phishing detection. In particular a MATLAB 
solution uses a voice generating user warning interface based on 35 features set to 
detect a phishing web page in real-time. The real-time approach is one of the strengths 
of this study. This was demonstrated in the previous chapter 5, with the IPDS able to 
respond with great agility and could verify a legitimate web page in 30 seconds. To the 
best of the current author’s knowledge, the research presented is the first work that 
considers how best to integrate image, text and frame features into a combined 
solution for a phishing detection scheme. 
6.4 Future Work 
The current work has established some areas that could provide further directions of 
research. These are described as follows; 
• There needs to be further study to evaluate what other variables could be used 
to improve classification accuracy and reduce the false-positive rate of the 
classifiers. 
• Since the detection system is automated, there needs to be further work as to 
how the knowledge base might be kept up to date to reflect new trends in 




response to changing phishing attack strategies (such as use of non-standard 
ports, as described in chapter 5).  The current non-dynamic limitation of the 
present solution is the main barrier to the intelligent solution being able to 
achieve maximum accuracy and optimum performance. 
• The approach would benefit from a better validation of the features, such as 
‘Abnormal DNS Record’ and ‘Abnormal Request URL’ possibly using 
appropriate database queries on listings of known reputable registered and 
lawful websites. 
• The algorithm for determining the similarity of website features needs to be 
improved, as the current system does not base comparisons on standardised 
content (text, frame, images, style, javascript), that is, there is a need to 
standardise content so that like-for-like comparisons can be made. 
• The toolbar plug in needs to be developed so that it is cross-browser 
compatible and able to be used by all standard browsers (Internet Explorer, 
Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome). It could also be developed as a Desktop 
application, possibly running in the background for spontaneous phishing 
detection as well as self-directed tool for specific phishing detection.      
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Hybrid Features Table 
Text Features Approach  
Search index 
Page ranking 
This feature was used to check the importance of the web page 
by counting the number of quality links to a page to determine 
the relevance of the site on the Internet. 
Google index 
This feature was used to compare if the URL of the website 
included in the Google index matched the one submitted to 
google index. 
Website traffic 
This feature is used to measure the amount of data sent and 
received by a visitor to a website. 
Statistical-
report 
This feature is also used for the usage of the website, such as 
the number of queries and the website availabilities. However, a 
new website may fail this check; some other features are used 
to ascertain the legitimacy of a website. 
Security & encryption 
Existence of 
“https” in URL 
This feature was used to check the existence of https in a URL 
Long URL 
This feature was used to check the length of the URL to 
determine if the original website has the correspondent URL. 
Using the IP 
address 
This feature was used to check the URL if it contains IP address 
as most phishers use this to deceive the unsuspected user. 
Abnormal URL 
This feature will check the URL against abnormality in the 
resources locator against the information stored in the WHOIS 
database for the legitimate website. 
Abnormal 
request 
This feature checks if there is a request from an external object 




This feature checks if their anchor element is like a tag <a> from 
an external link. This feature is treated as the request URL. 
Web address bar 
Adding prefix 
or suffix 
This feature is used to check if the dash symbol that is rarely 
used in a valid URL. Phishers tend to add suffix or prefix to 
separate by (-) to the domain name to made users feel that they 
are dealing with the legitimate web page. These are checked in 
the URL with our approach. 
URL is having 
“@” symbol 
This feature is used to check for the @ symbol in the URL as it 




This feature checks for considerably smaller URL length and 
still leads to the acquired web page. These are achieved by 
using https redirect on a domain name that is short. 
Some links are 
pointing to a 
page 




This feature is useful as it checks for validating if a service such 
as https is up or down. If all ports are open, phishers can run 






Age of the 
domain 
This feature is used to extract the information from the WHOIS 
database and compare with information of a phishing site. Most 
phishing websites live for a short period. 
DNS record 
This feature was used to check the identity of the domain in the 
WHOIS database for the records. However, If the DNS record is 





This use of this feature is to check how the site is registered. 
Since phishing websites live for a short period, we believe that 
trustworthy domains are usually paid for several years in 
advance. 
Sub-domain This use of this feature is to check how the site is registered. 
Source code Javascript 
Redirect using 
“//.” 
This feature was used to check the existence of // within the 





This feature was used to check if a website redirected user’s 
information to a personal email, instead of a server to process. 
https 
This feature is used to check the existence of secure 
communication and if the issuer is trusted and how long, the 
certificate is issued. 
 
Frame Features Approach 
Iframe 
Redirection 
This feature is used to check the HTML tag used to display 
additional web pages in the current website. A phisher will take 




This feature is used to check if the right-click function is 
disabled using the JavaScript so that users cannot save or view 
the web page’s source code. 
Using a pop-up 
window 
This feature is used to check if users were asked to submit their 
personal information through a pop-up window, which is 
unusual to find in a legitimate website. 
Server form 
handler (SHF) 
This feature is used to check if the domain name in server form 
handler is different from the domain name of the web page 
Website 
forwarding 
This feature is used to check how many times a website has a 
redirect, a legitimate site does one time, while phishing site 
repeats this more than four times. 
The link in 
Script & Meta 
This feature is used to check that the tag on the website is 
linked to the same domain of the web page. 
Layout 
similarity 
This feature is used to check the percentage of the layout 
similarity of the web page. 
Style similarity 
This feature is used to check the percentage of the style 
similarity of the web page. 
 
Image Features Approach 
Favicon 
This feature is used to check the icon associated with a 
particular web page and check if the icon is loaded from a 
domain other than that is shown in the address bar. 
Image size 
This feature is used to check the size of the images on the 
website 
Alternative text 
This feature is used to check with some level percentage if the 





This feature is used to check if JavaScript is used to show a 
fake URL in the status bar to users. 
Login form 
This feature is used to check if there is an obstructive login form 
on the website 
 
Appendix B: Source Code from MATLAB AppDesign for the Validation 
Toolbar 
We show some important code use to develop our model testing interface for deep 
learning. The application uses the interface to validate the phishing website in our 
system implementation. 
classdef PhishDect < matlab.apps.AppBase 
% Properties that correspond to app components 









properties (Access = public) 
input = 'link.Value'; 
end 
methods (Access = private) 
% Button pushed function: Check 
function CheckPushed(app, event) 
load phishfin; 
app.input = app.link.Value; 
app.input = lower(app.input); 




enc = wordEncoding(documentsNew); 
app.input1 = doc2sequence(enc,documentsNew,'Length',75); 
app.output = phishfin(input1); 
app.output.Label = classify(app.phishfin,app.input1); 
[app.input string(app.output.Label)]; 
[app.output string(app.input1)]; 
app.output.color = app.output.label; 
if (app.output.label == 'phishing') 
app.output.colour = [1.00,0.00,0.00]; 
elseif(app.output.label == 'suspicious') 
179 
app.output.colour = [1.00,1.00,0.00]; 
else 




% App initialization and construction 
methods (Access = private) 
% Create UIFigure and components 
function createComponents(app) 
% Create UIFigure 
app.UIFigure = uifigure; 
app.UIFigure.Position = [100 100 186 344]; 
app.UIFigure.Name = 'UI Figure'; 
% Create PhishDectPanel 
app.PhishDectPanel = uipanel(app.UIFigure); 
app.PhishDectPanel.Title = 'PhishDect'; 




% Create Check 
app.Check = uibutton(app.PhishDectPanel, 'push'); 
app.Check.ButtonPushedFcn = createCallbackFcn(app, @CheckPushed, true); 
app.Check.Position = [65 200 67 22]; 
app.Check.Text = 'Check'; 
% Create Label 
app.Label = uilabel(app.PhishDectPanel); 
app.Label.HorizontalAlignment = 'right'; 
app.Label.Position = [65 159 25 22]; 
app.Label.Text = ''; 
% Create output 
app.output = uilamp(app.PhishDectPanel); 
app.output.Position = [112 161 20 20]; 
% Create urlEditFieldLabel 
app.urlEditFieldLabel = uilabel(app.PhishDectPanel); 
app.urlEditFieldLabel.HorizontalAlignment = 'right'; 
app.urlEditFieldLabel.Position = [7 233 25 22]; 
app.urlEditFieldLabel.Text = 'url'; 
% Create link 
app.link = uieditfield(app.PhishDectPanel, 'text'); 




methods (Access = public) 
% Construct app 
function app = PhishDect 





% Register the app with App Designer 
registerApp(app, app.UIFigure) 




% Code that executes before app deletion 
function delete(app) 





Appendix C: Features Extraction Code 
static void extractFeatures(String URL) 
        { 
            int[] featureVector = new int[15]; 
            //feature 1 URL has ip address 
                        string domainName = 
extractDomainName("C:\\Users\\ResearchPC\\Documents\\extract_domain.py", 
URL); 
            //Regex ip = new Regex(@"\b\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\b"); 
            //MatchCollection result = ip.Matches(domainName); 
            Console.WriteLine(domainName); 
            domainName.TrimEnd('\r', '\n'); 
            //IPAddress ipAddress; 
            //bool result = IPAddress.TryParse(domainName.Trim(), out ipAddress); 
            //Console.WriteLine(result); 




                featureVector[0] = -1; 
            else 
                featureVector[0] = 1; 
            Console.WriteLine(featureVector[0]); 
            // Console.WriteLine(parse(domainName)); 
            //feature 2 Long URL 
            if (URL.Length < 54) 
                featureVector[1] = 1; 
            else if (URL.Length >= 54 && URL.Length <= 75) 
                featureVector[1] = 0; 
            else 
                featureVector[1] = -1; 
            //feature 3 tinyURL 
            //see later easy to do extract domains from hrefs in page http://bit.do/list-of-
url-shorteners.php 
            //feature 4 @ Symbol 
            if (URL.Contains("@")) 
                featureVector[2] = -1; 
            else 
                featureVector[2] = 1; 
            //feature 5 // after 7th position 
            if (URL.LastIndexOf("//") > 7) 
                featureVector[3] = -1; 
            else 
                featureVector[3] = 1; 
  //feature 6 - in domain 
            if (domainName.Contains('-')) 
                featureVector[4] = -1; 
            else 




            //feature 7 dots in domain part 
            string getSubDomainDomain = 
extractDomainName("C:\\Users\\ResearchPC\\Documents\\extract_domain1.py", 
URL); 
            getSubDomainDomain.Trim(); 
            string[] temparr = getSubDomainDomain.Trim().Split(' '); 
            int dotsCount1 = 0; 
            try 
            { 
                string subdomain = temparr[1]; 
                dotsCount1 = temparr[1].Split('.').Length - 1; 
              }   
            catch (Exception e) { 
                Console.WriteLine("No subdomain found"); 
            } 
            int dotsCount = domainName.Trim().Split('.').Length - 1 + dotsCount1; 
            if (dotsCount == 1) 
                featureVector[5] = 1; 
            else if (dotsCount == 2) 
                featureVector[5] = 0; 
            else 
                featureVector[5] = -1; 
            //feature 8 use of https certificate issuer is ignored 
            if (!URL.Substring(0, 6).Contains("https")) 
                featureVector[6] = -1; 
            else 
                featureVector[6] = 1; 
            //feature 9 //domain registration length 
            whois.MyMethod(URL); 




            my_arr = whois.getArr(); 
            Console.WriteLine("Array: "); 
            for(int i = 0; i < my_arr.Length; i++) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine(my_arr[i]); 
            } 
            //System.IO.StreamReader reader = new 
System.IO.StreamReader(@"C:\imp.txt"); 
            int i1 = 0; 
            while (i1 < 3)  
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("I am here"); 
                string line = my_arr[i1]; 
                string[] arr = line.Split('-'); 
                if (i1 == 2) 
                { 
                    //string[] arr1 = arr[1].Trim().Split('-'); 
                    int year = Int32.Parse(arr[0].Trim()); 
                    //int month = Int32.Parse(arr1[1]); 
                    int currentYear = 2016; 
                    //int currentMonth = 5; 
                    Console.WriteLine("Year: " + year); 
                    if (currentYear - year <= 1) 
                        featureVector[7] = -1; 
                    else 
                        featureVector[7] = 1; 
              } 
                i1++; 




            //feature 10 favicon.ico http://stackoverflow.com/questions/5119041/how-can-
i-get-a-web-sites-favicon 
            //feature 11 not feasible 
            //12 https in domain part 
            if (domainName.Contains("https") || getSubDomainDomain.Contains("https")) 
                featureVector[8] = -1; 
            else 
                featureVector[8] = 1; 
            //13 Request URL 
            IWebDriver webDriver = new 
ChromeDriver("C:\\Users\\ResearchPC\\Selenium Drivers"); 
            
webDriver.Manage().Timeouts().SetPageLoadTimeout(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(180
)); 
            
webDriver.Manage().Timeouts().ImplicitlyWait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(180)); 
            webDriver.Navigate().GoToUrl(URL); 
            Console.WriteLine("SRC:\n"); 
            int srcCount = 0; 
            int legalSrc = 0; 
            int illegalSrc = 0; 
            double legalPercentage = 0.0; 
            double illegalpercentage = 0.0; 
            try 
            { 
                ReadOnlyCollection<IWebElement> links = 
webDriver.FindElements(By.XPath("//*[@src]")); 
                //ReadOnlyCollection<IWebElement> links = 
webDriver.FindElements(By.Name("src")); 
                foreach (IWebElement webElement in links) 
                { 




                    string attributeURL = link; 
                    Console.WriteLine(attributeURL); 
                    string domain1 = 
extractDomainName("C:\\Users\\ResearchPC\\Documents\\extract_domain.py", 
attributeURL); 
                    if (!domain1.Contains(domainName))  
                        illegalSrc++; 
                    else 
                        legalSrc++; 
                    srcCount++; 
                } 
                //Please take a look at code below 
                if (srcCount != 0) 
                { 
                    illegalpercentage = 100 * illegalSrc / srcCount; 
                    if (illegalpercentage < 22.0) 
                        featureVector[9] = 1; 
                    else if (illegalpercentage >= 22.0 && illegalpercentage <= 61.0) 
                        featureVector[9] = 0; 
                    else 
                        featureVector[9] = -1; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    featureVector[9] = 1; 
                } 
            } 
            catch (Exception exception) { Console.WriteLine(exception.Message); } 
            int hrefCount = 0; 




            int illegalHref = 0; 
            double legalPercentageH = 0.0; 
            double illegalpercentageH = 0.0; 
            Console.WriteLine("HREF:\n"); 
            try 
            { 
                ReadOnlyCollection<IWebElement> links = 
webDriver.FindElements(By.XPath("//*[@href]")); 
                //ReadOnlyCollection<IWebElement> links = 
webDriver.FindElements(By.Name("src")); 
                foreach (IWebElement webElement in links) 
                { 
                    string link = webElement.GetAttribute("href"); 
                    string attributeURL = link; 
                    Console.WriteLine(attributeURL); 
                    string domain1 = 
extractDomainName("C:\\Users\\ResearchPC\\Documents\\extract_domain.py", 
attributeURL); 
                    if (!domain1.Contains(domainName))  
                        illegalHref++; 
                    else 
                        legalHref++; 
                    hrefCount++; 
                } 
                if (hrefCount != 0) 
                { 
                    illegalpercentageH = 100 * illegalHref / hrefCount; 
                    if (illegalpercentageH < 31.0) 
                        featureVector[10] = 1; 
                    else if (illegalpercentageH >= 31.0 && illegalpercentageH <= 67.0) 




                    else 
                        featureVector[10] = -1; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    featureVector[10] = 1; 
                } 
            } 
            catch (Exception exception) { Console.WriteLine(exception.Message); } 
            //string  [] data = whois.Instantiate(URL.Trim()); 
            Console.WriteLine("Illegal Src Percentage: " + illegalpercentage + " Illegal 
src: "+ illegalSrc + " Total src: " + srcCount); 
            Console.WriteLine("Illegal Href Percentage: " + illegalpercentageH + " Illegal 
href: " + illegalHref + " Total href: " + hrefCount); 
            //feature 12 meta link script 
            //meta 
            int metaCounter = 0; 
            int metaIllegal=  0; 
            try 
            { 
                ReadOnlyCollection<IWebElement> metaTags = 
webDriver.FindElements(By.TagName("meta")); 
                foreach (IWebElement metatag in metaTags) 
                { 
                    int startIndex = 0; 
                    string content = metatag.GetAttribute("content"); 
                    if (content.Contains("http") || content.Contains("http")) 
                    { 
                        if (!content.Contains(domainName)) 
                            metaIllegal++; 




                    metaCounter++; 
                } 
            } 
            catch (Exception e3) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine(e3.Message); 
            } 
            //Link 
            int linkCounter = 0; 
            int illegalLink = 0; 
            try 
            { 
                ReadOnlyCollection<IWebElement> linkTags = 
webDriver.FindElements(By.TagName("link")); 
                Console.WriteLine("In Link: "); 
                foreach (IWebElement linktag in linkTags) 
                { 
               //int startIndex = 0; 
                    string contentURL = linktag.GetAttribute("href"); 
                    Console.WriteLine(contentURL); 
                    string domainLink = 
extractDomainName("C:\\Users\\ResearchPC\\Documents\\extract_domain.py", 
contentURL); 
                    if (!domainLink.Contains(domainName)) 
                        illegalLink++; 
                    linkCounter++; 
                } 
            } 
            catch (Exception e3) 
            { 




            } 
            int scriptCounter = 0; 
            int illegalScript = 0; 
            try 
            { 
                ReadOnlyCollection<IWebElement> scriptTags = 
webDriver.FindElements(By.TagName("script")); 
                Console.WriteLine("In Script"); 
                foreach (IWebElement scripttag in scriptTags) 
                { 
                    //int startIndex = 0; 
                    string contentURL = null; 
                    contentURL = scripttag.GetAttribute("src"); 
                    contentURL.Trim(); 
                    if(contentURL != null) 
                        Console.WriteLine("ContentURL: " + contentURL); 
                    string domainLink = ""; 
                    if (contentURL != "" || contentURL!= null) 
                    { 
                        domainLink = 
extractDomainName("C:\\Users\\Rushikesh.Dharmadhik\\Documents\\extract_domai
n2.py", contentURL); 
                        Console.WriteLine("DomainLink: " + domainLink); 
                        if(domainLink.Trim() != "Exception") 
                            if (!domainLink.Contains(domainName)) 
                                illegalScript++; 
                    } 
                    scriptCounter++; 
                } 
            } 




            { 
                Console.WriteLine(e3.Message); 
            } 
            int totalLinkMetaScript = linkCounter + metaCounter + scriptCounter; 
            int totalIllegal = illegalLink + metaIllegal + illegalScript; 
            double illegalPercentageLinkMetaScript = 0.0; 
            if (totalLinkMetaScript != 0) 
                illegalPercentageLinkMetaScript = totalIllegal * 100 / totalLinkMetaScript; 
            Console.WriteLine("Total Link, Meta, Script: " + totalLinkMetaScript + " Illegal: 
" + totalIllegal + " "  + illegalPercentageLinkMetaScript); 
            if (illegalPercentageLinkMetaScript < 17.0) 
                featureVector[11] = 1; 
            else if (illegalPercentageLinkMetaScript >= 17.0 && 
illegalPercentageLinkMetaScript <= 81.0) 
                featureVector[11] = 0; 
            else 
                featureVector[11] = -1; 
            try 
            { 
                ReadOnlyCollection<IWebElement> formTags = 
webDriver.FindElements(By.TagName("form")); 
                foreach(IWebElement formElement in formTags) 
                { 
                    string action = formElement.GetAttribute("action"); 
                    if (action.Contains("about:blank")) 
                    { 
                        featureVector[12] = -1; 
                        break; 
                    } 
                    else if (action.Contains("http") || action.Contains("https")) 




                        if (!action.Contains(domainName)) 
                            featureVector[12] = 0; 
                        break; 
                    } 
                    else 
                        featureVector[12] = 1; 
                   } 
            } 
            catch(Exception e6) { Console.WriteLine(e6.Message); 
                featureVector[12] = 1; 
            } 
            //Console.WriteLine("Data: "); 
            //for (int i = 0; i < data.Length; i++) 
            //  Console.WriteLine(data[i]); 
            //feature 14 mail mailto doesnt seem promising 
            //directly iFrame 
            int counterIframes = 0; 
            try 
            { 
                ReadOnlyCollection<IWebElement> iframeTags = 
webDriver.FindElements(By.TagName("iframe")); 
                foreach (IWebElement iframetag in iframeTags) 
                { 
                    int startIndex = 0; 
                    string src = iframetag.GetAttribute("src"); 
                    if (src.Contains("http") || src.Contains("https")) 
                    { 
                        if (!src.Contains(domainName)) 
                            featureVector[13] = -1; 




                            featureVector[13] = 1; 
                    } 
                    else 
                        featureVector[13] = 1; 
                } 
            } 
            catch (Exception exception5) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine(exception5.Message); 
                featureVector[13] = 1; 
            } 
            //feature age of domain 
            string line1 = my_arr[0]; 
            string[] arr1 = line1.Split('-'); 
                          //string[] arr1 = arr[1].Trim().Split('-'); 
                int year1 = Int32.Parse(arr1[0].Trim()); 
                int month = Int32.Parse(arr1[1].Trim()); 
                int currentYear1 = 2016; 
                int currentMonth = 5; 
            Console.WriteLine("In domain age: "); 
                Console.WriteLine("Year: " + year1); 
            Console.WriteLine("Month: " + month); 
            int differenceyear = currentYear1 - year1; 
            int differencemonth = currentMonth - month; 
            int differencemonth1 = differenceyear * 12 + differencemonth; 
            if (differencemonth1 >= 6) 
                featureVector[14] = 1; 
            else 




            Console.WriteLine("Features: "); 
            for (int i = 0; i < featureVector.Length; i++) 
                Console.WriteLine(featureVector[i]); 
            //Console.WriteLine("FeatureVector:\n" + featureVector.ToString()); 
            Console.Read(); 
        } 
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Appendix D: Phishing Website Validation  
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Appendix E: Suspicious Website Validation 
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Appendix F: Legitimate Website Validation  
                                             
 
 
                                            
 
 
